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NOTICE TO READERS: All material in this volume previously disseminated in electronic form.

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Berisha on Problems With Greece, FYROM Vote

95P20124A Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 11 Oct 94 pp 1, 2

[Unattributed article: "News Conference of the President of the Republic, Sali Berisha"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [P. B., BASHKIMI] What do you think about the elections in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, FYROM] and the participation of Albanians?

[Berisha] I would like, once again, to urge the Albanians to take part in the elections. Their registration and participation in the elections are especially important for them, for the consolidation of their rights and for the stability of Macedonia. Withdrawal from the election process and from a free vote does not serve the freedom and rights of Albanians there or even the stability of Macedonia, which is very important for Albanians. I hope that the Albanians will have wisdom and vote for their best candidates. In politics, self-sentencing is the same as sentencing; therefore, it not a very good idea to accept it. [passage omitted]

[Xh. Shehu, Voice of America] What is your opinion of the demand made by the Greek Government spokesman for the release of the five ethnic Greek Albanian citizens and their extradition from Albania?

[Berisha] Such a demand is completely unacceptable because a democratic country cannot engage in the trading of its citizens. However, I would like to assure the five ethnic Greek Albanian citizens who are in prison, and all emprisoned Albanians, that they are, and will remain, citizens of this country; and, though they may be in prison today, they have the rights stipulated by the law, while tomorrow they will be free citizens in a free country. Brezhnevian practices will never be applied in Albania

In regard to the tract published in the PASOK newspaper ELEFTEROPIA, this development illustrates exactly what we have said: the fact that the commandos came from Greece and then returned to Greece. On the other hand, however, I must emphasize that there must be a series of serious investigations on the part of the Greek Government to identify those terrorists, whose act had such a great effect on Albanian-Greek relations. Their identification, capture and confrontation would be especially well-received by us.

[Xh. Shehu, Voice of America] Do you see any possibility that Albania might participate in peacekeeping forces?

[Berisha] Albania will examine the possibility of participation in UN [peacekeeping] activities, with a small unit. It could be in Haiti, but there is no doubt that this participation will be in accordance with the possibilities and the political will. The concrete possibilities are something else, which we will try to create. We will try to join the peacekeeping forces as soon as possible.

[Vjollca Vokshi, Albanian Television] There has been talk recently about the possibility of third-party mediation in Albanian-Greek relations. What do you think about this and who can play this role? What formula has Albania prepared if the Greeks set the pardoning of the five minority members as a condition for beginning the Albanian-Greek dialogue?

[Berisha] With regard to a mediator, I would like to stress, first of all, that we are ready for a direct two-party meeting. We put forth the alternative of a mediator as a possibility that might have been more acceptable to the Greek side. Who might this mediator be? It might be Germany and France, which head the EU [European Union]; it might be the United States; it might be UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali; it might be friendly countries, neighboring countries, Italy, Austria. We do not have any objections. We are open [to the ideas]. The Greek side has rejected some of these mediation efforts. It has rejected the UN secretary general and others as well, demanding a judgment and presenting unacceptable conditions with its demands. For Albania, the issue of a mediator is not such a disturbing problem. But Greece has its doubts. Albania will never accept the undermining of the sovereignty of its institutions. Apart from this, we agree to sit down at the conference table without any conditions, and to negotiate and talk. The issue of the sovereignty of the institutions is not up for discussion. No authority in Albania has the right to think that it can undermine this sovereignty.

[Zamira Koleci, Radio Tirana] Have you had pressure from the EC [as published] with regard to the trial of the five ethnic-Greek Albanian citizens? With which Greek Government have you reached an understanding?

[Berisha] There has been no pressure on Albania from the EU and its member countries. Let me tell you that there has been full understanding of the position of Albania and its policy, and I would like to thank them for this. We have aimed to reach an understanding with both governments. Relations have worsened during this period but I myself form my opinions independently of party affiliations and I am determined to respect any government that is elected by a free vote in neighboring countries.

[Ylli Rakipi, REPUBLIKA] The Greek media have been carrying on a campaign of insults and invectives against the Albanian Government and against you personally. How do you think that this affects Albanian-Greek relations? Does Albania feel isolated as a result of Greece's attitude?

[Berisha] Coprolalia [obsessive or uncontrollable use of obscene language], the vocabulary of the ultranationalists, is typical of Zhirinovskiy. Other Zhirinoids in various countries also use it. Its purpose is to inflame fanatics, to win applause within the country. I think that they should not be esteemed and should not be taken into consideration. As for your second question, Albania regrets the crisis that Albanian-Greek relations are going through at a time when these relations could be much better and could be of assistance in the Balkans and beyond. Albania does not feel at all isolated, however, in the sense that, during this period, solidarity with Albania and understanding for Albania have increased. This was clearly evident in the visit of Italian Foreign Minister Martino to Albania, a visit that certainly began a new page in relations between our two countries; it was clearly evident in the visit of the German state secretary, who came for the purpose of expressing solidarity with Albania; and it is clearly evident in the great number of messages I have received from various heads of state. Therefore, it is absurd to think that Albania feels isolated. No one can think that. Greece has blocked ECU35 million [for Albania]. No, the matter of ECU35 million is not isolation. We can truly say that, because of a technicality, Greece can block the European Commission from giving Albania generous aid from European taxpayers, but this does not mean that Albania is in any way isolated from the member countries of the EU. These countries have been showing increased solidarity with Albania, and I am grateful for this solidarity. Therefore, it is not a matter of isolation. Certainly, it is unfortunate that relations with our neighbor are in a state of crisis.

[Merita Dhimgjoka, Associated Press] Mr. President, what do you think will be the future of the head of the Albanian Orthodox Church in Albania after the Constitution enters into effect? I am referring to the article that says that the heads of the religious faiths must be Albanian citizens and must have lived in Albania for 20 years.

[Berisha] The Constitution will go into effect the day after it is approved. As he himself has repeatedly stated, his excellency [Archbishop Anastas Janullatos] has been and still is, temporarily, at the head of the Albanian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. I myself have had, and still have, high regard for the work he has done. The procedural problems arising after the Constitution goes into effect are issues that are more in the province of the church—which, here in Albania, is separate from the state.

Albanians, Greeks Argue Over Cameria at UN

AU0611192994 Tirana LAJMI I DITES in Albanian 20 Sep 94 p 1

[Report by A. Milo: "Two Questions from Minister Alfred Serreqi"]

[FBIS Translated Text] In his speech at the 49th session of the United Nations, Albanian Foreign Minister Alfred Serreqi asked the Greek government: "How could the Turkish, Macedonian, and Albanian national minorities in Greece disappear at the stroke of a pen? How can the Greek government forget the 1944-1945 massacres of the Albanian population of Cameria, when men and women were killed by chauvinist Greek nationalists? Those who remained alive were deported to Albania and Turkey—which provoked a real tragedy by separating families—while their lands and homes were usurped by Greek colonists who have kept them ever since, contrary to international civil law."

In reply to Mr. Serreqi, the representative of the Greek delegation accused the Cams [ethnic Albanians in Greece] of having "actively collaborated with the Axis powers during the occupation of Greece."

The Albanian delegation replied by pointing out: "It is a pity that the Greek government still continues to distort the truth about the large Albanian minority in Greece, who have been living on their own lands for centuries. The allegation that the Cams were Nazi collaborators is nothing but an attempt to justify the 1944-45 massacres of the Cam population, when many of the Cams who were ejected by force sought refuge in Albania. They were never permitted, by either the Greek authorities of that time or the present Greek government, to get their property back."

In his reply, the Greek representative did not give any explanation as to why the existence of the Albanian minority in Greece was denied. "I would recommend that he at least take a look at the May 1994 report by the British Helsinki Human Rights Group on the situation of the Albanian, Macedonian, and Turkish minorities in Greece, so that he understands how far behind Albania Greece is in honoring the obligations stemming from international documents on minority rights."

Three Constitutional Court Members Resign

AU0611181494 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 4 Nov 94 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Three Members of the Constitutional Court Resign"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Three days before Sunday's [6 November] referendum, three members of the Constitutional Court—Ylvi Myrtia, Natasha Sheshi, and Thimjo Kondi—tendered their resignations, thus upsetting the balance of the court, whose job it is to defend constitutional order in Albania. They accuse the court of ignoring the request by the Socialist Party and the Social-Democratic Party to declare the Law on Referendums unconstitutional. The charge against Rustem Gjata, chairman of the Constitutional Court, is a serious one. According to the three court members, the chairman ignored the request of the two parliamentary parties on the pretext of a visit to Bulgaria. The three judges will in any case tender their resignations, because, if the constitution is approved, its section on the Constitutional Court would make the court's work impossible. This section puts the Constitutional Court under the control of the president, who after 7 November will very quickly fill the court's vacant seats. The president must have candidates ready. The decisions of the Constitutional Court, heretofore made with a minimal majority of one vote, will then be made with nine vote, all under the president's control. Thus, with the help of nine votes, the president will be able to overturn any decision by parliament.

CE Delegation To Observe Referendum Voting

AU0511214894 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 5 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] A Council of Europe [CE] delegation that has arrived in our country to observe the referendum on the draft constitution, as well as to compile the final report on Albania's admission to the Council of Europe, was received today at the Foreign Ministry by Deputy Foreign Minister Arian Starova and ministry directors.

The delegation is composed of Kelchermans, rapporteur of the Foreign Affairs Commission; Columberg, rapporteur of the Commission for Judicial Affairs and Human Rights; and Hartland, secretary of the Foreign Affairs Commission and adviser of the clerk's office of the parliamentary assembly of the Council of Europe.

Official Foreign Ministry sources report that the discussion focused on the referendum on the draft constitution and on Albania's relations with its neighbors.

We are happy to note that Albania has scored great achievements in the sphere of democratic processes, the law-governed state, and the economy, Columberg stated. We have always hoped that you would have a constitution and now we hope this will become a reality. The decision to hold a referendum has affected positively the situation as regards Albania's membership into the Council of Europe.

The constitution is extremely important for Albania's admission into the Council of Europe, Rapporteur Kelchermans said at the meeting. We have come here to observe the results of the referendum and we hope to celebrate its success together on Monday [7 November].

After talking about their work as rapporteurs and the draft of the final report, the members of the Council of Europe delegation showed particular interest in the situation in Kosova and our country's relations with neighboring countries.

After a briefing by Deputy Foreign Minister Arian Starova, they assessed Albania's foreign policy in the region to be a factor of peace and stability.

Party Official Reportedly 'Stabbed to Death'

AU0611183094 Paris AFP in English 1828 GMT 6 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, Nov 6 (AFP)—An official of the ruling Albanian Democratic Party was stabbed to death at a polling station by two opposition militants during Sunday's referendum on the constitution, a party spokesman told AFP.

The victim, Mark Gjin Prenga, was an observer for his party at the polling station in Vig in the northwest. He was stabbed to death by two brothers from the Socialist Party (formerly communist), which is the main opposition grouping, said spokesman Alfred Luleta by telephone.

'Irregularities' Mar Voting

AU0611213494 Paris AFP in English 2116 GMT 6 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Tirana, Nov 6 (AFP)—Albanian voters largely ignored calls by the opposition to a boycott, turning out to cast their ballots Sunday in a constitutional referendum that was soured by the murder of an election monitor.

Polls closed at 1900 GMT. Central electoral commission member Njazi Kosovlasti told AFP that the latest estimates four hours before the closing of the polls, said that two-thirds of the 1.9 million registered voters had cast their ballots. Results were not expected before Tuesday.

The voting was marred when an official of the ruling Albanian Democratic Party (DP) was stabbed to death at a polling station by two opposition militants. The victim, Mark Gjin Prenga, was an observer for his party at a polling station in Vig near Shkodra in the northwest. He was stabbed to death at mid-morning, DP spokesman Alfred Luleta said—allegedly by brothers Tonin and Pjetr Vlashi from the Socialist Party (formerly communist), the main opposition grouping. "It was a political assassination," Luleta said.

Several other incidents were reported. A DP spokesman said another DP official had been shot and wounded by a Socialist supporter at Lushuje, 60 kilometres (36 miles) south of here, although no official confirmation was available.

Socialist Party officials also said there had been "several irregularities" in the voting, and accused the government of exerting "psychological pressure" on voters, some of whom they charged had been encouraged by police to vote yes.

The referendum, the first in the nation's history, was the first major test for President Sali Berisha and his party since it came to power in April 1992.

Meanwhile, Greece has warned Albania against any "provocation" of Albania's Orthodox Church community. Article 7 of the draft threatens to remove from office Albania's Orthodox archbishop, Monsignor Anastassios.

A Greek national, the 65-year-old archbishop faces having to step down, since the article states that only an Albanian national having lived in the country for 20 years can hold the position. The archbishop's enforced departure would further addle relations between Greece and Albania, relations that are already at a low ebb over the rights of their respective minorities. [passage omitted]

Referendum 'Proceeding Normally'

AU0611151394 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 6 Nov 94

[Report by Zamira Koleci]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Announcer] At 0800 this morning, polling stations opened throughout the country for the voting on the referendum regarding the draft constitution. The Central Election Commission [KQV] reports that over 4,600 polling stations have been opened, and the number of registered voters is approximately 1.9 million. Information received so far confirms that voting is proceeding normally.

At 0930 today, Sali Berisha, president of the Republic of Albania, voted at Polling Station No. 3 in Tirana's ninth district.

[Koleci] Accompanied by his wife, this morning President Berisha voted at Administrative District No. 9, Constituency 9, Polling Station No. 3. The polling station is set up in the halls of Jeronim De Rada School, near the president's house. He came here accompanied by citizens who live nearby.

Berisha was received by Tirana Mayor Sali Kelmendi and other local government leaders at the entrance to the school. He then greeted members of the commission at the polling station.

Inserting his voting slip in the presence of reporters, Berisha said:

[Begin Berisha recording] Today, we, the Albanian people, are [word indistinct] in the greatest act of creation in our history. The verdict, will, and ideals of free Albanian people will triumph in Albania today. This is a great day, a successful day, a blessed day in the history of our nation. [end recording] [passage omitted]

Today, Pjeter Arbnori, chairman of the presidency of the People's Assembly, and Prime Minister Meksi voted at Administrative District No. 5, Constituency 5, Polling Station No. 7.

Voter Turnout 74 Percent of Registered Voters

AU0611220094 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 2100 GMT 6 Nov 94

[Report by Arben Karapici from the Palace of Congresses in Tirana—live]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Karapici] Information available to the Central Election Commission [KQV] shows heavy voter participation in the referendum for the first constitution of the new Albanian democratic state. The KQV in Tirana is providing figures that are still changing. A total of 74 percent of voters have participated in this nationwide referendum, thus having their say on the fundamental document of the Albanian law-governed state. Mr. Eduard Prodani, a KQV member, will brief you on the current situation:

[Prodani] Good Evening! The information at the disposal of the KQV on the referendum on the draft constitution of the Republic of Albania is as follows:

Percentage of Registered Voters Who Voted

Berat	73
Bulqize	90
Delvine	67
Devoll	75
Diber	74
Durres	85
Elbasan	74
Fier	65
Gramsh	68
Gjirokaster	66.2
Has	77.7
Kavaje	95.2
Kolonje	68
Korce	80
Kruje	74
Kucove	75
Kukes	69
Lac	77
Lezhe	83
Librazhd	85
Lushnje	67
Malesi e Madhe	75
Mallakaster	75
Mat	about 70
Mirdite	73.5
Peqin	83
Permet	64.75
Pogradec	71
Puke	75
Sarande	78
Skrapar	62
Shkoder	70
Tepelene	51.2
Tirana	72.5 (in the district)
Tropoje	82
Vlore	70

We should add that half an hour ago, we received a report from Tirana Municipality stating that 72 percent of registered voters have voted in Tirana. This is still changing information, collected by the KQV's secretarial office in direct communication via telephone with district election commissions.

On the basis of the aforementioned results, it turns out that, as you said, about 74 percent of the registered voters have participated in the voting.

[Karapici] Thank you. Mr. Prodani.

KQV Member Provides Voter Turnout Figures

AU0611161694 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1330 GMT 6 Nov 94

[Interview with Njazi Kosovrasti, member of the Central Election Commission, by Rezear Xhaxhiu in Tirana—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Kosovrasti] The KQV [Central Election Commission] for the referendum to approve the draft constitution continues to maintain contact with all the districts throughout the country. It appears that the commissions have come to know the procedures well, as this is the fourth time voting has been held in Albania following the victory of democracy. We have received very few complaints here at the center. Obviously, any concerns that may have arisen have certainly been aired by the commissions of municipalities, communes, or districts. The information received by the district councils—not completely accurate, as the information is constantly coming in—presents the following situation:

More than 60 percent of voters have voted in Bulqize, more than 60 percent in Elbasan, over 74 percent in Kavaje, over 70 percent in Lac, over 70 percent in Lezhe, over 91 percent in Permet, and 66 percent in Tropoje. We are still expecting information from other districts that have not yet confirmed the number of people at the polls.

[Xhaxhiu] You can consider them districts with leading participation in the polls. Are there any districts that are somewhat....[pauses]

[Kosovrasti] We can mention some districts where voting has not reached the figures I just mentioned. For example, according to the information received, 41 percent have voted in Kucova. A report from Librazhd states that the number of voters amounted to 35 percent. As for other districts, the information remains the same as at 1400, as we did not receive a report from them at 1100. [passage omitted]

[Xhaxhiu] This is the most recent information from the KQV. We expect more information and will keep you abreast of developments.

AD Leaders Explain Call To Boycott Referendum

AU0611181394 Lezhe KOHA JONE in Albanian 4 Nov 94 p 2

[A.B. report on Democratic Alliance rally in Tirana on 3 November: "This Campaign Attempts To Collectivize Conscience"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Democratic Alliance [AD] held a rally in the Asllan Rusi Sports Palace in Tirana yesterday at which leaders Ceka, Zogaj, Imami, and Teta put forward their party's views on the referendum of 6 November. Yesterday's rally coincided with the second anniversary of the founding of the AD. Blendi Gonxhe opened the rally and then gave the floor to party chairman Neritan Ceka. Ceka once again emphasized the AD's familiar stand on a boycott of the referendum. The AD chairman considered a boycott to be the most legitimate way of sending the draft constitution back to parliament. "This referendum is a coup d'etat, a fascist act that attemtps to turn the shouts of the crowd against legitimacy," Ceka said. "What is missing in Albania today is the state." Ceka said that the referendum is a covert attempt to establish personal power, and that it seriously jeopardizes freedom. "The referendum is a challenge to our political conscience," Ceka said. Ceka emphasized the danger of a polarization of the electorate as a result of the campaigns of both the Democratic and Socialist parties. Pursuing this argument, the AD chairman stressed that "this is an attempt to collectivize conscience." Without going into detail, Ceka also said that several articles in the constitution imperil the freedom won on 22 March [election day in 1992].

Arben Imami, another AD leader, spoke of the shortcomings of the submitted draft constitution. He did a short review of the constitution, dwelling on specific articles. "We are going through the most difficult time since February 1991, when Ramiz Alia attempted to carry out a coup d'etat," Imami said. He considered the campaign mounted by President Berisha to be hysterical and without the slightest logical basis. Imami then dwelt on specific articles. He first addressed the article on arrest, according to which one may be arrested "on the basis of sufficient information." Imami considered this article dangerous to every citizen and every politician, because it establishes that a person under arrest loses his electoral rights. However, for Imami, the gratest danger of this draft constitution lies in the failure to establish a clear separation of powers. Imami then spoke about the prerogatives of the presidents of different countries, and made clear to the audience that the prerogatives of the Albanian president significantly exceed those of others. Imami especially dwelt on the president's right to declare a state of emergency. Continuing his comparisons with other presidents in other countries, Imami added, "Besides, with the president we have, I have no guarantees." Referring to the way in which this draft constitution is being approved, Imami said that this referendum might be compared with that announced by the dictator Pinochet. Imami called on the Albanian electorate to turn 6 November into a day of political strike. "Berisha is trying to create a state of caves, law codes [kanune], and ciftelis [Albanian folk instrument of northern Albania]," Imami said.

Mr. Perikil Teta, former defense minister in the Stability Government and a member of the AD presidium, then denounced the electoral campaign of the president and the Democratic Party conducted with the state's leks and gasoline. Teta also expressed pity for those intellectuals and specialists "who have formed lines in the offices of their yokel bosses, to sign up for the constitution." Berisha has gone so far as to say that anyone against the constitution is against the flag, Teta said. Like the others who spoke before him, Teta expressed the view that a boycott is the most legitimate and honest response.

Prec Zogaj dwelt on the same problems, stressing that "Berisha wants this constitution only in order to extend his personal power." Zogaj told the audience that the AD is seeking to fill the gap at the center of the Albanian political map.

At the end of the rally, AD leaders replied to questions from the audience. In reply to one question, Ceka said that Berisha is preparing for the ominous year of 1996. Ceka warned Kosovar leaders Demaci and Rugova, who have spoken out in favor of the illegal referendum, that "Albania belongs to the Kosovars too, but the leaders of Kosova should first resolve their problems at home." In connection with the danger of rigging the referendum, Perikli Teta quoted an expression by Stalin, who used to say, "Let the people vote however they want; we count the votes."

AD Issues Appeal To Reject Draft Constitution

AU0611181294 Tirana ALEANCA in Albanian 3 Nov 94 p 1

["Appeal Addressed to Democratic Party Members and Supporters" by the Democratic Alliance, AD, in Tirana on 2 November: "The Democratic Alliance Addresses Its Comrades-in-Arms Who Overthrew the Dictatorship"]

[FBIS Translated Text] To all who took part in the democratic movement of December 1990;

To all who from the very start unreservedly supported the struggle against totalitarianism and the communist bigwigs:

To all who boldly joined the Democratic Party [PD], heedless of the regime's violence and threats of that time.

To all who, for the sake of a European, democratic, and humane Albania, rose up to free the country from the beliefs of communism, from the Politburo's personal power, and from many years of isolation:

We issue this call to say "no" to the referendum of 6 November and "no" to the personal power of an individual.

Brothers and sisters, friends from times of trial, democrats!

We all rose up together in December [1990] for a just state, a state with democratic laws. The president has violated Articles 15, 16, and 43 of the constitutional law!

We all rose up together against the cult of the individual, against the personal rule of one man, and against ruling clans and nepotism. The draft constitution sanctions the personal power of the president, making him master of everything in Albania.

We all rose up in favor of a parliamentary republic. The draft constitution sanctions, de facto, a presidential republic.

We all rose up in favor of the separation of powers. The draft constitution makes all the powers totally dependent on the president.

We all rose up for the independence of the judiciary as the sole genuine guarantee for human rights and freedoms. The draft constitution puts justice under the diktat of the political wing.

We all rose up in favor of the independence of local government. The draft constitution does not guarantee this.

We all rose up in favor of the sanctity of private property. The draft constitution leaves this matter unsettled.

This is not the draft constitution of our December ideals. It is a draft constitution of political opportunism in favor of personal power that leaves the state without firm foundations. This is why the notion of "belated democrats"—referring to the filling of state posts with perennial toadies—has become current in the last few days.

However, we did not all fight together in order to transfer power from the hands of one man into those of another. We did not struggle for the personal rule of one person, regardless of who he may be. Presidents change, and this draft constitution will pose a perpetual danger for pluralist democracy in Albania and for our sacred ideal of genuine pluralism.

Brothers and sisters, comrades-in-arms of December!

Read the draft, and think and reflect in silence. Think about the future of democracy and say "no" to the referendum and "no" to this draft. We guarantee that, with your help, a different and much more democratic draft will immediately be submitted to the parliament and the people.

Saudi Islamic Affairs Minister Visiting Albania

LD0511235494 Riyadh Saudi Arabian Kingdom Radio Network in Arabic 2230 GMT 5 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Dr. 'Abdallah Bin- 'Abd-al Muhsin al- Turki, [Saudi] minister of Islamic affairs, endowment, call and guidance, arrived in Tirana today on a visit to the Albanian Republic within a tour of the Balkan states. [passage omitted]

The minister of Islamic affairs, endowment, call and guidance, had a meeting with the Albanian minister of education, Joseph Yanhu [as received]. The Albanian minister of education praised the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's aid to the Albanian Republic in all fields, particularly education through the grants offered by the kingdom to Albanian students to complete their studies at the kingdom's schools and universities. [passage omitted]

Meets With Muslim Officials

LD0611204794 Riyadh SPA in English 1948 GMT 6 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, Nov 6, SPA—Dr. Abdallah Bin- 'Abd-al-Muhsin al-Turki, the Saudi minister of Islamic affairs, endowments, propagation and guidance held a meeting here today with the officials of the Islamic groups and minorities in East Europe and Balkan region.

Addressing the meeting, Dr. al-Turki emphasized the keenness of the government of custodian of the two holy mosques, King Fahd Bin- 'Abd-al- 'Aziz to promote communication with the officials of the Islamic communities and establishments in the entire world those of the East Europe and Balkan region in particular.

During the meeting, a number of issues pertaining to the Moslems of this part of the world were discussed.

PR Chairman Critical of Coalition, Corruption

AU0611192894 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 21 Oct 94 p 1

[Report by Fatos Baxhaku: "Godo—Corruption Everywhere. The Republican Party Makes Bitter Accusations at Its Congress"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—The Republican Party [PR] chairman himself was the first to launch a barrage of sharp criticism against the coalition created after the 1992 elections. At the same time, he complained bitterly about corruption. "The attitude toward us has been insulting.... It is up to the congress to decide whether we should stay on in the coalition or not.... There is no reason why we should take the blame for mistakes that are not ours." Upon hearing these words, the 600 delegates of the second PR congress rose to their feet to applaud Sabri Godo. His report, packed with criticism against the government and the majority coalition, lasted two hours—much longer than expected. In the gallery opposite, high-ranking leaders of other political parties—except the socialists, who were uninvited—listened to the PR's chairman.

Godo thus left to congress delegates the task of making serious decisions. Godo once again explicitly demanded that there be a biweekly roundtable for discussions on major problems, and consultations with the majority aimed at replacing those ministers who have not carried out their duty properly. He also asked that high-ranking state officials be prohibited from effecting partisan propaganda. "However," he added later, "we do not set any conditions." It seems the PR's latest attitude to the three-year-old coalition is characterized primarily by disagreements—now, in the wake of the congress, disagreements with the Democratic Party that are quite open—and differences between its program and that of the third member of the coalition—which now seems to be coming to an end: the left-wing Social Democrat Party.

"We do not want a typical Albanian democracy," Godo shouted in the conference hall of the Palace of Culture, following this with a critique of the present situation: "The government program is leaning more and more toward the left. The silence over the oil smuggling affair constitutes political arrogance and a disregard for public opinion." Godo also addressed the problem of corruption: "Corruption is accompanying the reform," he said. According to Godo, the privatization boards are full of members or devotees of the ruling party. "In this way, politically secure owners have sprung up," he added.

Prefects Criticize Law, Discuss Problems

AU0611181594 Tirana GAZETA SHQIPTARE in Albanian 25 Oct 94 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The Prefects Devoid of Power: 'We Demand Our Jurisdiction; The Law Must Be Improved'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—The prefectures are going through an identity crisis. Although several months have passed since the proclamation of these official state structures, the prefectures have not been able to find a proper place between the central and local state bodies. Now it is the prefects themselves, the government appointees, who are criticizing the law on prefectures—the very law that created them.

At a meeting in the conference hall of Durres prefecture, all Albania's prefects had the opportunity to submit their complaints about their lack of jurisdiction and about flaws in the existing law. It seems that it was the experience gained during a working visit to France that made the shortcomings of the prefecture mechanism in Albania clear to them. Speakers at the meeting described cases where the prefects could not take action because they had no jurisdiction.

Aside from the shortcomings in the law, the meeting also expressed concern at the absence of a precise definition of the institution of prefect, in relation not only to other local state bodies but also to the courts and the police. Also described as unacceptable was the lack of proper staffing for the prefectures. In this respect, the meeting underlined the urgent need for general secretaries of the prefectures to be appointed.

Finally, the prefects decided to put all their suggestions together in one document and then to bring up the problems and discuss their solution at a meeting with Prime Minister Meksi.

Leka Zogu Pays Secret Visit to Tirana

AU0611185694 Tirana KOMBI in Albanian 23 Oct 94 p 3

[Report by Ashik Shiku: "Why Did Leka Zogu Come to Albania and Did He Meet...?!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sources that do not wish to be identified report that within the past few days, Leka Zogu came illegally to Tirana. He had important meetings with the leaders of the ruling Democratic Party, deputies, leaders of two political parties, and.... According to the source, the reason for his secret visit, after being refused before, is that he and his supporters in Tirana are quite worried about the fact that the form of rule in Albania was not made the subject of referendum, and that the "royal throne," rather than being inherited by him, will be unjustly inherited by Berisha.

Deputy Defense Minister Summons Greek Envoy

AU0411174794 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Defense Ministry Press Center reports that in connection with the information regarding airspace violations by Greek aircraft over border regions of our territory, on 4 November Angel Manchev, deputy minister of defense, summoned Anostosios Sidheris, Greek ambassador to Bulgaria, and demanded an explanation.

Indzhova, Russian Ambassador Discuss Trade

AU0311171694 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Prime Minister Reneta Indzhova met with Russian Ambassador Aleksandr Avdeyev today. The need to preserve traditional relations in the sphere of the oil and gas industry was pointed out during the talks. The establishment of joint enterprises and the liberalization of the trade regime were also discussed.

DAR Leaders Meet Avdeyev

AU0411174994 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, the leaders of the Democratic Alternative for the Republic [DAR] Political Alliance met Russian Ambassador Aleksandr Avdeyev. Dr. Petur Dertliev, Aleksandur Tomov, Aleksandur Karakachanov, and Nikolay (?Guzev), representative of the Alternative Social Liberal Party, took part in the meeting.

After the meeting Ambassador Avdeyev told journalists that DAR is a coalition consisting of interesting political formations. During the meeting, he noted that the DAR leadership is unanimous in its intention to develop political dialogue and economic relations with Russia.

The DAR Press Center announced that on Monday, 7 November, the DAR leadership will meet U.S. Ambassador to Bulgaria William Montgomery.

National Police Director Batsarov Resigns

AU0311145294 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 3 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Police Press Center has announced that Colonel Ivan Batsarov, director of the national police, has resigned.

Sofia Police Step Up Fight Against Crime

AU0711144794 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 7 Nov 94

[Report by Lyubomir Rozenshtayn]

[FBIS Translated Text] On 4 and 5 November alone, the Sofia police detected the perpetrators of 196 crimes, the Sofia Directorate of Internal Affairs announced at a news briefing today. This incredible result was achieved following a reorganization of the duties of the Sofia police, who started work under the new system early on Friday morning. During the 24-hour duration of the operation, 55 crimes were recorded, representing only half the usual number. Police succeeded in recovering 25 stolen vehicles after checking 9,000 cars on the streets of Sofia and over 500 garages and parking places.

In addition, police officers inspected 56 security and protection firms, nine buildings guarded by private companies, and 19 stores of explosives, and checked 154 persons holding firearm licenses. They compiled 116 reports as a result of passport checks and detected 18 persons with documents not in order.

The measures are only the beginning. The Sofia police will step up their activities even more, and more uniformed officers will be seen on the streets, the Press Center of the Sofia Directorate of Internal Affairs announced.

Former Privatization Director Interviewed

AU0411210294 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 31 Oct 94 p 8

[Interview with Docent Dimitur Stefanov, dismissed director of Mass Privatization Center, by Irina Keremidchieva of Balkan Agency; place and date not given: "Reneta Indzhova Settled Mass Privatization Problem by Force"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Keremidchieva] Docent Stefanov, does your dismissal reflect a negative attitude to the mass privatization process?

[Stefanov] My dismissal confirms the process of privatization that is now under way. Reneta Indzhova is hostile toward mass privatization. I see this as the motive for my dismissal. The reason is that I have attempted to convince public opinion that the present model leads nowhere and does not solve the country's main problem, namely a speedy transfer of ownership. The sale of a few dozen enterprises simply solves nothing, as thousands of firms are involved. However, it may settle the problems of the people who are selling off the enterprises [members of the Privatization Agency], who have formed a private club for themselves, not an agency. If you ask them whether they oppose mass privatization, they will tell you that they support it, but in fact they are defending this limited privatization model.

[Keremidchieva] What kind of privatization model forms the subject of your dispute with the Privatization Agency?

[Stefanov] A model that is being realized in practice in all the countries in a state of transition. It has various forms, and is close to the Czech model. This form of privatization enables people to participate in the privatization process, in the transfer of ownership, and gives them an opportunity to choose. Second, it is a transparent process, whereas in Bulgaria they are adopting legislation that casts a veil of complete secrecy over denationalization.

[Keremidchieva] Have you discussed the work of the Mass Privatization Center at all with any member of the Privatization Agency?

[Stefanov] Not with Mrs. Indzhova. Khristina Vucheva asked for written information on the center's work and the problems it has. I submitted to her a memorandum several pages long, but did not receive any reaction.

[Keremidchieva] But you had no discussion with Reneta Indzhova....

[Stefanov] I have not had any discussions with anyone. Before she became prime minister, I suggested that we should cooperate on the problems relating to the list of enterprises for mass privatization. I mean that some of the large enterprises should be in the list for mass privatization, while others should be earmarked for market privatization. However, I always received a categorical refusal.

[Keremidchieva] Is your dismissal an act of personal revenge or does it reflect an attitude to mass privatization?

[Stefanov] I would say that formally it is the latter, but in reality I stopped them doing their own thing by demanding that the privatization model be changed.

[Keremidchieva] Do you expect any reaction from the president if the mass privatization, or rather the preparations for it, is stopped?

[Stefanov] I doubt it. In my view the aim is to work with a limited privatization model that is not open to public view, and to settle accounts with those who can hinder this process in some way or other, especially with those who insist that this model be replaced.

[Keremidchieva] Does your dismissal mean that the mass privatization process will stop altogether.

[Stefanov] I do not want to generalize. The fact that I directed the center is not fatal. Naturally, my dismissal will slow down the process until a new man works himself in. What is more important is that the debate between the two different concepts was resolved by force.

[Keremidchieva] Did your dismissal break the law in any way?

[Stefanov] No, formally everything was settled properly. I realized that the government had not discussed this problem, but instead the ministers' signatures were collected on a memorandum.

[Keremidchieva] Were you summoned for an interview when the order was handed to you?

[Stefanov] No, I have had absolutely no contact with the government and probably will not have any.

SDS, People's Union Reportedly To Cooperate

AU0511192394 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 2 Nov 94 p 2

[Report by Malina Petrova]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sofia—At a meeting of Christian Democratic parties in Vienna, representatives of the People's Union (of the Bulgarian National Agrarian Union and the Democratic Party) and the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] expressed political readiness to form a possible post-election coalition, Asen Agov, chairman of the SDS-affiliated Christian Democratic Union, announced. He regards the term "political readiness" as implying the condition that the prospective partners win seats in the next parliament.

The meeting in Vienna, organized by the European Christian Democratic Union, affirmed the need to establish a new coalition to cooperate in the election campaign in opposing the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] and, after the elections, to assume responsibility for governing the country.

Ivan Glushkov, leader of the Christian Agrarian Party [CAP], said that his party would sign an agreement with the SDS coalition, irrespective of whether the Kingdom of Bulgaria Federation (of which CAP is a member) joined in signing the document or not. He added that CAP is not worried by the fact that the party's name will not be entered on the SDS ballot paper. According to Filip Dimitrov [chairman of SDS National Coordinating Council], the agreement with CAP will be signed very soon.

Dimitrov said that the SDS parliamentary group has about 1 million leva left unused, which the SDS National Coordinating Council has decided to donate to charity rather than spend it on the election campaign. The SDS council hopes that the supporters of Savov [Democratic Party members] will not object to the money being donated.

Commentator Analyzes SDS Economic Program

AU0511140794 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 1 Nov 94 p 6

[Commentary by Yakov Barukh: "The Future of 'Our People'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The economic program of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces] is precisely the opposite of what the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party] is thinking of doing. This means that if the SDS wins the elections, the average Bulgarian will live in one way, but in quite a different way if the BSP are the victors.

However, since things are never as simple as this, people should be clearly aware that the situation is changing from political conflict to economic confrontation. This will also be the formula for the next parliament if the bipolar model again wins the upper hand. If that is so, the entire electorate is guaranteed to have a hard time, and everyone will cherish fond, nostalgic memories of the 36th National Assembly.

In the SDS's published program every word seems uttered with a clenched fist: This will be done, and it will be done just so. The other side's program will also have a categorical ring, but in a different way. The SDS seems to say: Come now, people, cast your votes; our common future will be decided by the future of "our people." [SDS activists] After the elections, one side will be jubilant, while the other will spit and swear. Such is the situation in our dear fatherland, two Bulgarias are still being built....

Parties exist to express differing views on the development of society. The only trouble is that society should first start developing, and only later begin to divide up the cake among the interests of its different sections. It is precisely for this reason that the mailed fist approach in the election programs on divisive issues bodes nothing good for the future.

The SDS program ends with the words: "Only together can we build a new Bulgaria." How true that is.

Socialist Youth Union To Join Patriotic Alliance

AU0511135994 Sofia NOVINI 5 in Bulgarian 31 Oct 94 p 3

[FBIS Translated Text] The Socialist Youth Union will field its candidates for the parliamentary elections in the Patriotic Alliance's ticket, a Balkan Agency reporter was told by the Parliamentary Alliance's press center. "It is only a matter of time before our organization joins the Patriotic Alliance coalition," said Socialist Youth Union Chairman Lyubomir Nikolov. "We are already attending meetings of the Patriotic Alliance," he said, "and I can tell you that our ideas and goals are identical."

Until recently the Socialist Youth Union had coalition links with the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party], but two months ago the BSP established its own youth organization.

DPS Call for Expatriate Vote Called Provocation

AU0411162794 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 2 Nov 94 p 6

[Commentary by Khristo Bardaliev: "Importing Votes"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently the DPS [Rights and Freedoms Movement] once again decided to provoke Bulgarian society, which is sensitive on the subject of "Turkey" and "Turks," by promising to bring in 150,000 expatriates from our southeastern neighbor to cast their votes on 18 December. Of course, this election "beachhead landing" is not only practically impossible to carry out, but also unnecessary. All expatriates can exercise their right to vote, they only have to visit the Bulgarian diplomatic representations in Turkey.

This propaganda demarche by the DPS is really a well-considered provocation. The nationalists will of course react in their usual manner, which will "cement" the movement's eroding electorate. Again, if the DPS nonetheless fails to surmount the 4-percent barrier, it will provide grounds for disputing the election results on the grounds that the expatriates were not given an opportunity to cast their votes in Bulgaria, or that the mandates were unfairly distributed among the electoral districts. It is no coincidence that the DPS was the only party to declare publicly that it wanted the elections postponed until the spring.

The self-advertised nationalists are not the only ones who may derive advantage from such declarations and seek election dividends or justifications for losing. A certain party newspaper has already reported the information in question on its front page....

DPS Plans Gypsy Candidates in Five Districts

AU0411144394 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 29 Oct 94 p 3

[24 CHASA staff report]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The DPS [Rights and Freedoms Movement] will not field its own candidates in the Vidin, Montana, Kyustendil, Pernik, and Vratsa districts, where the DPS tickets will consist solely of Romany candidates, Osman Oktay [DPS Central Council secretary] announced yesterday. Oktay said that 19 Romany district election headquarters and 31 municipal electoral clubs have been set up within the DPS organizational framework. "In Shumen, for example," Oktay explained, "the DPS has always managed to collect votes for two deputies, and we will enter a Romany as the third candidate on our electoral list." [passage omitted]

Commentary Welcomes Rapprochement With France

94CH0007A Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 8 Oct 94 p 1

[Commentary by Adam Cerny: "Prague-Paris, a New Rapprochment"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The new rapprochement between Prague and Paris must be perceived in comparison with the preceding hesitation. In any case, however, for the Czech Republic it is important that, in France, a key European country, its views are heard and understood. For example, the Czech Republic succeeded in making clear the reason for its negative stance toward any form of institutionalization of relations among countries of the Visegrad Group. It repeatedly explained that the regional contacts within the framework of the Central European free trade zone are one thing, and the creation of a pressure group that should be jointly knocking on the door in Brussels is another. The Czech Government was always afraid that joining the candidate countries as a group could take them jointly onto a siding instead of into the European Union.

Relations between Prague and Paris after 1989 were marked by failures of some economic plans (Czechoslovak Airline [CSA], SKODA auto works) and the decline in the intensity of diplomatic relations after the division of the Czechoslovak federation. The failures of ambitious projects shrouded the continuously developing trade at the middle and higher levels—today France is the third-largest foreign investor in the Czech Republic.

The dominant item in Josef Zeleniec's talks in Paris was the question of the future form of European integration, and an important aspect was the common emphasis on the political framework of this process because, out of the definition of the political goal flow the technical and economic instruments by which the declared objective is to be achieved. In the discussion following the speech in the French Institute of International Relations, the Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs emphasized that reversing the order could block the way to the goal.

The goal of European integration remains the same as in the postwar period: Europe needs to find a framework and the means that would enable it to avoid repeating the old mistakes that twice in this century plunged it into a world war. There is only a small likelihood that countries with such historical experiences as France and the Czech Republic would not ponder how important it is to maintain precisely the form of European integration that puts into its center Germany and its incorporation into the broader structures. The fact that views on the form of European integration became closer must be considered the most significant result of the work of diplomats from the Czech Republic and France.

Politicians React to Havel Speech on 'New Vision'

AU0411171194

[FBIS Editorial Report] Prague RUDE PRAVO in Czech on 31 October carries two reports on leading Czech politicians' reaction to the speech delivered by President Havel on 28 October, in which he said that it was the task of the forthcoming period "to begin talking with all earnestness about the nature of the democracy we want to nurture, the roots from which it should grow..." and that "we simply need a new vision."

A 300-word report by Jitka Goetzova on page 1 entitled "According to Vaclav Klaus, the Czech Republic Has Its Vision" says that, "while the Civic Democratic Party chairman" and prime minister "is convinced that the Czech Republic has its conceptual vision of the future and cannot understand why a nationwide discussion on the topic should take place, Czech Social Democratic Party Chairman Milos Zeman believes that society is facing numerous changes, including moral reform." The two politicians are said to have responded this way on the 30 October Nova television program to the president's national holiday speech. Zeman allegedly went as far as to add: "I want to say sincerely that it was the first speech (by Havel) in a long time that I can endorse in its entirety as a social democrat."

The same daily carries another 300-word report by the same author on page 2. This item, entitled "Dienstbier, Pilip, and Kasal on Havel's Speech Concerning the Vision of the Czech Republic," reports on the reaction by politicians from Free Democrats, the Christian Democratic Party, and the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party. "Jiri Dienstbier, chairman of the Free Democrats, described the speech as courageous and excellent and corresponding to the needs of this stage of the transformation of society." Ivan Pilip, Christian Democratic Party chairman, is quoted as saying, "We do not feel so strongly that we are at some historical crossroads right now." Jan Kasal (Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party) allegedly said that "the president should reflect in his speeches on matters beyond the everyday concerns of the executive and parliament."

Outgoing Prime Minister's Nationwide TV Address

LD0611230394 Bratislava STV 1 Television Network in Slovak 1850 GMT 6 Nov 94

[Nationwide address by outgoing Slovak Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik; place and date not given—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Esteemed viewers, dear citizens:

Immediately after the constituent meeting of the National Council of the Slovak Republic, the government offered its resignation, as is stipulated by the Constitution.

Such a situation has emerged for the first time in the short history of our state. That is one of the reasons I consider it important to draw your attention to some constitutional and political consequences of this act. The situation concerns matters of public administration, and it is my duty to inform you about important facts.

Right at the beginning, I would like to stress that, in the spirit of our Constitution, the main precondition for a normal functioning of the state is the support the government receives in parliament. If the government does not have such support, there is the danger of a crisis in state power, and that can have very undesirable consequences for all citizens. In such instances, it is impossible to pass in parliament bills presented by the government, the state budget cannot be approved, any minister can be recalled at any time—simply, the government cannot fulfill its duties.

Support for the government can be achieved in parliament either by an agreement of parliamentary political parties or, in exceptional cases, when the political parties are not able to reach an agreement, such support can be achieved by an agreement between deputies regardless of their political allegiances because, under the Constitution, the deputies are not bound by party discipline. This is also an explanation of why it was necessary to change the government in March of this year. After the government of Vladimir Meciar was dismissed, a new government took office. This government has retained the National Council's support until the election. Political stability has been introduced, and the government has been able to carry out its duties in a normal way.

In connection with this, the fabrications saying that there was a parliamentary putsch in March 1994 seem funny. Anybody can set up any investigation commissions; he will change nothing. He can only divert attention from the substance of the matter, which is a permanent need to maintain in parliament support for the government. He who is not able to maintain it has to go into opposition.

After the election, the president of the Republic entrusted Vladimir Meciar with forming a new government and with gaining for it the support of the majority of the deputies in the National Council. Our government offered its resignation after the constituent meeting of parliament. In this sense, the procedure was in line with the Constitution.

The actions the prime minister-designate has taken to date generate some concern.

The first National Council meetings demonstrated that Vladimir Meciar has succeeded in attaining an effective majority in the parliament. All of his proposals, including those concerning personnel issues, were adopted without any problems.

There are no obstacles that would prevent Mr. Meciar from presenting a new government to the Slovak president in the next few days.

It is turning out, however, that it is not his intention to do so. Instead, he allowed the confidence vote concerning two key ministers of the current government to go ahead, even though the government had already resigned. This is designed to make it impossible for the government to properly carry out its constitutional duties and hold office until the new government is formed.

At the same time, the new parliamentary coalition has taken control of the National Property Fund or, in other words, of part of the executive power.

As I have already said, I would like to say that it is absurd and politically irresponsible to take control of the parliament and, at the same time, to keep delaying the formation of a new government. This is a path that would not promote the stability of power but, rather, would lead to the destruction of power. He who plays such a game must realize that he is placing the fate of Slovakia at stake.

That is why I once again call on Mr. Meciar to stop playing a child's blindman's buff game, to come out from the dark so that he can present, as soon as possible, his long-prepared and much glorified shadow cabinet.

He should realize how much he promised his voters before the election. He now has the chance to show all those who put their trust in him that he did not lie to them.

The first two parliamentary sessions adopted some resolutions that, in our opinion, contradict the principles of a law-abiding state. One of the examples is the annulment of the contracts concluded on the basis of privatization rulings, the annulment of some decisions made by the government, the setting up of the investigation commission with no legal support for it.

In some instances, the law has not been violated, but the way chosen has created doubts as to the sincere intention to contribute to the solution of Slovakia's problems by those who had pushed through such an approach.

A typical example is the transfer of Professor Juraj Svec, the vice chancellor of Comenius University, from the Committee for Education and Science to the Committee for Environment, all this at the proposal of Deputy Olga Keltosova.

Deputy Svec is renowned throughout Europe as an expert on education and science. His transfer to a different committee, to put it mildly, contradicts common sense.

Esteemed citizens, it is our duty, the duty of those political parties that have created the present coalition so far, to push through the style of government we applied in the recent past. We went into the election defending this style. We have gained the support of more than 1 million voters. May I use this occasion to thank them once more for their support?

Regardless of the posts we fill, we will try to keep our promises.

Moravcik Interviewed

LD0411224894 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1700 GMT 4 Nov 94

[Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik interview by correspondent Zuzana Stukovska on 4 November; place not given—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Stukovska] What are your ideas about the further practical work of your Cabinet after the president accepted your resignation and, especially, after the decisions made by the new parliament early today?

[Moravcik] Our ideas are based on the Constitution. This is so because of the continuity of power. There cannot be a single moment of anarchy after the election. It means that there always has to be somebody who carries constitutional responsibility for public matters in this country. From this point of view, the government has all the powers, as before. It has to manage public matters with full responsibility.

Members of the government are still obliged by their oath, sworn in front of the president when they were nominated as members of the government. Only constitutional law can limit these powers. It is not possible to do so by regular laws because these powers are granted by the Constitution.

From this point of view, the government will carry on, though it is rather unnatural and undesirable, in these circumstances, to delay the process of forming the government. It is up to the winner of the election to comply with the responsibility laid upon him by the voters in the election. His responsibility is to form the government supported by a majority in parliament as soon as possible. Otherwise, there is a controversy. The government continues to carry out its duties but no longer has any support in the parliament. It means that the government cannot realistically carry through the decisions agreed upon.

As it looks at the moment, the HZDS [Movement for a Democratic Slovakia] is playing a tactical game to dominate parliament and usurp the majority in parliament, while staying outside the government and banking on remaining in opposition. This can be assumed from the HZDS's behavior. This would be most unfortunate. It contradicts the promises that the HZDS has given to its voters, which was to achieve stability in this country. Such maneuvers undoubtedly lead to destabilization.

[Stukovska] Prime Minister, to some extent you can affect the speed with which the new government is formed. I base this on a statement made earlier by Ivan Gasparovic. [passage omitted] What is the situation concerning these conditions—that is, the budget drafting?

[Moravcik] These statements are total nonsense. The speed with which the government is formed does not depend on the budget drafting. It would be much better for the new government to draft the budget. During all its time...

[Stukovska, interrupting] You did state this in your manifesto, did you not?

[Moravcik] Of course, but I will return to this later. During all its time in opposition. the HZDS boasted of having a shadow government and of being ready to take over executive power at any time. It has this chance now. Let shadow ministers step out of the shadows and rule. The people who voted for the HZDS expect it of them. If they are only waiting for us to prepare the budget for them, we shall have it ready for them on 15 November.

[Stukovska] And what about the report detailing your work?

[Moravcik] We have reviewed our work several times. and we are ready to do this again at any time. There is nothing we should be ashamed of because the results we have achieved are very positive and offer good prospects.

[Stukovska] You favor the opinion that the 1995 draft budget should be presented to parliament by the new government. On the other hand, there is another possible approach, saying that, if this government ruled well, it should not be afraid of presenting the draft budget to parliament. Would this draft, if approved by parliament, constitute some kind of pledge for the new government to continue along the lines followed by your government?

[Moravcik] Well, yes. Under ideal circumstances, one could follow this line of thought. However, let us move into the real political situation. For the government to be able to push the budget through, it has to have majority support in parliament. Moreover, the 1995 budget drafting must be based on a certain conceptual framework—for example, in privatization. [passage omitted]

We are trying to draft this conceptual framework, but the framework is also a political issue. If these days in parliament somebody puts forward an anticonstitutional bill saying that this government's rulings on privatization should be made null and void, you can see in what kind of environment we find ourselves. It tells you to what extent we can count on such a partner to approve in parliament what we have prepared. [passage omitted]

[Stukovska] However, your government has also annulled certain privatization projects.

[Moravcik] Well, if they have any doubts concerning the correctness of our decisions, let them form the government and make them null and void. A government can make null and void a ruling made by a previous government, but parliament cannot do likewise. Parliament can only declare a government's ruling null and void by a constitutional law, this due to the fact that parliament has its powers and a government has as well. The government's powers are stipulated by the Constitution. [passage omitted]

[Stukovska] Ludovit Cernak, chairman of the National Democratic Party, which, as is known, is close to the Democratic Union, has expressed a remarkable thought. Ludovit Cernak said in his interview for Radiozurnal last week, let me quote: The president should declare, quite clearly, that, if anyone tries to play some tricks to gain a majority in parliament, he has strong enough measures, such as not nominating a government—end of quote. Have you talked about this with the president either yesterday or before? Have you ever discussed this notion?

[Moravcik] I do not quite understand why the president should not nominate the government. He must nominate the government. Even if he wanted to nominate the same government as the one that resigned, he would have to nominate it again. It would be a new government.

[Stukovska] According to your information, does the president intend to speed up, in one way or another, the formation of the new government, particularly with respect to what happened in parliament yesterday? Did you touch on this issue in your talks yesterday?

[Moravcik] We did not discuss this issue. The president has no practical measures to speed up the formation of the new government. That depends on the political parties, primarily those that have the majority in parliament.

[Stukovska] Should the designated prime minister, Vladimir Meciar, fail to form a majority government, can you imagine an alternative for Slovakia, such as a new election?

[Moravcik] If I attempted to make any inferences at this point, I would have to think in terms of normal logic. The winner of the election is behaving very illogically at this time.

[Stukovska] In conclusion, your Cabinet is short one member. Deputy Prime Minister Ivan Simko has resigned, for known reasons, before the constituent session of parliament. The economic minister, Peter Magvasi, is quite open about his intention to join the HZDS government. After his recent assertion about the historical mistake of the Party of the Democratic Left, Defense Minister Pavol Kanis has become another weak point in the government's chain. We should also remember what Eduard Kukan, the foreign minister, once said, though later on rather unpersuasively explained. And, if we also account for the dismissal of Ministers Janicina and Pittner, do you consider the final period of your government in office to be somewhat disappointing, regardless of what happened in parliament yesterday and early today?

[Moravcik] I would not call it a disappointment. They all fulfilled their duties in a proper fashion. All the ministers you named were very responsible in their posts. Their thoughts look to the future and reflect the election results. All of the assertions you quoted or mentioned in your question do not concern the work of this government. This government has fulfilled its duties properly. It has applied a particular style in politics that was understandable to our citizens. After all, if we look at the opinion polls, this government was the most trusted one since November 1989. So, from this point of view, I am not disappointed.

The election results are a different matter, but in this context we cannot apply the same criteria. It is not a matter of disappointment; it is real life. That is what Slovakia is like, and we have to accept that.

Moravcik Comments

LD0411135494 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 4 Nov 94

[Interview with Prime Minister Jozef Moravcik by editor Zuzana Stukovska on 4 November; place not given—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Stukovska] Yesterday evening, your cabinet resigned, surprisingly while the parliament's constituent session was still in progress. Our public expected that this step would be taken only this morning. According to a statement by the director of the Government Office Press and Information Department, this course of action was to be taken provided the constituent session of the newly elected parliament took place constitutionally and in a spirit of democracy.

Mr. Prime Minister, was your decision to resign speeded up by a fear that members of your Cabinet might have been dismissed? There is a difference between leaving on the basis of the Constitution and leaving as a result of a no confidence vote in your work.

[Moravcik] We assumed that everything would proceed as it should in normal circumstances; that is, that, after the end of the constituent session, the first session of the

National Council, a break is declared and the next session is resumed the next day or the next week, or simply a few days later.

However, during deliberations, we learned that a proposal of no confidence in two members of the government was to be presented.

This was indeed what pushed us, why we hurried to submit our resignation. The reason is that, once the Cabinet resigns, it ensues from the Constitution itself that that Cabinet, that all Cabinet members, are requested to continue to hold their posts until a new government is formed.

This rule, outlined also by our Constitution, is very necessary because it secures the continuity of power. And, to a certain extent, it also pushes the party that won the election to form a new government as soon as possible. This is what is needed, what is necessary for the stability of the country.

For this reason, we resigned as soon as the constituent session ended. Once the constituent session was over, I immediately informed the president about this, and the president accepted the resignation.

[Stukovska] Then what follows is this. Is parliament entitled to dismiss those members of the Cabinet who have already resigned? What does the law say about this?

[Moravcik] No, it is not. This is an unequivocal interpretation because Cabinet members are enjoined by the Constitution itself, and this can be canceled only by a constitutional law. Therefore, to achieve this, at least 90 deputies will need to adopt a constitutional law preventing these two ministers from performing what they have been entrusted with until a new government is formed.

[Stukovska] What next? Are you going to refuse to accept this decision by parliament? What other solutions can your Cabinet opt for?

[Moravcik] Now it is up to the president because the decision by parliament, the no-confidence vote, has to be implemented by the president. He has to assess the matter, interpret the Constitution, and make his decision on this basis. If there is a dispute, the decision has to be made by the Constitutional Court.

Report on National Council's Overnight Session

LD0411132594 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 0900 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The second session of the National Council continued overnight. More than 80 members of the assembly were present. The deputies expressed no confidence in Ladislav Pittner, minister of the interior, and in Milan Janicina, minister of administration and privatization of national property.

At about 0545, the parliament passed an amendment to the bill on the conditions for the transfer of state property to other entities, with the aim of gradually transferring all of the activity and powers regulating the process of transformation and consequent privatization of state property from the jurisdiction of the government to a body directed by the parliament, to the National Property Fund.

The deputies then began debating a proposal on the law on abolishing the government decision on the privatization of enterprises and parts of property, and on the property participation of the state by means of direct sales adopted after 6 September of this year. While this proposal was being debated, those present, apart from the deputies of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS], the Farmers' Party [RSS], the Association of Workers of Slovakia [ZRS], and the Slovak National Party [SNS], included only three representatives of the opposition parties. Of the 84 deputies present, 80 voted in favor of the proposal, two were against, one abstained, and one did not vote.

The next point of the National Council's second session was a proposal to dismiss Jozef Olej, chairman of the Supreme Inspection Office, and Deputy Chairman Milan Hudan. This proposal was also unanimously approved. After that, they dismissed Vojtech Bach, the attorney general of the Slovak Republic, and elected HZDS-RSS candidate Ludovit Hudek in his place.

Imrich Andrejcak, chairman of the Committee for Defense and Security, then proposed to the National Council the appointment of new members of the parliament's special control body to verify the activity of the Slovak Intelligence Service. Its chairman is Ivan Lexa, and members include Frantisek Gaulieder, Igor Urban, Jan Slota, and Hubert Kraus.

Vojtech Tkac, chairman of the Constitutional and Legal Committee, initiated the setting up of a commission of inquiry to explain the reasons that led to the constitutional crisis in 1994. He explained this by the instability of the political situation in Slovakia that led in March to the dismissal of Vladimir Meciar's Cabinet and, consequently, to early parliamentary elections. This step, according to Vojtech Tkac, meant diminishing the prestige of Slovakia abroad, destabilizing society, and reducing the entry of foreign capital into our economy, as well as slowing down economic and social reform. The aim of the inquiry commission will be to explain the reasons for the constitutional crisis. Katarina Tothova was appointed chairwoman of the commission, and Marian Andel was appointed deputy chairman. Members include: Peter Baco, Jozef Prokes, Sergej Kozlik, Ivan Lexa, and (Iveta Novakova).

Roman Hofbauer, chairman of the Committee for the Economy, Privatization, and Business, then proposed, in accordance with the law on the conditions of transfer of state property to other entities, changing the membership of the highest bodies of the Fund of National

Property. All of the present members of the fund's Presidium were unanimously dismissed. Stefan Gavornik was elected president of the Presidium, and Milan Rehak was elected vice president. (Igor Mate) became chairman of the supervisory council, and Lubomir Cerny became deputy chairman.

Parliament also dismissed today all members of the Slovak Television Council, apart from Eva Kristinova, and consequently elected new members. These include (Jergus Ferko), Vera Urbanova, (Jan Stevcek), Ladislav Tazky, (Emil Spisak), Jan Majernik, Peter Kovac, and (Miroslav Curma).

The National Council also decided on changes in the composition of the Radio Council. After dismissing the present members, it elected to the Council (Marina Ceretkova-Galova), (Jozef Malovec), Jaroslav Reznik, (Pavol Blej), Jozef Bobok, (Maros Puchovsky), Eva Berasinova, Jozef Mazar, and Edita Plankova.

Having reconstituted the Radio Council at the overnight session, the dismissal of Vladimir Stefko, director-general of Slovak Radio, was proposed. At the same time, the council decided to appoint Jan Tuzinsky to this post. Parliament accepted both proposals. The voting on a personnel change in the post of director-general of Slovak Radio was the last—that is, the 13th point—of the second session of the National Council, which Deputy Speaker Augustin Marian Huska ended shortly before 0900.

The National Council of the Slovak Republic was in session continuously for 22 hours and 50 minutes.

President Says Council's Moves Counterproductive

LD0411133894 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1100 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Office of the President of the Slovak Republic has taken a position on the current internal political situation. It is now conveyed by its spokesman Anton Balas.

[Balas] According to the president's view, the second session of the National Council, which took place yesterday, did not amount to the best way of seeking accord [dohoda] in our society. According to the president, the steps taken at the meeting will not lead to political and civic understanding and to solving Slovakia's current problems. These problems urgently call for broad cooperation and for the creation of the appropriate political and social atmosphere. It is precisely in this context that the president has serious doubts whether the deliberations constituted a step in such a direction or whether, in fact, it was a step in some other direction.

Regarding the individual decisions made by deputies, naturally, the president is of the opinion that it is necessary to respect the fact that the decisions were passed by a parliamentary majority and as such, of course, were democratic and legitimate.

According to the president, we still do not have enough information available to establish whether all of the decisions passed by the deputies were in line with the Constitution and the appropriate laws. One needs the necessary information and enough time to carry out such a scrutiny, and, therefore, at the moment, the president is not in a position to take a stand on this issue.

SDL Suspends Talks on Coalition With HZDS

LD0511152994 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1500 GMT 5 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] has suspended coalition talks with Vladimir Meciar's Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] on forming a new Slovak government. This was announced by SDL Chairman Peter Weiss after an SDL session today. He added that a specific course of action will be decided by the SDL National Council next week.

HZDS on SDL Decision on Coalition Talks

LD0511183894 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 5 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] It comes as a surprise that the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] takes the liberty to criticize the course of action taken by the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and its coalition partners at the constituent, second session of the National Council because the same course of action was taken by the SDL and its partners in March 1994 in the illegal dismissal of Vladimir Meciar's government. Dusan Kleiman, head of the HZDS press and information department, said this in a statement for TASR in reaction to the results of today's deliberations of the SDL Executive Council. Kleiman went on to say that the HZDS had gained its parliamentary legitimacy in democratic elections and that all of the resolutions passed at the session of the National Council were adopted by a simple majority vote, as stipulated by the parliamentary procedures and the Constitution.

Kleiman said that the reservations voiced by the SDL proved that the Joint Choice coalition was not able to come to terms with the election defeat. In his opinion, by casting doubts on the resolutions adopted by the National Council, the SDL is introducing a split and chaos into society.

SDL Executive Committee Issues Statement

AU0511183794 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 31 Oct 94 p 2

[Statement issued by the SDL Executive Committee in Kosice on 28 October 1994]

[FBIS Translated Text] At its session on 28 October 1994, the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] Executive Committee assessed the course of action adopted so far in talks with the political parties.

It considers the statements made by some leading SDL officials to be a premature commencement of the debate before the 3d SDL Congress, statements that weaken the party's position among the public. It is convinced that the SDL will manage to resolve its problems itself and that it is not threatened by a split. The SDL Executive Committee asks officials to refrain from making further statements on internal party issues before the release of the congress documents for public discussion. The Executive Committee is preparing for debate draft policy and organizational changes that will strengthen the party's left-wing character.

The SDL Executive Committee considers success in the local elections to be the primary task of the party, its members, and its supporters, and it expresses its complete support for its candidates in them.

Having analyzed the talks with the other parties, the SDL Executive Committee states that no agreement has been reached on forming a government. It decided that it will not support the proposal from the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia to establish a commission to look into the president's activities. It recommends that SDL deputies in the National Council of the Slovak Republic [NR SR] do all they can to ensure that decisions are made by 150 deputies at the NR SR constituent meeting.

It has decided to hold another session on 5 November 1994 to assess the NR SR constituent meeting and to discuss continuing the talks.

Schmognerova Views Current Situation in SDL

AU0511141794 Bratislava SME in Slovak 26 Oct 94 pp 1-2

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Brigita Schmognerova by Alica Strbava; place and date not given: "'A Short Spell in the Opposition Could Do the SDL Some Good'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Following last week's talks between the Common Choice and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia-Farmers' Party of Slovakia [HZDS-RSS] coalition, Defense Minister and Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] Deputy Chairman Pavol Kanis said that the SDL's entry into the current government in March was a historical mistake.

[Strbava] Apart from being deputy prime minister in charge of the economy, you are also the SDL's economic leader. What is your opinion of the statement made by Minister Pavol Kanis?

[Schmognerova] I am of a different opinion. Certainly, the SDL had a great deal to think about in March because it knew very well under what circumstances it would participate in the government. The step it took has shown that it is an extremely responsible party—even at the cost of electoral losses, which were ultimately confirmed. On the other hand, I think we have demonstrated that not only do we take a responsible approach toward the issues facing society, but also that we are capable of taking part in government. So, from the longer-term point of view, I consider the SDL's involvement in the government to be positive.

[Strbava] How do you see the SDL's political future, and also your own, if it enters into a coalition with the HZDS? Will you be just an SDL deputy, or would you also accept a post in the new coalition government?

[Schmognerova] I think we are jumping the gun because further rounds of talks are still to be held. Incidentally, the SDL Republican Council will decide whether the party enters into a coalition. I think that the Council must take into consideration not only the SDL's short-term interests, but also its longer-term ones and, at the same time, the interests of Slovak society. In my opinion, we obviously do not have the possibility to form, in any coalition grouping, the government we would like—a government that would be in office for four years. Unfortunately, the way the election turned out means that this opportunity does not arise. From the SDL's point of view, it will also be necessary to consider a solution that would do the least harm possible to the party.

[Strbava] What kind of decision will you personally make about the future?

[Schmognerova] My personal decision will, of course, be governed by my ability to help this society and also by the SDL's prospects. I would be very unhappy if what some people have been attempting for some time were to happen—that the SDL breaks up. I am convinced that this would vacate space to the left of center, space that no political entity would be able to fill for several years. That would really be a pity for Slovak society.

[Strbava] Are you not concerned that the opinion expressed by Minister Kanis could provide a stimulus for a split within the SDL?

[Schmognerova] I spoke about a different opinion on our involvement in the government. Perhaps certain differences could also be found in other issues. However, I think that, during the past six months, between our entry into the government and the election, there has been a considerable shift in the SDL voters' base. We are trying to obtain sufficiently revealing information about the SDL voters' base today. I believe that the Republican Council must also take this into consideration. That is to say, our undertaking in the next election, which await the Slovak Republic not in the very long term but in a relatively short time, is to make sure that we do not lose another part of our voters' base. When we have enough information about the views among our voters' base, to which, as members of the Deputy's Club, we will also have to render accounts, we will be able to make a more responsible decision. I would like to wait a little in this regard, although we already have the preliminary information.

[Strbava] So, on the basis of the mandate you obtained in the election, we will see you, at worst, in parliament.

[Schmognerova] I do not consider this at all to be "at worst." I think a short spell in the opposition could do the SDL some good.

Pavol Kanis Continues Criticism of SDL

AU0511195694 Bratislava SLOVENSKA REPUBLIKA in Slovak 29 Oct 94 p 2

[First installment of an interview with Pavol Kanis, defense minister and SDL deputy chairman, by Drahoslav Machala; place and date not given: "A Politician Must See Around the Corner"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Machala] It is odd that speculative journalists are boosting your critical remarks to the level of a split within the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL]. However, this is an honest attempt not to make light of your election defeat. Moreover, the man who is most responsible for the electoral failure lacks self-criticism in this respect. The SDL leader had become completely entangled in complacency, the syndrome of the microphone and the cameras, and popularity in the opinion polls. I had always admired him for his sense of self-assessment. However, for some time now, he has been behaving as if seized by strange paroxysms and for political effect...

[Kanis] My statement about the SDL making a historical mistake is the result of my reflections on the reasons for the election results and their consequences. If a left-wing party abandons its left-wing domain and enables other parties to become institutionalized in it, it must accept the blame not only for its failure but also for the political repercussions. The left has been successful in all neighboring countries; only we have been trounced. The issue is really more profound than is acknowledged by the hysterical journalists who prefer Weiss, who is more to their taste than I. I have never set great store by being praised by journalists who declare completely different values from mine. I have also aired this issue within the party. Previously, the inclination was to analyze all of the SDL's problems over the longer term as something necessary. I am concerned that we will be in a situation in February 1995 in which current events appear completely different. Reality could be much worse. Without overestimating my ability to see around the corner, it is enough for people to see further than their own noses. They must now interpret their view of the near future from reality. Some people criticize me personally as lacking in party discipline. However, I have to say that the most serious mistake I have made is that, this year, in particular, I have adhered to party discipline. If I had been more critical and more alert, things might be quite different. At the same time, I want to make it clear that I do not intend to repress the pungency of my points of view on issues that I am convinced will lead the SDL to success.

[Machala] If, as a party, you were able to reach an agreement with the Christian Democratic Movement, why is there so much political prejudice against a coalition with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS]? After all, the art of the possible, the ability to make compromises, and magnanimity especially are the order of the day—from the HZDS toward the president, who has made mistakes, and from the SDL and some of its aggrieved leaders so that they acknowledge who won and who lost the election. Indeed, this involves the stability of the state...

[Kanis] The problem after the '94 election is the problem of March '94—that is, the issue of the relationship between the HZDS and the SDL. I absolutely distance myself from the rejection a priori of any political entity or personality. The principles of relationships compel me to express my opinions and verdict about a politician only after I consider, from personal meetings, the objective aspect of the relationship several times. I do not take away from anyone the possibility that he may change for the better. This apriorism in Slovak politics, which some journalists cultivate and feed off, is unhealthy. After all, in politics I can never refuse to talk to a particular person. Responsibility forces a politician to keep looking, to push for the art of the possible. If we add to this a truly apolitical interest in our young state's stability, there is an opportunity here for a government of major compromise, for a government for four years. And, if someone relinquishes in advance his desire to form a government for four years, why then is he involved in politics?

SDSS Withdraws From Coalition Talks With Meciar

LD0411163294 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1400 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The presidium of the Central Council of the Social Democratic Party of Slovakia [SDSS] adopted a resolution at its session in Bratislava today in connection with the course of the constituent and ensuing second session of the National Council.

It ensues from the resolution that it is recalling its representatives from the talks to form a coalition government with the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia-Farmers' Party [HZDS-RSS], as Miroslav Stejn, first deputy chairman of the Social Democrats, told TASR. In view of the interests of Slovakia and of the pledges stemming from membership in the Socialist International, the presidium recommends that the SDSS Central Council adopt a decision on how the party should act in the coming period in opposition.

At the same time, it charged party chairman Jaroslav Volf with informing the partners from the Joint Choice coalition about this resolution.

Kukan on ZRS Chairman's Anti-European Remarks

AU0411131294 Bratislava SME in Slovak 27 Oct 94 p 2

[Interview with Slovak Foreign Minister Eduard Kukan by Alena Gottweisova; place and date not given: "Everywhere There Is Someone Opposed to Joining the European Union"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Gottweisova] Could the remarks made last weekend by Association of Workers of Slovakia (ZRS) Chairman J. Luptak during a demonstration by anti-European and anti-Maastricht parties in Brussels, at which he expressed his party's negative point of view on Slovakia's entry into the European Union and NATO, provoke mistrust in our Republic's orientation toward the European structures—NATO and the European Union?

[Kukan] Not only this government but also Slovakia as a state is a participant in international life, and we were convincing precisely because we said that our foreign policy is based on the general consensus of virtually all of the political entities, including the opposition. However, if a party that declares openly that it is opposed to Slovakia's entry into the European Union, NATO, and other Pan-European organizations were to become part of the government or the governing coalition, we would not be able to talk about a general consensus, and we would have to use the formulation that the majority of political parties favored this orientation. Of course, this would be negative for Slovakia in the sense that the Slovak Republic is now being monitored very closely, and every statement is placed under a very powerful microscope. Looking at this objectively, in every country that has declared its intention to join the European Union, there are certain parties that are opposed to this step—even more sharply opposed to it than the ZRS. Despite this, these countries are being accepted into this organization. So, I would see no fundamental risk to Slovakia's interests in Luptak's remarks, but they could, to a certain extent, make our negotiating position more difficult.

Szent-Ivanyi Interviewed After Trip to Russia

LD0411203494 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1830 GMT 4 Nov 94

[Interview with Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, state secretary at the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs by unidentified correspondent on 4 November; place not given—live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Correspondent] Istvan Szent-Ivanyi, state secretary at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has just returned from Moscow. Good evening. Are the Russians really reluctant about our possible NATO membership?

[Szent-Ivanyi] It can indeed be sensed that the Russian position has changed in this issue and perhaps not in a favorable direction. There was also mention of this issue during my talks with Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Krylov. He cautioned against possible consequences of a hasty membership regarding Europe's security and bilateral relations. I felt during our discussion that their position mostly derives from internal political worries. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] The matter of settling Russian state debts was another important topic. Is it not too risky to acquire assets in an economy like the Russian, for that is the idea, if I am right?

[Szent-Ivanyi] That is right, the idea is to convert the Russian debt of some $900 million or a considerable part of it, into assets. There is of course a risk to it, but perhaps it is less risky than acquiring nothing for the 900 million or accepting only what the Russian partner offers. Therefore we continue talks on capital conversion.

[Correspondent] Can you tell us any concrete cases in connection with this?

[Szent-Ivanyi] No concrete deals have yet come about. For the time being we have to obtain the Russian leadership's political will, that is if they want it or not. They have other proposals. It became known earlier that they think in terms of military technology and other payment methods. It [conversion into assets] would be more favorable to us and our talks were aimed at obtaining a political will regarding this.

[Correspondent] Thank you.

Tabajdi Views Chances of Autonomy in Romania

AU0711121794 Bucharest ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian 26 Oct 94 p 3

[Interview with Csaba Tabajdi, political state secretary in the prime minister's office for minority affairs, by ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO Chief Editor Janos Gyarmath in Budapest; date not given: "The Chances of Autonomy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Gyarmath] Mr. Tabajdi! What are the chances of any form of autonomy for the ethnic Hungarians in the neighboring countries within the foreseeable future, an autonomy demanded by the legitimate organizations of the Hungarian minorities living in these countries?

[Tabajdi] The program of our socialist-liberal government includes support for the autonomy efforts of the Hungarians living beyond our borders in accordance with progressive European practice. However, leaders of several neighboring countries have serious reservations regarding any form of autonomy. I think such fears are unfounded; instead, it is the word "autonomy" that causes problems for the political leadership of some neighboring countries, out of some kind of territorial sovereignty reflex. The examples of South Tirol or Catalonia prove that autonomy is not the precursor of separatism; rather, it is a factor avoiding separatism and solving the minority issue within the framework of a given country. As for the word "autonomy" itself, honoring the autonomy efforts of the ethnic Hungarians living beyond our borders, I think that it is essential that these autonomy concepts continue to mature. It is not enough to only outline the autonomy concepts; it is expedient to simultaneously take the necessary steps that eventually lead to autonomy, through local organization, participation in local self- government bodies, creating local subsistence means, and through the local school system. Therefore, for me it seems expedient to simultaneously support the intention and struggle for the implementation of these autonomy efforts, as well as to work on the fullest possible use of local opportunities.

[Gyarmath] The Romanian Government, and not only the Romanian Government, constantly stresses that they are only willing to guarantee individual rights. At the same time, it is very difficult to imagine a situation in which an individual can make use of these rights, an individual without partners, and that an individual can simultaneously be a student, parent, and teacher in a school. My question is how far can we go in demanding collective rights according to the valid or emerging European norms?

[Tabajdi] Unfortunately, the European norms do not contain the concept of collective rights. At the same time, both the CSCE Copenhagen document and Article 1201 of the parliamentary meeting of the Council of Europe stipulates that persons belonging to a national minority exercise certain rights jointly in their groups. I think that the content, rather then the formulation is essential. The essence of the matter is that, in order to preserve their identity, the national and ethnic minorities need to enjoy not only individual rights but also special rights that apply to them as a community, because certain rights can only be exercised in a community. This refers not only to the minority rights, because the right to strike or the right for assembly only mean something if one is not alone in exercising these rights. The same applies to the right of religious practice. I think that, in the case of collective rights, another concept that is not recognized by the leading Western countries, one should not magically stick to the concept itself; instead, one should take the content in the meaning of community rights, and one should fight for this content, and not for the symbolism involved.

[Gyarmath] The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania [RMDSZ—UDMR in Romanian] worked out a document before the Hungarian-Romanian foreign ministerial meeting, and it sent this document to the negotiating sides, a document in which the RMDSZ describes its concepts regarding the future basic agreement. In your opinion, what are the RMDSZ demands that can already be fulfilled in the short run?

[Tabajdi] The Horn cabinet declared in its program that it wants to conduct an intensive dialogue with the organizations of ethnic Hungarians abroad free of party and ideology considerations. Consequently, in the second week after the new cabinet took office, Prime Minister Gyula Horn received RMDSZ Chairman Bela Marko, and the Prime Minister's Office, the Office for Hungarians Living Beyond the Borders, and the RMDSZ have conducted several political and professional coordination talks since then. I think this was a very thorough dialogue and coordination, and this position is also the result of this process and the logical consequence of the RMDSZ policy in recent years. In my opinion, the RMDSZ position starts from a constructive and realistic attitude. It does not exceed the proposals formulated in European and international documents that are currently valid. Of course, there are also question marks in this position. For example, what does the RMDSZ mean by regional autonomy? The Hungarian Government can fully support the cultural and administrative autonomy, and the documents clearly reflect this; at the same time, it is not quite clear from a professional and political point of view what we should understand by regional autonomy. I think it would be an illusion to believe that the RMDSZ position can be a short-term political goal. However, I highly appreciate the fact that the second part of this document lists the demands whose fulfillment is essential for the normalization of Hungarian-Romanian relations.

[Gyarmath] The Hungarian press made an accusation that the national minority policy of the present Hungarian Government, more exactly its policy toward the RMDSZ could lead to a split in the RMDSZ, along the existing platforms.

[Tabajdi] In my opinion, that statement is totally unfounded, because we held talks with the legally elected heads of the RMDSZ, and we hope the position meets the support of all the RMDSZ leadership. The negotiations aim to make the Hungarian community in Romania thoroughly aware of the goals of the Hungarian Government, because there are a lot of misinterpretations, misunderstandings, and misconceptions in connection with those goals. It is far from the truth that the Horn cabinet is letting the Hungarians living abroad down. At the same time, the Hungarian Government does not want to continue the overheated rhetoric of previous years, because it is not sure that a brother loves his brother most when he constantly voices such love. I would refer to Cordelia's fate in Shakespeare's King Lear. It is an obvious fact that, slightly misled by symbolic declarations and resounding slogans, many people in Transylvania failed to realize what these slogans actually mean in the sober reality of everyday life. They also failed to realize that a loud minority policy might even annoy Western Europe. Unfortunately, the ethnic Hungarians in Romania do not sufficiently realize the fact that, as a result of the government policy of recent years, Hungary's room for maneuver on the international arena became limited regarding the minority issue, precisely because the relevant problems, efforts, and intentions were voiced too often, and frequently distorted, in an inadequate form and not at the proper forum. We regard the issue of Hungarians living beyond our borders as very important, just like the previous government did, but we want to use different methods in dealing with this issue, and we want to present this issue in a different way, and we would like the Hungarians in Romania to precisely evaluate and understand this different approach. We will focus on practical aid and actual progress.

[Gyarmath] As it is a matter of dispute, I would like to ask whether it is possible to draw a parallel between the fate of the ethnic Romanians in Hungary and that of the ethnic Hungarians in Romania?

[Tabajdi] The answer is quite obvious. The government program contains precise references to this, namely that the Hungarian Government rejects any reciprocity, mutuality, and even negative mutuality in this matter, because one must start from the situation, demands, and needs of the given national minority in every country. Therefore, it would not be expedient to limit the implementation of demands of national minorities of various conditions in the spirit of some kind of an alleged reciprocity. In other words, any magic comparison between the two is out of the question. We regard the issue of ethnic minorities in Hungary as a task that must not be connected with the cause of ethnic Hungarians living beyond our borders. The Hungarian Government regards the issue of minorities in Hungary as a primary task, of course in cooperation with their organizations and the governments of relevant mother countries. At the same time, it is also the constitutional, moral and political responsibility of our government to deal with the fate of ethnic Hungarians living beyond our borders, a totally different task, requiring the use of totally different means. Therefore, we do not accept any concept of mutuality in this matter.

[Gyarmath] The role of the Office for Hungarians Beyond the Borders [HTMH] has been reassessed. What direction is the HTMH taking now?

[Tabajdi] The legal predecessor of the HTMH was created by the Nemeth-cabinet. I was put in charge of organizing and leading this body in October 1989. I have to say this because much of it is unknown beyond the borders. I do not want to offend anyone, because everyone has the right to express his own opinion about this. The HTMH continues to act as an independent organization, just like in the past. However, a lot of criticism has been directed against its activity, and I think justifiably so. There are talented people working in this office, and there are people who should receive the chance to also fulfill higher requirements. Therefore, we do not want to carry out any cleansing in this office. Not a single person has been fired so far. We are rather patient, therefore. As for the leaders, Mr. Geza Entz was dismissed by [Former prime minister] Peter Boross. Only the former deputy chairman, Istvan Zalatnay, has been dismissed, in addition to Geza Entz, but we have a contract arrangement with Zalatnay, so we will continue to employ him in the future. Speaking about the activity of this office, we do not want it to become a complaints office or one dealing with individual affairs or cases, because this is not its task. Its task is to maintain contacts with the legitimate organizations of ethnic Hungarians living abroad: in Romania, with the RMDSZ, the Association of Hungarians in Transylvania, the Bolyai Association, and the other professional organizations. As for its domestic tasks, the HTMH must organize an interministerial coordination and must participate in working out a national minority policy concept. A new organizational unity has emerged within this office, because the government program's major goal is to help the Hungarians beyond the borders to establish a living, become a bourgeois society, and engage in economic ventures. We would like to examine who received funds, from what sources, and for what purpose in the past years. There is great demand for this both in Transylvania and elsewhere. We do not want to engage in court matters, because this would not serve the cause of Hungarians beyond the borders, but we would like to get a clear picture with the help of the RMDSZ and other relevant organizations. Thus, for example, we will try to review the activity of foundations that manage state funds. We will hand over the summary of four-year support to the national minority organization of the relevant countries and will try to clarify the possible questions with the respective foundations. We would like to work out a more thorough, democratic, and controlled aid system. There is great demand for this both in Hungary and among the Hungarians beyond the borders. We set up a working committee for this. We also set up a committee in charge of coordinating the views connected with the support for the economic activity and subsistence of Hungarians living beyond the borders. Attempts in this direction occurred in the past, but we must advance things. We must try to involve private capital from Hungary and abroad and we must strengthen our cooperation with entrepreneurs from Romania. Naturally, a system of conditions must be created for all this. We must also reexamine the system of scholarships, because many students who come to Hungary to study do not go back. In this matter, we also want to talk to the organization of Hungarians beyond the borders to jointly discuss the future aid system. Probably we will receive the students for postgraduate training and summer courses in the future. I would like to point out, though, that there will be cases in which we will continue to provide scholarships, but we want to support them first of all where they are living. There is an agreement with the RMDSZ on this, as well as with the national minority organization of other countries, and we will jointly work out a concept with them. We also want to set up a working forum aimed at promoting the professional training of the ethnic Hungarian local government officials abroad. Finally, we will try to create a spiritual workshop of national minority policy where we will try to work out a high-level national minority policy concept by clarifying the political basic concepts of this issue (autonomy, individual and collective minority rights, the European practice of national minority protection, etc.), and confronting the various views.

Tokes Conditions Treaty on Minority Rights

AU0411131094 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 31 Oct 94 p 3

[Statement made by Laszlo Tokes, honorary chairman of the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, UDMR, to unidentified ROMPRES correspondent in Budapest; date not given: "Laszlo Tokes on the Romanian-Hungarian treaty"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "The Romanian-Hungarian basic treaty, in my opinion, is not a goal in itself. That is, if we do not manage to correlate the purpose of the basic treaty with the essential cause of solving certain problems regarding both parties, there is no point in concluding the basic treaty," Bishop Laszlo Tokes, who was attending the World Federation of Hungarians, told the Budapest ROMPRES correspondent in an interview.

"It seems to us—considering the West's expectations, by which I mean the democratic European states' wish to see peace, stability, and a tension-free situation in this region—the Romanian party would be contented with the apparent solution of merely concluding the basic treaty, without really solving the problems. We, the Hungarian party, would actually have a great deal to lose, because the Romanian party's claims, namely that the borders and Romania's territorial integrity should be vouched for, have already been achieved. They have merely to be confirmed and reconfirmed, whereas we would have nothing to gain, just lose, as our demands are far from being solved. Thus, compared with Romania, there is much more at stake for us. Romania is in an advantageous position compared with the Hungarian party. That is why we would like to pass over the border issue and tackle the most important clause, that of the ethnic minorities living in Romania," asserted Laszlo Tokes.

Union Leader Considers Possibility of Strike

LD0511104994 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0900 GMT 5 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The opinion of the largest Hungarian trade union's leader is that in the present difficult financial situation, Hungary's financial leadership ought not keep scaring the country day by day by giving information on half-baked and undecided matters.

Sandor Nagy, chairman of the MSZOSZ [National Federation of Hungarian Trade Unions] told MAGYAR NEMZET that he continued to be in favor of a social-economic agreement. However, in case of extreme necessity, he would not shrink back from leading a strike, if the possibilities of negotiations were exhausted.

Czech News Agency To Close Budapest Office

LD0611182194 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 6 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Czech news agency, CTK, has no other choice but to close down its Budapest office from next year because it will no longer receive budget funding. According to the information of the Czech daily MLADA FRONTA DNES, the news agency's only has enough revenue maintain the post of six correspondents, and the Budapest one is not among them. By closing down the present CTK office, the last permanent correspondent of the Czech press will also be forced to leave Hungary.

Damage Caused by Poisoned Paprika Detailed

95CH0038A Budapest NEPSZABADSAG in Hungarian 22 Oct 94 p 5

[Unattributed article: "Green Light for Red Paprika Beginning on Monday; Against Whom Can Lead-Poisoned People File Complaints?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Cooking paprika will once again be available beginning on Monday, in the stores, at least. Temporarily, as a choice between having no seal at all, or the regular seal, a small, white piece of paper will seal the pouches containing guaranteed lead-free paprika.

Industry and Commerce State Secretary Karoly Attila Soos told a news conference that his associates had collected 98 percent, or about 148 metric tons, of all commercially available paprika. The IKM [Ministry of Industry and Commerce] has still to decide what to do with the spice it had collected. Quality controllers will affix the temporary label on paprika pouches to be sold in stores beginning on Monday; the label informs consumers that they are purchasing a controlled product. This piece of paper will appear on pouches until replaced by a genuine seal, after parliament amends the revenue act. In response to a question raised by this newspaper, the state secretary added: While the theoretical value of the seal is about 100 forints, the label that serves as a seal is totally worthless. He cautioned: Selling paprika is still prohibited at markets, in market halls, and in public places.

Division chief Mrs. Tamas Koncse reminded the press that even though the exact cost of action involving paprika is not known, it fully consumed the IKM's market intervention fund. Other sources informed us that while the addition of lead could have provided only a little more than 10,000 forints in added profits to the adulterators, damages suffered by the state could be as high as 400 million forints.

Police Colonel Domokos Margitai reported that more than 100 criminal acts involving paprika have been committed, and that 18 of the 44 suspects have been placed under preliminary arrest. Those who adulterated the paprika violated two provisions of the Criminal Code of Laws: They perpetrated a criminal act with a consumable item and caused grave physical harm to several persons.

"At this time, 65 patients with lead poisoning are hospitalized due to the adulterated paprika," the colonel continued. "They could sue for damages in court, but it is not going to be easy to find out which offender to sue."

Envoy to Moscow on Chernomyrdin's Suspended Visit

WS0411141594 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 4 Nov 94 p 2

[Interview with Polish Ambassador to Russia Stanislaw Ciosek by Piotr Smilowic; place and date not given: "We Have Already Hit Bottom; It Can Only Get Better Now"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Smilowic] What was the real reason for the cancellation of Russian Prime Minister Victor Chernomyrdin's visit to Poland?

[Ciosek] As an ambassador, I have to respect the formal explanation, which everyone already knows. Looking at relations between the two states, however, it is difficult to believe that such a minor incident provided a real reason for calling off the visit. I would not reject any of the reasons speculated about in the Polish and the Russian press.

[Smilowic] What was a more viable issue? The recently emerged possibility of Poland's being included in NATO very soon, political and personnel conflicts within Russia, or the lack of consensus on trade agreements?

[Ciosek] It cannot be ruled out that the issue of NATO played a key role. I wish to stress, however, that there was no one main reason. There have been, obviously, some misunderstandings over economic issues, but the aim of the visit was to dispel them. I personally believe that the cup of bitterness overflowed on the Russian side. A small incident was enough to produce a storm.

[Smilowic] The press campaign launched in Russia seems out of place with the events that occurred at the Eastern Railway Station.

[Ciosek] I would not call that a campaign. It is, however, very symptomatic. I think it is a kind of response to the critical Polish press coverage of Russia, which has been going on for some time. While the USSR still existed, this could have been interpreted as a venting of steam after years of compulsory silence. Polish journalists, however, seem not to have noticed that Russia has changed. Every word of criticism from Warsaw reverberates there like a cannon shot. Thus, every opportunity of exacting revenge of sorts is used.

[Smilowic] It is known that Polish citizens have also been abused in Russia. There was the well-known case of Krzysztof Szostak, killed by Russian police in 1992. How did Poland react to that? Why did a similar scandal not erupt?

[Ciosek] The Poles protested very categorically, observing codes of diplomatic conduct applicable in such situations. We did not, however, interpret the incident in terms of ill will on the part of Russia, as a state. It was an accident.

[Smilowic] But the offenders were never revealed.

[Ciosek] No, they were not.

[Smilowic] How would you comment on the information also published by the Russian press that, soon after Prime Minister Chernomyrdin's ultimatum, stating that his visit to our country depended on whether the Polish Government extended an official apology, a Polish diplomat presumably was going to see him and present such an apology. The fact that the diplomat did not turn up led the Russian prime minister to make his final decision.

[Ciosek] That is complete nonsense. No visit to the Russian prime minister by a Polish representative was scheduled for that day. I was in Warsaw at the time, at crisis headquarters, and asked the Russians not to lose patience, telling them that Foreign Minister Olechowski would send a letter to Foreign Minister Kozyrev. Someone got something wrong, and the distorted information reached the headlines.

[Smilowic] What is your opinion of Yeltsin's decree?

[Ciosek] I have not read it yet, but, from what I do know, it pertains exclusively to countries within the CIS. We have nothing to fear.

[Smilowic] What is the future of Polish-Russian relations?

[Ciosek] All's well that ends well. We have already hit bottom, and things can only get better. We must not allow for two huge states in the center of Europe to suspend their bilateral relations.

In any case, Prime Minister Chernomyrdin should visit Poland, regardless of the results of the investigation into the events at the Eastern Railway Station. I do not doubt he will come. It will certainly be a test of the Russians' goodwill.

Walesa Sends Letter to Lithuanian President

LD0511123294 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1902 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw, 4 Nov—The President's Press Office today sent the text of a letter dated 2 November from President Lech Walesa to President of Lithuania Algirdas Brazauskas. In the letter, Walesa referred to a telephone conversation of 17 October.

"I would like to express my satisfaction with our telephone conversation, which took place during a very important time for both Poland and Lithuania. We have behind us the final acceptance of the treaty between our countries. This document is very significant and brings hope for cooperation and joint actions.

"I have carefully read your letter about a meeting of the heads of the Baltic and Visegrad Group states. I share your opinion that it is necessary in order to explain and discuss political and economic transformations in neighboring countries. We all experience the results of those changes, but some of them cause concern. I agree that members of the European Union, NATO, and other international organizations did not concentrate adequate efforts and the means to help the states from our region to rationalize the process changes. Individual attempts by some of the Central and East European countries to integrate with Europe may awaken concerns about the weakening of our joint potential. That is why I value regional cooperation—the closest cooperation between neighbors. I am convinced that both Baltic and Visegrad Group states may be very successful in this field.

"I would like to assure you, Mr. President, that Polish Republic authorities are open to concrete suggestions of the Lithuanian side and that the problems presented by you may be tackled today. Consultations and working cooperation are the tasks for the appropriate ministries of all concerned.

"I hope you share this opinion and that the development of joint cooperation will be profitable for all."

Possible Olechowski Bid for Presidency Viewed

WS0711095094 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 4 Nov 94 p 2

[Article by Eliza Olczyk and Kazimierz Groblewski: "Fitting Olechowski"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *With the presidential election at hand and no ideal candidate in a situation to win it, every popular and active politician is being "fitted" for the role. Foreign Minister Olechowski has also come under scrutiny, whether he wanted to or not. Olechowski for president?*

Even after he handed in his resignation (and later rescinded it), it is said that he gained electoral support, scoring points in the election.

His opponents accuse him of involvement with structures of the former Polish People's Republic and call him a man of the left. His supporters see him as a highly qualified professional. Lech Walesa saw him as head of a nonparty government, claiming his "physiological predispositions" were a major asset. His name was on Antoni Macierewicz's list. Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz also placed him on his list, among officials he believed violated a law dating back to 1981, prohibiting individuals performing public functions from earning salaries elsewhere.

Andrzej Olechowski, currently minister of foreign affairs, sat on the government side at the Roundtable. This did not prevent him from making a career in Solidarity governments.

At the time of Tadeusz Mazowiecki's government, he was deputy president of the National Bank of Poland [Narodowy Bank Polski]. In Jan Krzysztof Bielecki's government, he was deputy minister of foreign economic cooperation. In Jan Olszewski's government, he became minister of finance. After resigning from the post he became an economic adviser to President Lech Walesa, and, after the last election, he was appointed minister of foreign affairs.

The first question is:

Will He Run?

Andrzej Olechowski has reason to be grateful to Lech Walesa. Thanks to his support, he became head of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Walesa also benefits, at least in terms of propaganda, from the fact that Olechowski is associated with him.

Andrzej Olechowski does not have a Solidarity background, which means that he has no sentimental reasons to stand by Lech Walesa through thick and thin.

There are signs that there is no full symbiosis between the two. From what we know today, Olechowski did not inform the president of a decision as important as his resignation.

Although facts show that Olechowski is under no obligation to stay in Walesa's camp, it would be tactless of him to run in the election if Walesa were also to run—that is, if he decided to compete with Walesa.

On the other hand, it would be quite strange for the popular politician Olechowski to not consider becoming president.

If, in the end, Walesa decided not to run in the presidential election, the situation would be clearer. The reason it is inappropriate for Olechowski to run would disappear. If Walesa does run, Olechowski is unlikely to. At least that is what it seems at present.

Olechowski...

Is Very Lucky

...no one brings up the mistakes he made in the past against him. He probably owes this to his "stately" image. No one remembers that he advocated establishing EC-II, while simultaneously supporting the president's idea of giving every citizen 100 million zlotys, despite the criticism of other economists.

He is considered to be politically "innocent." No one remembers that he had already run in elections and lost. After all, he headed the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms in last year's election.

Not Such a Sure Winner

One must keep in mind that Andrzej Olechowski has no constituency of which to speak. There are no clear reasons that senior citizens, farmers, or blue-collar workers should vote for him.

Of course, there is one factor that may tip the scales—his "stately" image. Many people might be tempted to vote for "the man who looks so good on television."

People similar to Olechowski might vote for him, people who are successful, well-off, businessmen, people with university degrees. He could scrape together some votes from various groups and supporters of different parties, taking votes away from all of the other candidates. This could, however, prove insufficient to win the election.

In Public Opinion Polls

...and speculation about possible presidential candidates, Olechowski's name has often appeared. In February of this year, in a poll conducted by the Public Opinion Research Center [CBOS], 7 percent of respondents chose Olechowski as their candidate.

In a poll conducted in October by the Center for Research on Public Opinion for ZYCIE WARSZAWY, Olechowski had 9 percent support (the same as Jacek Kuron), ranking behind Aleksander Kwasniewski and Waldemar Pawlak but ahead of Lech Walesa, for instance.

In a popularity poll published by GAZETA WYBORCZA (conducted by CBOS in early September), after a hypothetical second round, Olechowski lost to Aleksander Kwasniewski (29 to 35 percent) but won against Jacek Kuron (36 to 24) and Lech Walesa (39 to 14). An analysis of the polls shows that Olechowski's voters would be most of all from well-off people interested in politics. He is also popular with the age group 45-55, which includes people at the height of their professional careers. Other supporters include people with rightist viewpoints.

In an open poll (where respondents themselves supply the name of the candidate for whom they would vote in the election) conducted by the Social Research Laboratory [PBS] from Sopot for RZECZPOSPOLITA, Andrzej Olechowski received only 2 percent of the vote. In reality, the outcome of an election depends on the candidates who ultimately run for head of state. Simulations carried out by PBS demonstrate that, if Olechowski represented the Belweder camp (implying Walesa would not run for reelection), he would get 25 percent of the vote (falling behind Kwasniewski but beating out Pawlak, Hanna Suchocka, and Leszek Moczulski), and, in the second round, he could stand a slight chance of beating Aleksander Kwasniewski with 49 to 51 percent of the vote.

This Will Be a Tough Political Campaign

Hot issues such as the Concordat are bound to dominate. "Shotgun" types like Kwasniewski and Walesa stand the greatest chance of success in such campaigns. They set the tone for the campaign, decide how votes are distributed, and set criteria according to which voters evaluate the remaining candidates. The voice of a politician weighing arguments against each other cannot help but get through.

Perhaps Andrzej Olechowski's unwillingness to discuss the issue is not playing coy. He might have not yet decided whether he will run.

Olechowski will not run to lose because he does not need a defeat. If he does run, he will very likely win. At present, his chances are not very good.

Union of Freedom's Labuda Interviewed

MM0711094894 Gdansk GLOS WYBRZEZA in Polish 29-30 Oct 94 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Sejm Deputy Barbara Labuda, Union of Freedom activist and head of the "Bez Dogmatu" (No Dogmas) Rights and Freedoms Association, by correspondent Monika Malessa-Drohomirecka; place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Malessa-Drohomirecka] How do you justify your group's opposition to Poland's ratification of the Vatican Concordat? After all, the Concordat is a kind of interstate agreement, customarily accepted in political practice, which regulates relations between two states.

[Labuda] I see no benefits the Polish state might derive from the Concordat. I do not understand why we should be resolving matters concerning the Catholic Church through the mediation of another state. In Italy, Spain, and Portugal, the Concordat was accepted in order to restrict the church's power and separate it from the state. On the other hand, the document we are talking about here will significantly increase the sphere of influence of the Catholic Church while restricting the power of the secular authorities. There is an awful lot of obsequiousness and servility in the document. Its approval will mean that a lot of money will be spent from the state coffers to support the church. But, even without that money, the church is a most powerful and wealthy institution, which incessantly interferes in all aspects of public life. That is most harmful.

[Malessa-Drohomirecka] The disquieting tendency shown by the church to take over the running of public and political life has been noticeable for some time now. How do you assess the chances of defending the state's democratic instruments against that expansion?

[Labuda] Democracy in our state is still weak, its institutions are vulnerable, and its political parties are fragile. If the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD], the strongest political group, embracing upward of a dozen federations and associations, receives only as much as 21 percent in the election, it is manifestly far too little for that party to be able to run the state on its own. So it must look for allies. When parties do not find firm support in society, they begin seeking it among the church hierarchy. Politicians go and consult the bishops just as, in the past, they used to go and consult the Polish United Workers Party [PZPR] Central Committee.

In reality, the church's power rests on our weakness, on the weakness of the whole of society. If it were otherwise, the church would not command such a high political position in Poland. In any case, society's attitude toward the church is beginning to change slowly. The church is losing public respect precisely because it is beginning to turn away from attending to matters to which it should be attending by virtue of its mission: spiritual support and help for those who have been wronged by fate. When the church was concerning itself with these things, people loved it precisely because of that.

[Malessa-Drohomirecka] You have mentioned the fact that there is a marked lack of a strong political party on our political stage. Not even the Union of Freedom, which is perceived as a party with a high chance of exerting positive influence on our political life, has taken proper advantage of that chance. There are voices that draw attention to the danger that that party might suffer a split, especially in the context of a presidential campaign.

[Labuda] If the Union of Freedom bosses decide not to announce their presidential candidate until as late as the spring of next year, they have already practically deprived that candidate of all chances of winning the election.

[Malessa-Drohomirecka] It is, in effect, a suicidal step.

[Labuda] But precisely such a decision has been made already. When, two years ago, I spoke of the need to change the Union of Freedom leadership, I was shouted down. Instead, it was decided that Union of Freedom chairmanship and its top posts should be held practically for life. With all respect for Tadeusz Mazowiecki, I believe that he ought to pass the political power and the place at the helm into the hands of a more dynamic candidate.

Some people would like to expel me from the party. Well, let them. I am beginning to feel less and less concerned about it.

[Malessa-Drohomirecka] It is always possible to step down.

[Labuda] I cannot leave just yet. I still have friends in the Union of Freedom who think exactly as I do but who want to stay and change the party from within.

[Malessa-Drohomirecka] Is it, in any case, possible to combine party membership with the imperative of remaining true to one's own views?

[Labuda] Very often, membership of a particular political party demands that we give up our own concepts, sometimes even our beliefs. It is a kind of self-imposed limitation. Much depends on the way in which decision-making and promotion mechanisms function in the party and whether the party creates for its members the opportunity to realize their political ideas. The system of promotion in the Union of Freedom all too often operates in an abnormal way. For example, Hanna Suchocka became a member of the Democratic Union only a short time before assuming the office of prime minister. It was similar with Bronislaw Komorowski: No sooner did he join the party than he became its general secretary because that was what the party boss wanted. You can assume a variety of important posts in the party and in the state just like that, irrespective of your own effort, ability, preparation, or length of service. This discourages people and makes them demoralized. That is not good because, if we cannot safeguard democracy in our own party, what guarantees can we give that we would be capable of safeguarding it on a nationwide scale?

[Malessa-Drohomirecka] So have you not thought about setting up a new party of your own?

[Labuda] Indeed, I have had this suggested by people who come to me from other parties and political groups or from no party at all and talk to me about it. If and when such a party is needed, it will be created.

[Malessa-Drohomirecka] Increasingly, the opinion is voiced nowadays that politics is beginning to dominate the economy. This is particularly obvious in government decisions and also in parliamentary decisions that are directed at restricting competition and subsidizing large state enterprises and supporting their unprofitable production. What is your attitude about the government policy that aims at running the economy from centralized positions?

[Labuda] You must not say things that are not substantiated!

[Malessa-Drohomirecka] But these are facts!

[Labuda] Not entirely. In the first place, there is an awful lot of confusion in everything that is happening in the economy at the moment, rather than an attempt at centralizing anything.

The central authorities are weak, so let us not disseminate all those centralization myths about it. Unfortunately, a number of different institutions, persons, and "respected authorities" are doing everything they can to ensure that it is weak. Individual government teams try to reinforce the central power with varying degrees of incompetence. Whether they make correct or grotesquely wrong decisions, they are forever being attacked from all sides. As for me, I am interested in seeing strong authorities and a strong Poland, regardless of who is in power in it at any particular time.

[Malessa-Drohomirecka] Delays in the implementation of the privatization scheme and in setting up the National Investment Funds [NFI], the extension of a protective umbrella over the mining industry (through constant subsidies, financed by the taxpayers, to support unprofitable coal mines), the upholding of a monopoly in the telecommunications services—all these are facts.

[Labuda] Privatization involves very large sums of money. Prime Minister Pawlak was quite right in voicing his reservations about the NFI's. Foreign companies occupy positions on the NFI supervisory boards without having brought in any capital. Moreover, to all intents and purposes, these companies are not accountable to anyone, while wielding unlimited influence on decisions of strategic importance for the enterprises involved in the NFI's. If they come to the conclusion that they have not been successful, they can always withdraw and go back home without any consequences.

[Malessa-Drohomirecka] And how would you explain the fact that structures equivalent to the NFI's function in many other countries to the benefit of their shareholders, and no one feels cheated there?

[Labuda] But that is yet another mythical belief. As far as I know, no other country anywhere has introduced the kind of principles of the administration of private enterprises that have been proposed here. Our parliamentary act on NFI boards contains solutions that constitute an attempt to transplant certain schemes of the laws obtaining in Anglo-Saxon countries to our Polish ground.

[Malessa-Drohomirecka] The majority of enterprises privatized during the past year were those that were doing well and were not threatened with bankruptcy, so the government has been congratulating itself on large budget revenues obtained from the scheme. On the other hand, firms that are in danger of collapsing and for whom privatization would be a big opportunity for healthy revival are still waiting in line.

[Labuda] This is religious talk. I call it religious because it is based on an uncritical, dogmatic attitude to privatization. I oppose this attitude.

[Malessa-Drohomirecka] The present government team is charged with stemming the progress of the local self-government reform.

[Labuda] We are still having to deal with confused notions here. After all, the central issue in this case is what kind of local authority we want in Poland: one composed of two tiers—that is, the voivodship and the parish—or one made up of the more costly three tiers—that is, the voivodship, the district, and the parish. Where do you see that alleged stemming of the reform? A debate on the subject of which model to choose is still under way.

It seems to me that local self-government structures operate in luxury conditions in our country. They are not monitored sufficiently by either the local press or the opposition, which is too weak. Parishes are frequently considerably wealthier (proportionately, of course) than the State Treasury. They prefer not to have too many tasks to perform but keep their money, instead. And sometimes they invest the money in ventures that are not needed by their cities at all. I have seen a number of places already where public buildings have been given marble facades and marble interiors.

Parishes have very extensive possibilities, which they do not always know how to exploit properly. Some are already doing very well indeed, whereas others still have much to learn, just like most of us. But that will eventually happen. I am deeply convinced that it will.

Details of MON Crisis Committee Proceedings

WS0311084594 Warsaw ZYCIE WARSZAWY in Polish 29 Oct 94 p 2

[Article by Luiza Kowalska: "The Minister's Smile, Waga's Weight"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *There are no grounds for accepting Defense Minister Kolodziejczyk's resignation, states a preliminary draft of a resolution summing up the proceedings of a special subcommittee to resolve the Ministry of National Defense [MON] crisis. ZYCIE obtained shorthand notes from the subcommittee's closed meetings, during which nearly all participants of the Drawsko dinner were heard.*

The final version of the position of the MON crisis subcommittee will be adopted next week. According to the preliminary draft, the subcommittee is to support the minister of defense, admitting it was unable to recreate the events that took place during the Drawsko dinner. It is worth remembering that, according to our sources, the participating generals voted to dismiss the minister.

It is highly unlikely that all members of the subcommittee will support the resolution. Leszek Zielinski, of the Nonparty Bloc in Support of Reforms, said yesterday that he might vote against it.

ZYCIE WARSZAWY gained access to shorthand notes from subcommittee meetings, closed to the press, during which the minister and the highest-ranking generals spoke of Drawsko and the situation in MON.

General Janusz Ornatowski, head of the Silesian Military District, on the breakfast in Drawsko: "A conflict had already surfaced at breakfast. Mr. Sobieslaw Zasada, a businessman who wants to cooperate with the Army, proposes a toast—the day before had been the president's birthday—with good wine or champagne, 'Sto Lat' ['May He Live 100 Years'] is sung, everyone is sitting at one table, and Deputy Minister Waniek stands opposite the president and smiles with that, let us say, ladylike smile of her's. We all wondered why. Certain rules of conduct and respect... But that is probably a minor conflict."

Vice Admiral Romuald Waga, commander of the Navy, on the Drawsko dinner: "I was surprised they served such good food. I gained a few kilos, which I regret and consider one of the major drawbacks of the drills. (...) I raised my hand because I wanted to talk about problems facing the Navy. Because the president did not allow me to speak, I lowered my hand."

Gen. Tadeusz Wilecki, head of General Staff [SG], on cooperation with the civilian leadership in MON: "The defense minister traditionally pays numerous foreign visits. His functions require him to travel abroad approximately two or three times a month. Considering the intensity of the political situation and the expansion to the West, the minister is unable to take care of all of the day-to-day details, and the system is such that nearly everything is administered centrally. Many issues are therefore put aside and not dealt with. The SG intervenes in many areas where decisions are simply necessary. I admit that."

On the Military Information Services: "I would like to tell you that I did not ask or plead for the services. (...) I am even considering asking the minister to take supervision over them."

On the rules of organizational procedures, suspended by Piotr Kolodziejczyk upon entering office: "I believe any rules are better than none because even lousy rules lay down certain principles and regulations."

On staff policy: "For God's sake, it is not my fault that the SG has higher potential than the ministry. That is a fact because, for example, General Puchala is a figure, General Robelek is a figure. Specific generals, specific experience. But staff policy within the ministry...those people simply do not have experience."

General Leon Komornicki, deputy head of the SG, on the minister: "But I have had practically no words with the minister, and the minister has not shaken my hand for some time. Why, I do not know. I cannot understand that. If anyone holds a grudge against me, and various comments are made about me out there on all sides—a 'parlor general,' they say—I would like to know why because I am a general and I find it difficult to work. I find it difficult to implement objectives, and my subordinates see that. This is inadmissible."

Defense Minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk on cooperation with the military: "I felt foolish when Labor Minister Miller told me: 'You know, I was at Oksywie because that is where I did my military service.' He really did serve there. It was all very nice, but I arrived at the conclusion that such wonderful things were happening on my home field, and I knew nothing about it. There were many more similar cases."

General Edward Bolciuch, deputy head of the SG, on the conflict: "A lack of exhaustive information may lead to certain differences of opinion, which, as cruel life shows, may grow as large as we have been witnessing lately."

Gen. Janusz Ornatowski on the press: "I am angry most of all with the press (...) Revolt is rash; revolt is conspiracy. I feel like neither a rebel nor a conspirator." The general asked the deputies for their assistance in "straightening out all of the unnecessary issues that have been made public, particularly by the press. This is all very offensive to the generals. I have a huge pile of press clippings. I do not know, I do not want to talk about censorship, but what the press has been doing lately greatly disturbs us. It disturbs me personally as a general."

General Zenon Bryk, head of the Krakow Military District, on the press: "We could have talked in front of the defense committee but without leaking anything to the press. No good will come of that. Did I write to GAZETA WYBORCZA or ZYCIE WARSZAWY? (reference to leaks on the Drawsko dinner—ed.). Everything was magnified by ZYCIE WARSZAWY, and you know by which journalist."

Piotr Kolodziejczyk on the press: "The committee meeting was open. There was a journalist in the room, and she wrote what I said—namely, that I had discovered a conservative streak in the reasoning of the SG, and that was what enraged our generals. And then facts were distorted—that Luiza Kowalska, to whom they are allergic, stepped off the minister's plane in Drawsko. That is untrue because the press arrived on a separate plane, but Luiza Kowalska represented the worst to them, which is ludicrous."

Daily Discusses Situation in MSW, MON, MSZ

WS0411084594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 3 Nov 94 p 5

[Article by Malgorzata Subotic: "Crucible of Presidential Ministries"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Heads of the Ministry of National Defense [MON], Foreign Affairs [MSZ], and Internal Affairs [MSW] are "close to resigning." It is as hot in these ministries, often referred to as presidential, as in a crucible. Personnel conflicts are accompanied by disputes over power and a battle over new legislative solutions.

Foreign Affairs Minister Andrzej Olechowski submitted his resignation, even though a few days later he suspended his decision until the end of the year. "The departure of Piotr Kolodziejczyk (MON) is a foregone conclusion," deputies of the subcommittee investigating the so-called Drawsko case predicted recently. "These are already Milczanowski's (MSW) death throes." This is how a representative of the Sejm Internal Affairs Committee evaluated the return of Police Chief Smolarek and of the fact that Deputy Minister Zimowski was denied supervision over police.

Thus, it is very likely that the presidential ministers may go, which does not at all mean that this has to happen soon. Announcements of resignations are first of all a manifestation of conflicts over these ministries. Each conflict is a little different. This especially applies to Minister Olechowski's ministry.

However, there is at least one common denominator: These are all so-called presidential ministries. Still, the question is, what does this adjective "presidential" really mean?

A Very Strange Formation

"The motion requesting the appointment of the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of national defense, and the minister of internal affairs is submitted by the prime minister. However, before that, he hears the opinion of the president." This is what the Small Constitution says about this. But it also includes the following statements: "The president exercises general control over foreign relations" and in the area of "internal and external security of the state." (However, "The Council of Ministers carries out the domestic and foreign policy of the Polish Republic").

"There are no presidential ministries," believes Center Accord President Jaroslaw Kaczynski, who adds that, "because of the opportunism and cowardice" of others, the president managed to take these ministers from under control. "It is a very strange formation: Nongovernmental ministries, whose ministers, even though they are members of the Council of Ministers, are treated in line with principles that are entirely different from the principles applied to the others," says Bronislaw Komorowski of the Freedom Union, former deputy minister of national defense. "This leads to a situation in which they are deprived of responsibility and are caught in a political game."

The Paradox of the Coalition

According to Jaroslaw Kaczynski, it is the present governing coalition that contributed most to increasing the "presidential character" of MON, the MSW, and the MSZ. Early, when the Pawlak Cabinet was being formed, all personnel decisions in the ministries in question were left to Lech Walesa. Then, with pathetic efficiency, the coalition fought to introduce "its own people" there. Kaczynski believes that this was the number-one sin committed by the government of the Polish Peasant Party [PSL] and the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD].

However, everything started at the "roundtable." As Kaczynski recalls, General Jaruzelski (who was supposed to be president) was to guarantee that there would be no revolutionary changes in these areas. Now, what was good then "brought on pathetic results" later on.

Indeed, the three ministries—MON, the MSW, and the MSZ, became so very "presidential" only under Prime Minister Pawlak. However, the Small Constitution, which introduced the regulation saying that the president issues his opinion on candidates for heads of these ministries, was adopted by the Sejm in October 1992, when the Suchocka government was already working. Thus, the present government was the first to be formed when the Small Constitution was in force. Nevertheless, in practice, the "opinion issuing custom" changed, and Walesa was given a free hand by the SLD-PSL coalition, as far as selection of the staff for these ministries was concerned.

From Kiszczak to Milczanowski

[Passage omitted] When the Small Constitution came into effect—that is, when the Suchocka government was in power—the three ministers were Onyszkiewicz (MON), Milczanowski, and Skubiszewski (head of the Polish diplomatic services for the last time). In the Pawlak government, the president left only Milczanowski (he also selected him for MSW head in the Suchocka cabinet). [passage omitted]

The President's Men

Kolodziejczyk, Milczanowski, and Olechowski are people on whom Walesa could count. In the beginning, Olechowski had a separate, strong position. He was not only a loyal subordinate but also one of Walesa's closest aides, a politician who could play a role in politics on his own. If the president decides to run in the election, it is probably Olechowski who will be in charge of his election campaign. If Walesa decides otherwise, Olechowski can become a candidate himself and may stand a good chance of winning.

The situation of the other two ministers is different. Neither Kolodziejczyk nor Milczanowski is likely to play a political role on his own. The MSW head is "unconditionally loyal to the president, which does not mean that he blindly follows his orders." As for Minister Kolodziejczyk, what he did to his promoter can be compared to the behavior of the members of the National Council of Radio and Television.

Additional Protectors

Both in MON and the MSW, Walesa has "additional protectors"—that is, people who are loyal to him and who hold key offices: Gromoslaw Czempinski, head of the Office of State Protection, and General Tadeusz Wilecki, head of the General Staff. Even if both ministers resigned and Prime Minister Pawlak appointed directors of the ministries (this would most probably happen if it were impossible to agree upon new candidates), the president would retain his influence and control in these ministries (but, as far as the MSW is concerned, this would last for only some time).

However, his situation is the most comfortable in MON. In line with the Small Constitution, "the president is the commander in chief of the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic." He appoints and recalls the head of the General Staff, commanders of the various types of the Armed Forces, and commanders of military districts.

Thus, the resignation of Minister Kolodziejczyk is not just a remote possibility, despite opposition of the main parliamentary groupings (Bronislaw Komorowski says that "resignation of Kolodziejczyk would be a tragedy"). The president would remain in control over the Army, and, at the same time, he would weaken the coalition by depriving the Pawlak cabinet of a minister "with full rights." At the same time, there are not many people who would like to see the heads of the other two presidential ministries go.

Milczanowski Views Current State of Police

WS0711081594 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 31 Oct-1 Nov 94 pp 1-2

[Interview with Polish Minister of Internal Affairs Andrzej Milczanowski by Jan Ordynski; place and date not given: "Not Everybody Has To Like Me"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Ordynski] According to some papers, you are in a deadlock after the lack of success in appointing a new head of police, a new head of intelligence, and criticism of the state secret law. Rumor has it you have even considered resigning.

[Milczanowski] Absolutely not. To be precise, as far as Lieutenant Colonel Zacharski is concerned, I have no one to blame but myself for my predicament. It was my own sovereign decision, which I made deliberately. I am prepared to defend it today. Later on, however, certain developments occurred over which I had no control, and Lt. Col. Zacharski could not remain head of the Intelligence Board at the Office for State Protection [UOP].

[Ordynski] With the hindsight of all of the consequences of Zacharski's nomination, would you do the same thing again?

[Milczanowski] Do you mean a certain reaction?

[Ordynski] I mean any reaction you encountered.

[Milczanowski] In that case, I can tell you that positive reactions prevailed, and they came from various sides, both from within and outside the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MSW].

[Ordynski] How would you comment on a statement made by one of the deputies that you have become the last epigone of the post-Solidarity camp within the MSW? Are you really the last Mohican at Rakowiecka [MSW headquarters] and the old guard takes the lead?

[Milczanowski] I simply pay a certain price when I listen to statements made by some politicians and journalists, when I see my face on posters with unjust accusations only because I act according to common sense and do not play the role of a monkey that everybody has to like. I want to say one thing, perhaps the most important in this interview, and that is that, in the current times of mental and conceptual chaos, people who want to act rationally risk being slandered and unfairly judged. I am not a prissy missy, however, and I will pay the price without hard feelings. Such are the times. I will not, however, leave the path of normality.

[Ordynski] How would you define it?

[Milczanowski] For instance, if officers were once verified by committees, made up of a majority of people with a Solidarity background, they have to be treated like everyone else. Otherwise, the services, divided into those who are better and those who are worse, practically could not operate. I do not label anyone. I evaluate people only in terms of professional skills, IQ, and loyalty.

[Ordynski] Does not the MSW tend to "seek protective wings" of certain individuals or political camps?

[Milczanowski] I believe the ministry is apolitical, although I am aware of how broad the term is.

[Ordynski] The head of UOP is accused of being too servile toward the Belweder.

[Milczanowski] I would like to clarify that. UOP is obliged to report to the president and the prime minister. No one seems to remember that.

[Ordynski] What about informal ties?

[Milczanowski] I do not have any to anyone. I even meet with the prime minister more often than with the president. He does not limit me with any instructions.

[Ordynski] It is not true that you have given up your prerogatives on Gdansk and handed them over entirely to the president's people?

[Milczanowski] No, I can assure you of that with a clean conscience.

[Ordynski] Could you describe your relations with Colonel Czempinski? Zacharski's case gave rise to various speculations.

[Milczanowski] Minister Czempinski has never shown a sign of disloyalty, although we did differ in opinions when the issue of the nomination came up. Our relations are very good.

[Ordynski] The problem of the head of police was finally patched up, but one may hardly call it a solution. In my view, the feeling of temporariness that surfaced in connection with the situation has not been assuaged. Many commentators claim that the issue remains open and that Zenon Smolarek is bound to leave his post sooner or later.

[Milczanowski] The prime minister decided to leave Superinspector Smolarek in place. This was within his authority. I would like to repeat what I said at the Police Solidarity congress—namely, that it is the obligation of all officers and my own to support head of police Smolarek in fulfilling his duties. I also said that all quarrels, arguments, and conflicts within police ranks have a negative effect on the efficiency of the police. As it faces very difficult tasks, it should diligently perform duties and not enter political debates. It is difficult not to see how discipline in the police ranks has diminished.

[Ordynski] Could the problem of Smolarek have been avoided if the politicians had shown more prudence?

[Milczanowski] Mental discipline applies also to me, and discussing this issue would not serve the interests of the police.

[Ordynski] Let us remain with the problems of the police, however. Did this year bring an improvement of safety in Poland or, as it is claimed, a crime wave that is flooding us?

[Milczanowski] Where there is smoke there is fire, and the fears expressed by our citizens are well founded. The state of security has considerably worsened in comparison with the 1980's. In 1990, the crime rate dramatically soared and remains at the same level today, with only a slight fall. Of course, this is a side effect of the political and economic transformations. It is a cost of the change of system, which I have said repeatedly. Democracy, a free market, the opening of borders all carry dangers we did not experience before. We did not know smuggling on such a large scale. We probably had no drug problem, no credit fraud or international organized crime groups traveling so freely. Do you recall what a sensation the bank robbery at the post office in Jasna Street [in Warsaw] in the 1960's was? Today such things happen nearly once a week. These changes have not sufficiently reached the subconscious of politicians and citizens. The transformations that have taken place within the police over recent years—for instance, the fact that many experienced officers left and that 40 percent of the staff are newcomers—have also had negative effects.

[Ordynski] Would you risk a statement that, nevertheless, the police have grown stronger and more effective and are gaining experience?

[Milczanowski] You cannot deny that, for example, the Warsaw police, which until recently remained the weakest element of the system, are more effective in crime detection. Lately, they have caught many dangerous criminals, tracked down illegal alcohol bottlers and amphetamine producers. They are also more visible on the streets. Since March of this year, approximately 2,000 people joined the police. In my view, everyone has acquired a habit of complaining about the police without noticing the changes that are taking place.

[Ordynski] What is the condition of the average policeman outside Warsaw?

[Milczanowski] Every case requires separate treatment. I have been hearing complaints about the insufficient level of training for a long time. They have nothing to do with reality. Training has become more intensive and is carried out on a permanent basis. One must keep in mind the reality I already referred to—namely, that there is a huge group of new officers who are only acquiring experience and will become qualified after about five years in service.

[Ordynski] Is Poland safe against external threats?

[Milczanowski] Polish civil intelligence and counterintelligence have a huge potential that has not yet been used. The citizens or, more important, the journalists should not take this personally. One often hears opinions underestimating these services. I would advise everyone not to underestimate them, although neither these organizations nor I wish to discuss their potential in public.

[Ordynski] Has the threat of organized crime and terrorism risen or fallen?

[Milczanowski] As far as so-called classical terrorism that extremist organizations resort to is concerned, there is no such threat, but we do not underestimate it.

[Ordynski] Is the fact that no terrorist actions have been carried out on the territory of Poland due to the fact that these organizations have no interests here or because they have no possibility of operating?

[Milczanowski] Neither is the case. We do interest them to some extent, and they even visit us. We have information that some of them come here to rest, and others try to invest on a small scale. What I call retired terrorists come with the purpose of carrying out reconnaissance or offering direct support. Our services are in control and have good knowledge of the situation. I do not wish to pursue this topic.

[Ordynski] What do you have to say in your defense on the law on state secrets?

[Milczanowski] I am beginning to doubt, not for the first time, whether there is political goodwill for carrying out profound changes. It is difficult to find any in the parliament. How can you talk of political goodwill when the Sejm passed a majority vote on the law and the Senate rejected it? I made a speech strongly emphasizing the need for passing the law, and I will do so again once the Sejm gives me an opportunity.

[Ordynski] The president has also changed his opinions on the law.

[Milczanowski] But, in the end, he said he would sign it. Back to the issue: A hysterical uproar erupted concerning the regulations, in which fictional arguments were given. I claim the law is far more liberal than the British act of 1989, passed in a country with a much longer tradition of democracy.

[Ordynski] The British, however, had a problem with the Strasbourg Tribunal in connection with the law.

[Milczanowski] But, as I said, it is far more liberal than the British act. TYGODNIK SOLIDARNOSC recently presented a thorough review of relevant solutions in other countries. We, on the other hand, move from extreme to extreme. Suggestions have even been made to abolish all limitations. Let me quote a relevant passage from the Constitution: "... assiduous protection of state secrets is the obligation of every citizen." Why should journalists be excluded from this constitutional duty?

[Ordynski] Perhaps experiences of the past are the reason people are allergic to any attempts at curbing the freedom of speech.

[Milczanowski] I believe journalists defend primarily their group interests. If we shed light on state secrets, create an adequate context and amplify the issue, the circulation of the title will increase. I would like to add that we do receive information that some papers paid dishonest authorities for the disclosure of certain information, and it was not petty cash.

[Ordynski] This is a common practice in many countries.

[Milczanowski] Yes, but opportunity makes a thief because, if a state official is offered a huge single payment—let us say, 50 million zlotys—he is tempted. A journalist, in turn, being aware of his impunity, risks nothing. If he knew he could be punished, he would think twice before revealing a secret. I am saying all this because I seriously doubt whether there is political goodwill to clarify major legal issues. I will continue to appeal to the Sejm to consider state interests, which are, after all, the interests of a huge majority of citizens.

Tinca, WEU Delegation Discuss Cooperation

AU0711145694 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 7 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] This morning, a Western European Union [WEU] delegation held talks with Romania's national defense minister, Gheorghe Tinca, our correspondent Doina Seiciuc informs us.

The sides examined aspects of cooperation between the Romanian Army and the WEU.

According to the Romanian defense minister's statements, the Romanian side showed willingness to participate in joint actions with the Western political-military organization. As is known, the WEU has a planning cell [celula de planificare] with an exclusively military character, and the Romanian side was also invited to participate in its operation by sending military observers.

In principle, Mr. Gheorghe Tinca said, we are in favor of such an act.

European-Iraqi Center Opens in Bucharest

JN0511101194 Baghdad Republic of Iraq Radio Network in Arabic 2100 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] A European-Iraqi center has been established in Bucharest. The initiative was taken by a number of friendship establishments and societies in Romania. In a statement published by the Romanian paper (TODAY'S EVENT), (Remosio Sar), head of the center, said that the center will support the Iraqi people in confronting the blockade, which has been imposed for over four years. He indicated that branches of the center have been opened in Romanian provinces, and that the center will also seek to open branches in Central and Western Europe. Various humanitarian institutions and commercial companies are participating in the center.

Radio Broadcasting Protocol Signed With PRC

AU0411174894 Bucharest Radio Romania Network in Romanian 1100 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Today, one hour ago, in the hall bearing the name of Catinca Ralea of the Romanian Radio Broadcasting Company, the cooperation convention between the Romanian Broadcasting Company and the Ministry of Radio, Television, and Cinematography of the People's Republic of China was signed, our correspondent Doina Cretu informs us.

On behalf of the Romanian party, the convention was signed by the deputy general director of the company, Mr. Paul Grigoriu, while on behalf of the Chinese party, it was signed by Mr. (?Wanyan) (?Chun), the deputy general director of the PRC Radio Company.

The convention designates the framework within which the relations between the two institutions are to develop, the expansion of the cooperation in the technical domain, as well as an exchange of programs and editors.

Human Rights Leader Views Regime's Actions

AU0511140594 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 1 Nov 94 p 12

[Interview with Nicolae Stefanescu-Draganesti, president of the Romanian League for the Defense of Human Rights, by Laszlo Botos in Csikszereda, Romania; date not given: "What Was Cofariu Doing in Marosvasarhely?—Human Rights and Violations in Romania"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *In the course of his tour of the country, the head of the Romanian League for the Defense of Human Rights (LADO) also visited Szekler. LADO President Nicolae Stefanescu-Draganesti gave an interview to UJ MAGYARORSZAG at the end of his meeting in Csikszereda [Miercurea Ciuc].*

[Botos] Mr. Stefanescu, what have been the most frequent and most serious human rights violations in Romania since December 1989?

[Stefanescu] One cannot do such a "classification" because human rights are violated in a lot of different ways in Romania. For example, no one deals directly with the living standard. The government does not care that our living standard is dropping rapidly. They only follow the changes in the exchange rate of the dollar, and the prices increase several times in the meantime.

The other thing is the right to work. But unemployment is growing rapidly, and the young people's future is becoming increasingly hopeless. The situation of health care is also a serious human rights violation. It is dreadful! There is not enough medicine and adequate medical equipment, and hospital departments are closing down.

The issue of trade union rights is also extremely serious. The government is doing everything in its power to disrupt the trade union movement, so that there is no unity among the trade unions and they have no power. By offering various ministry positions for trade union leaders, the government estranged the various trade union blocs. We also have important statistics that the trade unions never won a single court trial on strike matters. Every single strike has been declared illegal in the past four and a half years.... Is it possible that every single strike is illegal and unjustified? Have the citizens and employees demanding their rights never been right? Is it not clear then that there is centralism here and central orders prevail?

It is also not accidental that the presidents of the justice administration institutions and the attorneys and judges do not participate in the meetings of our League; if they do, they leave quickly, so as not to be confronted with the truth and to be forced to tackle the issue of human rights. Most of our justice administration is corrupt. Corruption has reached the highest echelons in this country. This is not only my opinion; the parliamentary deputies and even the president himself said so. I have never heard of any judge, attorney, or deputy being arrested....

[Botos] What can the individual, the citizens do against human rights violations? What can they expect after submitting their complaints?

[Stefanescu] The complaints filed by individuals and citizens in general remain without any answer. Files are kept idle in the presidential office and the government office for months. Either no answer whatsoever is given, or the people are sent to LADO.

[Botos] What is LADO's power in solving such complaints?

[Stefanescu] In many cases, we succeeded in putting policemen on trial, policemen who hit, tortured, or even killed people during interrogation. In other areas, however, we rarely succeeded in helping with the complaints. However, in many cases, when we felt helpless we turned to international human rights organizations and forums with which we have very good relations and good cooperation. With their help, we try to exercise pressure on the government in Bucharest and on the relevant authorities, and we succeed in favorably dealing with 60-70 percent of these cases, of course depending on the extent the plaintiff was right.

I should say that we do not have too much power within Romania, but we have much more influence abroad, and tangible results of this emerge frequently. Most recently, we turned to the international forums on the issue of archeological excavations in Kolozsvar [Cluj] and we succeeded in avoiding a violent conflict between the Romanian and Hungarian inhabitants of the town.

[Botos] In your opinion, how can the demands of the national minorities be solved?

[Stefanescu] Equal rights should be given to everyone, without any advantages. Advantages should be given neither to the minorities nor to the majority. I learn in Romanian, he learns in Hungarian. I attend a Romanian university, he attends a Hungarian one if he wants. Somehow like this. I think the Hungarians in Kovaszna and Hargita Counties are not discriminated against. However, I am convinced that, in Kolozsvar, an ethnic Hungarian has no chance whatsoever against a Romanian inhabitant of the city. Almost the same applies to Marosvasarhely [Tirgu Mures].

[Botos] In your opinion, why is that so?

[Stefanescu] Some kind of a directed exclusion of Hungarians is under way, from various administration and other leadership levels. [Kolozsvar Mayor Gheorghe] Funar repeatedly declared that the Hungarians should go to Hungary, the border is open. Vadim Tudor said that, had he been Romania's president, he would have hanged every Hungarian from the bell-tower. These people and people like them want to achieve something that even the Ceausescu regime failed to "achieve." Under such circumstances, we cannot speak of understanding and peaceful coexistence. I also participated in the Parliament meeting and I heard the firm position of Funar's party: The Hungarians should be content with what they have, otherwise might lose everything....

[Botos] And the government does nothing against such extremist nationalist manifestations; instead, it even encourages such manifestations.

[Stefanescu] Yes, because it is also clear from the president's position that he is against the Hungarian minority. He repeatedly declared this.

[Botos] Do you know the case of Pal Cseresznyes of Marosvasarhely? What is your opinion about the fact that Pal Cseresznyes was the only one sentenced to a very harsh prison term among the participants in the ethnic disturbances in Marosvasarhely in 1990?

[Stefanescu] This affair shocked us deeply. I went to parliament several times and I brought the matter up and showed Andras Suto's picture made after he was seriously injured. This was a color picture made by a French journalist. They told me in parliament also to show Cofaru's picture. I said I cannot show his picture because I do not have a picture of him. Even if I had one, I would still not show it because Cofariu's case happened after Andras Suto was beaten up. In other words, Cofariu from the village of Hodak had nothing to do in the center of Marosvasarhely. Some people beat up Andras Suto and injure his eye, and then comes Cofariu to fight on the side of the people from Hodak? This is a shame! Marosvasarhely has 50,000 Romanian inhabitants; nevertheless, 600 rowdies from Hodak had to come in to make order? It is clear that the government had a hand in this serious ethnic incident. How quickly 600 people armed with sticks crammed into five buses and and appeared in Marosvasarhely! This was an organized event! Many people did not even know where they are going and why. There were also young conscripts dressed in civilian clothes among the attackers from Hodak. A clear parody!

[Botos] You confront the most serious problems in this country daily. In your opinion, what is the current Romanian situation like?

[Stefanescu] The central committee of the LADO met recently, a committee made up of 39 members. We discussed a lot about the current situation in Romania, so I do not only convey my own opinion here. We agreed that this is no longer a communist regime. But it is a regime of communists! We can find communists everywhere, from the very top, from the presidency down to parliamentary leaders. The entire state apparatus is ruled by communists. Ceausescu failed to create a state apparatus made up exclusively of communists. Iliescu has now succeeded in doing that. All the cleansing and personnel reductions in offices served this purpose, because people who were not members of the Romanian Communist Party are fired, and only the former party members stay behind.

Bosnian Serb Army Declares General Mobilization

LD0411230994 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2232 GMT 4 Nov 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Belgrade, Nov 4 (TANJUG)—The Supreme Command of the Bosnian Serb Army on Friday declared a general mobilization.

The Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA quoted a statement released by the Command as saying it had decided to "put all available resources at the service of the defense of the borders of the homeland."

The command has cancelled all leave and ordered all men of military age to report immediately to their outfits.

All schools of higher learning have been ordered to [words indistinct] the students, both those in [words indistinct] and those studying in neighboring Yugoslavia, have been ordered to report for army service.

All able-bodied men of military age who have taken refuge in Yugoslavia or elsewhere have been called to report back or face being "charged with desertion, which entails prosecution and the confiscation of property."

The Supreme Command has recommended to the Bosnian Serb National Assembly to declare a state of war throughout the Srpska republic to enable the Bosnian Serbs to "resist the increasingly violent enemy attacks." [passage omitted]

Karadzic Comments

LD0411171594 Sarajevo Radio Republike Srpske Program for Abroad in Serbo-Croatian 1630 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Following a meeting of the Supreme Command in Pale today, Srpska republic President Radovan Karadzic stated that the Supreme Command will defer to the National Assembly to introduce a state of war throughout the Srpska republic, and that a general mobilization has been ordered.

Karadzic stressed that a National Assembly session will be held next week and that the Ministry of Education will probably suspend the work of institutions of higher education. In that case we shall form student brigades, Karadzic said, adding that we are launching a decisive battle against our enemy.

Serbs Claim Croatia Violating Arms Embargo

LD0511113194 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1108 GMT 5 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Bileca, 5 Nov (TANJUG)—Three ships loaded with weapons, ammunition, military equipment and fuel from Islamic countries for Bosnian Muslims arrived in the Croatian port of Ploce Friday [4 November].

The Bosnian Serb Army said, quoting its intelligence service reports, that there were 9,000 tons of fuel on one ship, and that two others contained a cargo of weapons, ammunition and military equipment.

The United Nations Security Council imposed an embargo on arms sales to former Yugoslavia on Sept. 25, 1991.

The cargo will be transported via the communication Ploce-Metkovic-Mostar and further to Sarajevo and central Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Bosnian Serb Army intelligence reports said.

The Bosnian Serb Army believes the cargo is direct support to the Muslim offensives on a number of fronts in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The sources said Croats were hastily preparing for continuing the war. The Croatian Army is carrying out complete mobilization in the area of Dubrovnik and equipment and weapons for the newly formed units are speedily arriving at Dubrovnik's Cilipi airport, they said.

Movements have been observed from Dubrovnik towards the town of Ravno in southern Bosnia-Herzegovina, the region of Herzegovina, and from the direction of Metkovic towards Stolac and Ljubinje, also in Herzegovina, and the build-up of Croatian Army units in combat zones.

All the above indicates that strong attacks could take place from these directions in the next few days and attempts to break through and seize parts of Serb-controlled Herzegovina, the Bosnian Serb Army sources said.

Two Croatian Army brigades are engaged in the Bosnian Croat offensive underway in the area around the town of Kupres, 150 km west of Sarajevo.

Croatia had 22 brigades with about 40,000 troops in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina in the spring of 1992, one-third of its military potential at the time.

At the beginning of the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatian Army units occupied one-third of the municipality of the Serb-held town of Trebinje in Herzegovina, 20 km notheast of Dubrovnik.

Foreign Minister Views UN, Foreign Assistance

AU0711094594 Sarajevo VECERNJE NOVINE (Maribor Edition) in Serbo-Croatian 29 Oct-1 Nov 94 p 5

[Interview with Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubijankic by Mirjana Micevska; place and date not given: "The Behind-the-Scene Games Regarding Bosnia"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bosnia-Herzegovina has many friends, countries in both the East and the West, which have been helping wholeheartedly in the struggle for liberation. We talked to Foreign Minister Irfan Ljubijankic about the attitudes of the international community, especially the Islamic countries, toward our country.

[Micevska] What are the main factors defining the present situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, regarding its relations with the outside world, as well as the relations of the outside world toward our country?

[Ljubijankic] What defines the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is the influence of Europe, the Islamic world, and the neighboring countries. The multiculturalism of our country is the characteristic without which it is not possible to consider the world's relation toward us. This is the reason the United States understands us best, as it also has this multicultural character.

However, the approach of the Islamic world to Bosnia-Herzegovina is a very important element. We must say that they helped our country economically and politically, but their potential is far greater. Financial and economic aid is not enough. We know that the Arab world has a huge potential to influence the Western world, which is its oil.

The Behind-the-Scene Games

[Micevska] There have been such cases, and they turned out to be very efficient.

[Ljubijankic] For example, Malaysia's decision shook the entire aged British Empire when it stopped the links with the British economy because of certain political disagreements.

The Islamic world could help Bosnia-Herzegovina far more through the use of such political pressure.

Apart from the Western and Islamic countries, Bosnia-Herzegovina is also influenced by our neighboring countries, the countries of the former Yugoslavia, primarily Serbia and Croatia. This is an area that demands special analysis. We are in a sandwich between two countries that had a better territorial, military, and economic history than Bosnia-Herzegovina. They had the possibility of cooperating as independent countries, and this is where certain aspirations stemmed from. We have established balanced relations with Croatia, which is the precondition for any defense of both Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unfortunately, there is this aggression by Serbia and Montenegro, which is ostensibly below the surface. However, we are aware that the supply of the so-called Srpska republic is still being conducted across the borders, according to the reports we receive. Not only are materials and technical equipment passing, but are too.

[Micevska] To what extent is the international community able to influence this relation toward Bosnia-Herzegovina, and what instruments does it have for doing so?

[Ljubijankic] With the exception of the United Nations, they must be military force, economic power, and the power of the diplomatic behind-the-scene games in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Naturally, we must respond militarily, develop our production, and strengthen our economic status on the international scale; and, naturally, with the diplomatic means at our disposal.

The Deadline Is 14 December

[Micevska] Could you point out some of the elements of the strengthening of our country and its position in the world?

[Ljubijankic] Membership of and integration into the international financial and monetary institutions is an important element of the sovereignty of a country. Without that there is practically no sovereignty.

I headed our delegation at the annual Congress of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in Madrid. We defined the first steps Bosnia-Herzegovina must make to become integrated in these international institutions. The other former Yugoslav republics have already made that effort, and they are full members of the IMF and the World Bank.

We have to collect $30 million, which is only the first step, the ticket to the IMF, which in turn is the precondition for reprogramming the debt, for any debt-repayment plan.

[Micevska] Have there been any indications that these funds could be collected?

[Ljubijankic] It will be very difficult. We are making efforts in that direction. Within the framework of these international institutions, we have initiated the collection of the initial funds—between $2 and $3 million—which the World Bank would provide, so that an action has been initiated to pay the people who would work on the plan for reintegrating Bosnia-Herzegovina into the international financial climate. We also initiated the concept of creating a group of countries, friends, who would be selected from the main World Bank shareholders and who would help Bosnia with the future arrangements with the IMF and the World Bank. They would, therefore, not be paying for us, but helping us consolidate our economy.

The deadline that has been set for our IMF membership is 14 December this year.

[Box, p 5]

Decisions Without Obligation

The international community has established the United Nations as a kind of political successor to the League of Nations, which existed before World War II, and which, as we know, became a sort of signing club, an institution whose decisions never obliged anyone. I am afraid that the United Nations is going in the same direction. Many UN decisions have not been implemented, and it is particularly indicative that many resolutions regarding Bosnia-Herzegovina have not been implemented.

UN: Next Army Objective Could Be Donji Vakuf

AU0711130494 Paris AFP in English 1249 GMT 7 Nov 94

[Article by Francis Curta]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Nov 7 (AFP)—Moslem-led government forces Monday pressed on with attacks across Bosnia, attempting to turn recent territorial gains to strategic advantage, according to reports here.

The main thrust now seemed directed at gaining control of an all-weather route leading up from the Adriatic to central Bosnia—by way of Kupres, a town captured last week—while pushing Serbs back from encroaching positions on a line northeast of Sarajevo.

Fighting continued on at least four fronts, with government troops claiming to have seized new territory north of Sarajevo at the weekend, while the Serbs said they had regained up to a third of ground lost earlier in the west.

The UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) here was unable to confirm reports of much heralded Serb counter-attacks in the vicinity of the Bihac pocket in the west.

Croation Serbs continued to shell Moslem-held population centres along the border in support of their Bosnian Serb brethren, while government and Serb forces remained locked in battle for control of the Serb-held town of Bosanski Krupa, UNPROFOR spokesman Major Sol Koos said.

Clashes were also reported to the southeast of the Bihac pocket, with sounds of tank and mortar explosions outside Serb-held Bosanski Petrovac.

Meanwhile, artillery shelling continued in the north of the country, notably around Doboj and Gradacac, amid reports of an exodus of civilians heading south away from the fighting.

On the central western front, activity was reduced around Kupres, the town captured on Thursday by Bosnian Croat HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and Moslem-led forces after the Serbs forces had apparently simply abandoned it.

Since then most HVO forces have withdrawn south and there were no new reports of any joint operations between the two allied federation forces, leading observers to believe that last week's coordinated attack might have been a one off push.

Serb radio said HVO forces were now targetting Glamoc, southwest of Kupres.

Meanwhile, Bosnian commander Rasim Delic Monday praised HVO participation in the capture of Kupres as "important in both the military and political sense."

Moslem-led and HVO forces last year fought a bitter war, notably for control of the south of the country. Despite the creation, under U.S. auspices, of a joint federation in the spring, the two forces have yet to fully cooperate.

Bosnian Army Deputy Commander Jovan Divjak estimated that Moslem- led forces were now also able to throw into battle an extra 20 to 25 brigades of between 2,000 and 4,000 men each, which previously had been required to fight off the HVO.

Moslem-led forces remained engaged in fighting north of Kupres with UN officials here suggesting their next objective could be the town of Donji Vakuf, a major intersection in central Bosnia.

The capture of the town would be of major strategic value to government forces, giving them uninterrupted all-weather road access from the Adriatic coast into central Bosnia.

Government reconnaissance units have been sighted in the vicinity of Donji Vakuf "which could be their next objective," Koos said.

North of Sarajevo, government forces claimed the capture of 60 square kilometers (35 square miles) along with 30 abandoned villages near Vares.

Koos said unconfirmed reports spoke of Moslem-led troops either capturing, or surrounding a 20 to 30 square kilometer hilly area known as the Krst feature, along with successful attacks further north around Toljenak.

Meanwhile, NATO planes Sunday and Monday morning buzzed government and Serb positions in Sarajevo in the wake of an artillery duel Saturday night which had threatened to end an uneasy truce concluded in February around the capital.

Reappearance of Mladic Quells Rumors of Rift

AU0411175694 Paris AFP in English 1749 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Nov 4 (AFP)—The appearance of General Ratko Mladic, head of the Bosnian Serb army, on Serb television Friday [4 November] has quelled rumours of a rift in the Serb leadership after a recent absence of the Serb general from public view.

Mladic appeared on Serb television alongside Serb leader Radovan Karadzic Friday as Karadzic declared a general mobilisation of forces across Serb-held territory.

Mladic made no statement, content to listen as Karadzic announced that the leadership would soon be asking the self-proclaimed Serb parliament to extend the state of war currently declared in western Bosnia to all Serb-held areas.

A UN official who had looked into Mladic's absence said it was believed that the general had taken holidays for the first time since the start of the war.

Mladic's absence had coincided with a series of victories for Bosnian Government and Croat forces in an offensive launched last week.

Much of the territories regained by the government and Croat troops are areas awarded to them by an international peace plan for Bosnia but which the Serbs had refused to hand over.

Mladic Threatens To 'Conquer Additional Terrain'

AU0711115594 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 7 Nov 94 pp 150-151

[Interview with Ratko Mladic, commander in chief of the Srpska army, by unidentified DER SPIEGEL correspondent; place and date not given: "Borderlines Have Always Been Drawn With Blood"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [DER SPIEGEL] Mr. General, the Muslims are on the march. Do you fear that the Bosnian Serbs will be defeated?

[Mladic] Owing to Western assistance and the arms factories left behind by the former Yugoslav Army, the Muslims are increasing their military capabilities immensely. However, we will lose nothing, but will reconquer the territories that the Muslims took away from us—and, as a punishment, we will even conquer additional terrain.

[DER SPIEGEL] In this connection, will you also order an offensive against the UN-protected zones?

[Mladic] This has not yet been decided. The United Nations supports the Muslims in the security zones with supplies and weapons. The blue helmet force behaves like a strip-tease dancer and incites the Muslims. Why do Western governments not tell the public how many smuggle aircraft—from Turkey or Germany, for instance—were downed with arms and ammunition for the Muslims on board?

[DER SPIEGEL] Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Bosnian Serbs, has admitted "weak spots" for the first time. A general mobilization was called—as an emergency measure because your patriots are weary and you cannot find any voluntary front fighters any more?

[Mladic] I have enough soldiers and enough tanks to defeat the Muslims totally. However, this is not what we want. By ordering a general mobilization, we only want to warn the world not to drive us into total war.

[DER SPIEGEL] But you are personally responsible for the escalation. You rejected every peace offer.

[Mladic] For three years now, one useless meeting has been followed by the next. At this moment, we are interested in peace. However, it must be negotiated between the three warring parties; we do not accept a diktat from the outside.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are you ready to give up territory you conquered? And if so, how much?

[Mladic] Do not enrage me. In the past, all of Bosnia was Serbian. But after World War II, the Muslims puffed themselves up. Today, we are holding 73.8 percent of the country; this is our lebensraum, which I defend. We have generously disclaimed the remaining 26.2 percent. I do not care whether the Muslims and Croats set up an Eskimo state or launch themselves into space.

[DER SPIEGEL] But Karadzic has said he is ready to negotiate on the Serbian percentage. Would you oppose him if he disclaims land?

[Mladic] Let us leave the negotiations on percentages to the politicians; I am a soldier. No decision will be made without the people. Borderlines have always been drawn with blood. If the Muslims continue the war, they will lose everything. Then you Germans can take them in, since you love them so much.

[DER SPIEGEL] It seems you are still putting all the blame for the Balkan war on Germany. Do you?

[Mladic] No, but some of the blame. As for the rest, I have a favorable opinion of the Germans; I do not by any means believe that the crimes of the past are a burden for the present generation. However, Germany as a big power certainly cannot blindly bind itself to the Croats and Muslims. Many history-minded Germans were stunned speechless when the Croats said: "Thank you, Germany." As for this Koschnick from Mostar, he came to Pale and threatened that NATO would bomb us if we defended ourselves against the Muslims in Mostar. We need more understanding from the Germans.

[DER SPIEGEL] What for?

[Mladic] German neutrality is important for the peace efforts. Why does no German general come to us to see for himself how dangerous another escalation of this war would be? I would guarantee his personal safety.

[DER SPIEGEL] Your own brothers in Serbia dropped you. President Milosevic is furious because you refused to sign the peace agreement.

[Mladic] Our goal is and remains the unification of all Serbian territories—from Knin, Banja Luca, and Sarajevo to Belgrade. What the German people were permitted to do—to live in one state—cannot be denied the Serbs. We do not allow ourselves to be divided into three parts by a treaty.

[DER SPIEGEL] How long will it take for the sanctions from Belgrade to become effective and make your war apparatus break down?

[Mladic] Very long. The world has imposed terrible and criminal sanctions on Serbia and has thereby forced the Serbian Government to punish us in a mean and inhuman way. However, the people on this side and the other side of the Drina River are in agreement and will sit in judgment upon this some day.

[DER SPIEGEL] What are you going to do if President Milosevic recognizes Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent state, as the United Nations has asked him to do?

[Mladic] That would be disastrous, a terrible mistake with inconceivable consequences.

[DER SPIEGEL] Many people in Serbia believe that the Yugoslav Army is not convinced of Milosevic's course in the Bosnian crisis and does not support him. At least a quarter of the military officers are said to be ready, in the event of a NATO attack, to promptly intervene on the side of their Bosnian fellow-soldiers.

[Mladic] We are strong enough. We do not need help from Belgrade. NATO must finally see that never has a war been won by air raids alone; what is decisive are the ground troops. However, neither Germany nor the United States would ever consider letting their sons die for the Muslims. This is also what foreign generals have confirmed to me.

[DER SPIEGEL] Are you not concerned about being put before the international war crimes tribunal in The Hague some day? Even some of the Serbian press has described you as a brutal cynic responsible for the Serbian Army's atrocities.

[Mladic] I do not have time to take issue with paid scribblers. If U.S. generals who served in Vietnam, or British officers who raged on the Falkland Islands, appeared before a war court, then I would go to The Hague voluntarily. They waged war in a foreign country. I defend the heritage of our forefathers for our people. I have not violated the Geneva conventions in any military operation. Wherever crimes were committed, they must be punished—on all sides. However, the West must not impose its judgment on the Balkans by force.

Dutch UN Troops Attacked by Serbs in Cizmici

AU0411201794 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 4 Nov 94

[Report by Ibrahim Becirevic from Srebrenica]

[FBIS Translated Text] In the past month, members of the peace forces have been ever more frequent targets of the rebel Serbs. Yesterday at 1600, a Dutch Battalion patrol found itself under fierce automatic fire by the aggressor while it was performing its regular tasks in the Cizmici region. One Dutch soldier was wounded on that occasion and was to be evacuated from Srebrenica today. In order to silence the Bratunac chetniks, the Dutch Battalion called on NATO air forces.

As of this morning, the chetniks have again been showering the area along the lines surrounding the protected zone with antiaircraft and infantry weapons. There is no information on casualties.

Serbs Attacking Bihac, Cazin, Velika Kladusa

LD0611151994 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 6 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Mirza Sadikovic has filed a new report from Bihac:

[Sadikovic] Karadzic's and Martic's chetniks have continued attacking free territory of the Bihac district. Artillery and infantry attacks (?on fringes) of newly liberated parts of Bihac municipality and parts of the Bihac district controlled by the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] have intensified; the villages of [names indistinct] have again been shelled. Chetniks from the so-called Serb Krajina are trying to carry out infantry breakthroughs in this part of the front. Villages surrounding Velika Kladusa, the town of Velika Kladusa itself, and parts of the municipality of Cazin are again under attack today. The number of wounded in this part of the battlefield over the past three days has topped 20, and three people have been killed. Several children have also been wounded. [passage omitted]

Serbs Launch Attack Against Croats in North

LD0711103794 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1000 GMT 7 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The chetniks simply refuse to stay idle on the Teslic-Komusina front. According to the political activity department of the 111th (?XP) regiment, early this morning the Serbs took advantage of thick fog to launch a fierce infantry attack with strong artillery support. Croatian Defense Council [HVO] units have been putting up strong resistance. Three defenders have been wounded. A radio message has been intercepted in which a Serb commander asks for urgent ambulance service. This indicates that the enemy has also suffered losses.

Serbs Recapture Lost Territory Near Bihac

LD0611204894 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2001 GMT 6 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 6 Nov (TANJUG)—Units of the Srpska republic army [VRS] are continuing their advance on Bihac, SRNA reported this evening, carrying a statement issued by the command of the VRS 2d Krajina Corps in Drvar.

The command specified that after heavy fighting today members of the 2d Corps captured the village of Cukovi, 16 km from Bihac, said to have been "the last and most important Muslim stronghold along the upper course of the Una river."

According to SRNA, it has been said in Drvar that VRS forces also managed to move their lines in other sectors of the front in the Bihac pocket and that they are now in control of the territory captured by Muslim units in their offensive of 13 days ago.

The command of the 2d Corps said that fierce clashes have also been taking place around Krupa na Uni where, it was said, members of the Muslim army's 5th Corps unsuccessfully attempted to move Serb lines.

No major fighting was registered today around Kupres and in the Grahovo-Glamoc direction, the VRS sources said.

Bihac 'Noose' Tightening

LD0711112694 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1043 GMT 7 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Petrovac, 7 Nov—Joint Muslim-Croat forces have resumed their combat activities on all battlefields within the zone of responsibility of the 2d

Krajina Corps of the Srpska republic army, Serb military sources reported this morning.

According to the same sources, exceptionally heavy fighting is continuing on the Bihac-Krupa front near Krupa na Uni, where members of the 505th Muslim Brigade have for the last seven days been using all available means to break through the Serb defense lines.

Other sections of the front are under the full control of the Serb forces who are tightening the noose around Bihac hour by hour. Last night, the 2d Krajina Corps took control of Lohovska Brda and some other locations on the left bank of the Una river, which fell into Muslim hands 14 days ago.

Since last night, combined Muslim-Croat units have been attacking on the Kupres front. Members of Izetbegovic's 7th Corps pounded Serb positions from their stronghold at Saljuga. At the same time, on several occasions last night and this morning HVO [Croatian Defense Council] units used multiple rocket launchers followed by infantry onslaughts to break through the Serb defense lines at Zloselo, seven kms northwest of Kupres.

Following a one-day lull, Croatian forces became active on the Glamoc section of the western Krajina theater of war. From the direction of Mount Golija, Srpska republic army positions along the Livno demarcation line were pounded from mortar launchers but with no serious consequences.

Attack 'Resisted Successfully'

AU0711114294 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 7 Nov 94

[Report by Muhamed Mulic]

[FBIS Translated Text] The first defense lines of the 5th Corps soldiers are being subjected to ferocious artillery attacks from howitzers, mortars, tanks, and other heavy arms, accompanied by attempted infantry breakthroughs. However, all attacks on the free territories of the Bihac District have been repulsed effectively and the enemy returned to his starting positions.

The artillery attacks of the united aggressors on Velika Kladusa continues today, too. A howitzer grenade killed a 9-year-old girl in the town while several civilians sustained various degrees of injuries.

The aggressor's artillery is also pounding the outskirts of Cazin commune and the settlements along the border with Croatia, in the Bihac district.

In the zone of responsibility of the Croatian Defense Council General Staff for the Bihac region, the united aggressor continued to attack from UN Protected Areas—from [word indistinct], Donji Lapac, and Korenica—and attempted infantry attacks on the defense lines, which were resisted successfully.

Army Takes Strategic Hill in Bosanska Krupa

LD0611150894 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 6 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Members of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army have again inflicted heavy losses on the chetniks and extended the free territory. A hill above Bosanska Krupa—an important strategic point—has been liberated, and a large quantity of weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment was seized.

Concentration of Serb Troops Reported at Gorazde

LD0611172394 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 6 Nov 94

[Passages contained within quotation marks are recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] An extraordinary and regular sessions of the government of the Republic and Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina were held in Sarajevo today. The extraordinary session was devoted to the examination of the military, humanitarian, and health situation in the free and internationally protected zones of Gorazde, Srebrenica, and Zepa. In light of the fact that the aggressor has intensified its combat actions against these areas, and that over 100,000 citizens who live there are facing very difficult problems trying to survive, the government has adopted conclusions calling on UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] to fulfill its tasks, and has also addressed international health organizations asking for help for the population in this area.

The regular session adopted several draft laws [words indistinct] customs office in Doljani and the beginning of work of the federal police unit. The government endorsed a draft law on the extension of the mandate of the republican assembly and [words indistinct]. [Name indistinct] has a report:

[Correspondent] [Words indistinct] the topical issues of Gorazde, Srebrenica, and Zepa—the free and protected areas—whose citizens are still exposed to the aggressor's shelling and sniping [words indistinct]. The report was submitted by Deputy Defense Minister [name indistinct]. According to the latest report, he said, [indistinct passage]

[Deputy defense minister] "We also have reports that the aggressor has been concentrating its manpower and weapons in the Gorazde 20-kilometer exclusion zone [words indistinct]. According to one-month-old reports, UNPROFOR representatives registered new locations with 12 to 15 aggressor's artillery pieces in the Gorazde exclusion zone, which had not existed in this area or were camouflaged.

On 12 October this year, large groups of chetniks in plain clothes entered the exclusion zone from the right bank of the Drina River and occupied the villages of [names indistinct] from the direction of Cajnice. On the same day, a large number of motorized vehicles arrived from

Visegrad bringing military equipment and aggressor soldiers who were deployed on the left bank of the Drina River within the exclusion zone. On 11th and 12th October this year, the aggressor concentrated a sizeable force from the direction of Rogatica in the region of [name indistinct] and Vranovina [words indistinct] from the direction of Foca in the region of [name indistinct]."

[Correspondent] The aggressor is undertaking similar military activities in the Srebrenica area. Latest reports speak about bringing in 1,500 fresh forces from the so-called Yugoslavia. Simultaneously, they are bringing in forces by helicopters from the region of [name indistinct] and Bajina Basta. In Montenegro and the wider territory of Uzice, around 7,000 soldiers have been mobilized; they should be brought in to replace those who have been sent to Bihac. One tank company from Mt. Majevica has been sent toward the protected zones.

On the basis of these and other details, Deputy Defense Minister Muhamed [surname indistinct] put forward conclusions that the government then adopted:

[Deputy defense minister] "In the light of the unfavorable developments for the aggressor in the theater of operations of the First, Fifth, and Seventh Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, and following Karadzic's announcement that all combat actions will be directed against the protected areas, we can expect offensive combat actions against the protected enclaves in eastern Bosnia to begin soon, primarily against Gorazde, where the deployment of fresh forces from Uzice and Valjevo is likely. We think that with the forces at its disposal in the safe areas the aggressor cannot achieve its offensive actions without bringing in fresh forces."

[Correspondent] Bosnia-Herzegovina Prime Minister Haris Silajdzic said:

[Silajdzic] "We have to task Minister Hasan Muratovic to inform relevant UNPROFOR officials about the aforementioned. We deem that these activities around protected areas are indicative of a possible attack on these areas soon."

[Correspondent] The second key topic of the extraordinary session was health and humanitarian situation in the protected areas and numerous contagious diseases that have spread there. Even if we send doctors there under UNPROFOR protection the aggressor captures them and holds them as POW's, which contravenes all international provisions of humanitarian law, Health Minister Bozo Ljubic said. In addition to submitting a detailed report on this issue, Minister Ljubic also announced conclusions that the government had adopted:

[Ljubic] "First, to ask UNPROFOR and the UN Security Council to take energetic and effective measures for the release of the captured members of the Sarajevo medical team, [names indistinct].

"Second, to inform the international public [words indistinct] represents flagrant violation of the Geneva Convention on the protection of medical staff.

"Third, it has become obvious that [indistinct passage]"

[Correspondent] The government also adopted conclusions on humanitarian situation in these zones; a decision has been made to demand humanitarian air-drops.

At the regular session, a number of draft laws on education and customs was endorsed. A report on the situation in Doljani customs office and the federal police unit was examined.

Owen Views Bosnian Serb Defeat at Kupres

MS0511121294 London ITV Television Network in English 1900 GMT 4 Nov 94

[Interview with Lord Owen, EU peace envoy, by Jon Snow in the London Studio, from the "Channel Four News" program—live]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] [Snow] Lord Owen, how much of a turning point do you think today may prove to be?

[Owen] In Bosnia it will I think mean that Dr. Karadzic has to take more account of his vulnerability, and more account of the fact he is asking his soldiers to defend areas which he was actually going to give back in any negotiation, and hopefully it will mean he will listen more to President Milosevic and accept the Contact Group map. In Croat-Serb relations today has been an important day in that we've got the foreign ministers of the two countries openly meeting in Zagreb, and soon will go to Belgrade.

[Snow] It seems a very odd and rather unsymmetrical situation, because here you are actually seeing an improvement of nation to nation relations, and a worsening of the conflict on the battlefield between the same parties?

[Owen] Yes, but there's a significant divide between the Pale leadership and Dr. Karadzic for the Bosnian Serbs, and the Belgrade Serbs under President Milosevic.

[Snow] And that's being maintained?

[Owen] Yes it is, and the ban on everything other than humanitarian goods is being held by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. But there is still a need to have an overall comprehensive settlement, and if we can deal with Bosnia as with the arguments inside Croatia, between the Croatian Serbs and the Croatian Government, all well and good, but the crucial thing is of course, to get a change of mind in Pale, particularly by Dr. Karadzic.

[Snow] But he's saying today that the international community is now effectively backing the Bosnian Government's activities on the battlefield, and that to some extent is true. There's no regret about yesterday's fall of Kupres is there?

[Owen] That is not true. The United Nations has resolutely refused to become partial to back one side, to become a combatant. You've only got to see the quite unwarranted criticism that flows over General Rose, or General [word indistinct] to realize this, or Mr. Akashi. The UN are quite rightly refusing to become committed, their job is a humanitarian one, their job is to promote peaceful settlement, and I wish we'd had a little less criticism of people who are doing their job in trying to hold a balance. I believe the Bosnian Serbs will attack, and probably there may be some very difficult situations, and particularly getting humanitarian aid through. But nevertheless I think it is a warning and maybe they will seize it as an opportunity to go to peace after a few weeks more intensive fighting.

[Snow] Nevertheless, I mean, as you said earlier in the day, the Bosnian Serbs are actually fighting over territory that they are going to lose anyway under the Plan?

[Owen] Yes, Bihac, Kupres are all going back.

[Snow] Right, therefore if in fact the Bosnian Government forces, even with Croat assistance take these things back by force in the meantime, well, is the international community going to be so concerned?

[Owen] Well I think the international community isn't there to take sides either way, I mean war is going on. We can't stop that war, we can contain that war, that's what we're trying to do, we are impartial. We can all have our views on various things that are done, and when someone offends, when they attack UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces], we retaliate. When they make it impossible for UN to carry out a Security Council mandate, we put the pressure on, which ever is the (?people). Sometimes that's the Bosnian Government, more often it's the Bosnian Serbs. But all the time we're pushing for a peaceful settlement.

[Snow] Very briefly, therefore the threats from Karadzic of all-out war and the rest of it, are to some extent bravado in what you regard as a rather vulnerable position?

[Owen] I don't want to make him sound too vulnerable. I'm afraid the Bosnian Serbs can still have a stranglehold on Sarajevo, they could still cut some of the roads leading into Sarajevo, perhaps from Mostar, maybe elsewhere. We shouldn't underestimate their strategic position, but I think their vulnerability is defending this very long confrontation line.

[Snow] Lord Owen, thank you very much.

7th Corps Commander Comments

LD0611231494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 6 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is scoring fresh victories while the world is still reacting to the successful liberation drive launched by the 7th Corps. To this effect, General Mehmed Alagic, the commander of the 7th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, gave a news conference. Vehid Gunjic has the report.

[Gunjic] Following the exceptional military victories scored by the 7th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and units of the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] on the Vrbas-Kupres front, Brigadier General Mehmed Alagic, the Corps' commander, this evening held a well-attended news conference for domestic and foreign reporters.

Gen. Alagic began the conference by saying: We have wrapped up our operation and we are going on.

Asked about the cooperation between the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Croatian Defense Council, the commander of our army's 7th Corps replied: We worked separately on the preparations for this action, but acted in unison in the final operations. We enabled the Croatian Defense Council units on the Kupres front to regain the honor of the Croat nation, while they helped us tear down the defenses of the Serb people who had embraced criminal policies. The chetniks have been completely routed here.

The 7th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army has emerged much stronger from this campaign, and we are continuing our collaboration with the Croatian Defense Council in line with the military agreement concluded recently.

When asked by a reporter what would be done in the event of a possible chetnik counterattack, Gen. Alagic said: The fighters of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army's 7th Corps and the Croatian Defense Council will offer extremely fierce opposition with all means at their disposal—this is not 1992.

The next question concerned the arms situation; the general replied: We have already lifted the embargo, the spoils of war are impressive. Our might will be even greater in cooperation with the Croatian Defense Council.

When asked if he could give an approximate date for the capture of Donji Vakuf and Jajce, Brigadier General Mehmed Alagic, the commander of our army's 7th Corps, said: We will not necessarily go in that direction. One of the basic military rules is that you do not go in the direction of the entrenched enemy. That is why we might hold our next news conference in Kljuc, Alagic said.

The AFP correspondent asked how important was the HVO's participation in these operations. The general answered: Very important. What has been done so far is extremely good. The HVO can attain their objectives only with us.

How will the Serbs react to the loss of Kupres, another reporter asked. I would not like to be in their shoes, Gen. Alagic replied.

What were the enemy's losses in these operations? We estimate that around 1,000 chetniks were neutralized, he said.

A foreign reporter finally asked: General, do you believe that the Serbs could recapture Kupres militarily? The general replied: They will do everything to get it back; a chetnik prisoner told us it was common belief in chetnik ranks that Kupres was yet another Serbian republic. For this very reason they should definitively be dealt a final blow there. We are well aware of the fact that the

Kupreska Vrata is one of the four most important strategic points in Europe. Never again will the chetnik pass through there, Mehmed Alagic, commander of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army's 7th Corps, said at a news conference this evening.

TANJUG Reports on Muslim-Croat Dispute

LD0511142294 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1343 GMT 5 Nov 94

["Pool" item]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov. 5 (TANJUG)—Local Muslim radio stations Saturday protested because only the Croatian flag was being flown over the town of Kupres, seized by Muslim-Croat forces Thursday [3 November].

The Muslim forces suffered far greater casualties in the battles for Kupres, located 150 km west of Sarajevo, the radio stations said.

A local Croat radio said Saturday that the Bosnian Croat government had set up a police station in Kupres and invited only Croat refugees to return to their homes in the area.

This report was confirmed by the local Muslim radio of the town of Bugojno, 80 km west of Sarajevo. Radio Bugojno said Friday the Croat authorities were preventing Muslim civilians and soldiers from entering Kupres.

Bosnian Croat Force Commander Tihomir Blaskic told Croatian radio Saturday that he was conducting talks with the Muslim Army on further actions in certain areas.

Joint Muslim-Croat formations, backed by two brigades of the regular Croatian Army, seized Kupres Thursday afternoon. The town had been under Serb control since April 1992.

The Muslim-Croat offensive on Kupres and the surrounding area, a plateau of strategic importance which presents a doorway for northern and northwestern Bosnia, began about two weeks ago.

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees said about 2,500 Serb civilians, mostly women, children and elderly people, had fled from the area before the Muslim onslaught.

Bosnian Muslims and Croats fought fiercely for almost a year over territories with mixed Muslim-Croat populations in central Bosnia-Herzegovina, until they signed an agreement on a binational federation in March this year under pressure from the United States.

'Armed Clashes' Reported

LD0411133194 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1230 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 4 Nov (TANJUG)—Tension is rising along the separation line between Croat and Muslim units on the Kupres plateau, local Muslim and Croat radio stations in central Bosnia reported simultaneously today.

According to local Serb military sources, armed clashes over the division of war booty and captured Serb territory have already broken out between the Croatian Defense Council units and the Muslim army in the village of Ravno some 15 km from Kupres.

Muslim Radio Bugojno is protesting because the Croat authorities are preventing Muslim civilians and soldiers from entering the town of Kupres. [passage omitted]

Croats Dismiss Report

AU0411144294 Paris AFP in English 1435 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Excerpt] Sarajevo, Nov 4 (AFP)—Bosnian Croat forces meanwhile denied a report by Serb military sources in the Kupres region that clashes broke out Thursday between Croat troops and the Bosnian army after the town was captured.

HVO spokesman Tihomir Begic dismissed as propaganda the report, carried by the Bosnian Serb news agency SRNA, which said the allies quarrelled over "war booty and conquered Serb territory" in the nearby village of Ravno.

"These claims are false, this is war propaganda," Begic told AFP, adding that he had just returned from the region "which is totally calm."

Serbs Reportedly Shelling Sarajevo Region

AU0411195494 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The 1st Corps Information Service reports that one projectile from a portable rocket launcher and a rifle-launched grenade were launched today from the aggressor's positions on the Dobrinja district. The consequence of the attack is one wounded child.

Two recoilless gun projectiles and several rifle-launched grenades fell on Focanska Street and infantry fire was also opened. Fire from a B-1 gun was opened on Kolacusa and from an antiaircraft machine gun from Orlovac and Sjenicka Kosa on Ciglane and Slatina. Two rifle-launched grenades were launched on our defense lines from Spicasta Stijena. Sniper fire was opened from Zlatiste on Zelengorska Street.

The aggressor is showering the Hrasnica-Pazarici Road with infantry and antiaircraft weapons from the direction of Brezovaca and Golo Brdo. A mortar bomb and a rifle grenade were launched from Brezovaca at our defense lines. The enemy is carrying out offensive operations on our positions at (Kilavac) and (Deligrad).

In the theater of operations of the Visoko brigades, our positions at Zege, Brdo, and Borak were exposed to enemy fire. Operations from Cekrcici and Kut had no consequences on our fighters. Two mortar bombs fell on the region of Smreka Hrasce and Zbiljanski Potok. An antiaircraft machine gun and an antiaircraft gun operated on a section of the Dobranjsko Brdo and a submachine gun operated on the Visoko-Burci road.

On the Olovo battlefield, artillery fire was opened on the defense lines in the region of Kokocevo Vrelo. Defense lines in the regions of Kremenjaca, Kozlovac, Radava, Lisac, and Golo Brdo, as well as villages along the Krivaja River, were also shelled. [passage omitted]

Muslims Attack Key Plateau

LD0611231394 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2129 GMT 6 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Belgrade, 6 Nov (TANJUG)—After a lull of several days, Muslim forces today resumed attacks against positions held by the Srpska republic army on the strategically important Nisic plateau in the northern sector of the Sarajevo front. This was reported this evening by SRNA, citing a statement from the command of the army's Sarajevo-Romanija Corps. [passage omitted]

NATO Planes Buzz Sarajevo To Halt Fighting

AU0711084194 Paris AFP in English 0821 GMT 7 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, 7 Nov (AFP)—NATO fighters late Sunday buzzed the Bosnian capital as a warning to government and separatist Serb forces to refrain from shelling each other, a UN spokesman said Monday.

Planes were heard roaring over the capital at intervals between 10.50 p.m. (2150 GMT) and 11.30 p.m. Their mission was one of intimidation, Major Herve Gourmelon said.

This follows an artillery duel Saturday night in the capital's western suburbs involving banned heavy guns on both sides.

The United Nations blamed Bosnian government forces for starting Saturday night's confrontation which saw Serbs fire back in retaliation with heavy weapons impounded by the United Nations. The guns were fired directly from their UN-guarded compounds.

F-15 and F-18s fighters from the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) were called in to buzz government and Serb positions Saturday night to bring an end to the shelling duel.

The use of heavy weapons has been banned within a 20 kilometre (12.5 mile) radius of Sarajevo since February, but recent violations, including Saturday night's duel, raised tensions here and threatened to drag the capital back into the thick of war.

Serbs Recapture Lost Territory Around Trnovo

LD0611124994 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1134 GMT 6 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Bileca, 6 Nov (TANJUG)—A number of units of the Herzegovina Corps, consisting largely of fighters from Gacko and Srbinje (formerly Foca), in a joint action with the Sarajevo-Romanija corps, succeeded in mounting a counteroffensive and recapturing some of the territories in the area around Trnovo and Mt. Treskavica, the Serb forces' command in Bileca reported today.

The Muslim forces took this territory in a fierce attack they launched a week ago, having passed across the UN Protection Forces-controlled zone. Battles are still raging in this part of the front today and the Serb forces are continuing to advance.

The Serb command claims that several thousand Muslim soldiers went from Sarajevo to Hrasnica via a secret tunnel underneath Sarajevo airport. They are being deployed today in the Mt. Igman and Mt. Bjelasnica areas, from where fresh fierce attacks on Serb positions can be expected over the next few days.

It is reported that the Muslims are intending to attempt a new breakthrough toward Trnovo and link up with their units in the Gorazde area. They are expecting help from their forces in this town which are taking up positions along the separation line on the left bank of the Drina near Gorazde.

Muslim activities were also registered yesterday and today in the Konjic part of the Herzegovina front. Serb positions and the area around Lake Boracko came under mortar fire on several occasions.

From an elevated position above Glavaticevo the Muslims have been shelling from antiaircraft guns and machine guns almost incessantly. No victims have been reported on the Serb side.

Tudjman Receives U.S. Envoys Galbraith, Thomas

LD0511190494 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 5 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Special envoys of the member countries of the Contact Group met Yasushi Akashi, the UN secretary general's special envoy for former Yugoslavia, in private today at the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] Headquarters in Zagreb. The topic discussed is assumed to have been—journalists were not present and there will be no statements after the talks—the political situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina and ways of initiating the resumption of the peace process.

Charles Thomas, the special envoy of U.S. President Clinton, and U.S. Ambassador to Croatia Peter Galbraith, who attended the talks with the UNPROFOR, were received this evening by Franjo Tudjman, president of the Republic of Croatia. The talks are in progress and we are expecting a statement.

Croatia, Bosnia Discussed

LD0511204394 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 5 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman received President Clinton's special envoy Charles Thomas and U.S. Ambassador to Zagreb Peter Galbraith today in the Presidential Palace in Zagreb. They discussed possibilities for the resolution of the crises in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

President Tudjman presented Croatia's firm stands: He told the U.S. diplomats that Croatia cannot accept an extension of the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Forces] mandate unless an agreement on economic issues, put forward by Croatia in the spirit of the resolution adopted by the UN Security Council and the UN Fourth Political Committee on the reintegration of occupied areas in Croatia, is signed by 21 November and its implementation begun by 20 December. Different reports that have emerged on the work of the Z-4 [U.S. and Russian ambassadors to Zagreb, and the UN and European Union representatives at the peace talks] are totally unacceptable to Croatia.

The president expressed the hope that the Z-4 would support Croatia's peace stands, which are based on the Croatian Constitution, the constitutional law, and President Tudjman's peace initiative of 1 November. The Croatian president reiterated that he fully supports a peaceful resolution of the crisis. However, Croatia cannot allow procrastination, Cypriatization, or any secession of the smallest part of its territory, which groups of extremists in Croatian- occupied areas have been refusing to understand for years.

The president asked the United States and the Contact Group members to exert more influence for a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Croatia to be reached on the basis of reintegration of the occupied areas.

The president's special envoy, Miomir Zuzul, and the president's foreign policy adviser, Zeljko Matic, also attended the meeting.

Commentary Views Recent U.S. Statements

AU0511141994 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 27 Oct 94 p 2

[Commentary by Drazen Vukov-Colic: "'God' Is Behind Galbraith"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The U.S. State Department has, after a long time—even if it was in the form of an unofficial meeting with reporters—twice within three days directly talked about something directly concerning Croatia. In the first case it was a denial of Croatian Defense Minister Gojko Susak's statement that in November a high U.S. military delegation will try to help unite the Croat and Bosniak units in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the second case, full official support was expressed for everything U.S. Ambassador Peter Galbraith has been doing as perhaps the most prominent member of "the Zagreb four" in the attempt to join the occupied territories back to Croatia in a peaceful way. Both cases reflected official U.S. positions, although they were not stated as official announcements. The statements on these occasions by Cristine Shelly, deputy spokesperson of U.S. foreign policy, are clear evidence of the new attention paid to Croatia, but also of caution in very accurate interpretations of certain extremely delicate subjects.

At this moment, at which everything in the diplomatic cauldrons is fermenting both on the surface and underneath, in anticipation of some new wine finally pouring over, Washington obviously wants to dispel all the suspicions about the scope of its ambassador's authority, and at the same time deny—so as to make things easier with Moscow, Belgrade, and Europe—all the accusations about the Pentagon and the Defense Department becoming directly involved in consolidating and building some Balkan "military blocs." At the same time there is a message to Croatia, barely hidden between the lines, that it should take what Galbraith says seriously, and talk less publicly about what friends arrange quietly on the side.

All the semi-public hints with accusatory undertones, which attempted to write Peter Galbraith off as a person who adopted the non-existent right to "play the role of local God behind God's back," evidently overstepping the original ambassadorial authority, have thus been denied at the right place. Even when Galbraith states some very free estimates, he has the full support of his employer, as the active mediator in consolidating the agreement between Croatia and the "defected" Serbs. Thus Washington too "supports" the proposals of the four, which have been developed in cooperation with "authorized Croatians and Serbs," and they will soon be presented as the basis for the negotiation agreement.

"Although the Croat-Serb conflict has not escalated into large- scale fighting for nearly two years now," explained Cristine Shelly, "its peaceful resolution is the key factor in consolidating permanent stability in the Balkan region," in which Washington "appreciates Galbraith's contribution" and believes that "the Z-4 group has been making an important contribution to peace in the former Yugoslavia." Washington thus confirmed as early as on 24 October that there is after all a secret plan, about which Galbraith would at that time not speak, and at the same time it also issued a warning to the ones who think Galbraith can be avoided, skipped, or reduced, when he says things that are listened to with horror.

In the other instance, the State Department denied the report in THE NEW YORK TIMES concerning the impending arrival of a U.S. military delegation which is supposed to "help the Bosnian Government army unite its forces with the allied forces of the Bosnian Croats." The paper relied on the statements of Minister Susak for its report. However, the State Department claims that the delegation will not at all go to Bosnia-Herzegovina, but only to Croatia, and that it has no intention of meddling in the relations between the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] and the Bosnia- Herzegovina Army. Moreover, the members of the delegation are only retired officers, and not Pentagon people, and the State Department adds that everything is based on a private "consultation agreement." They will help the Croatian Army in "training" and "selection of men," the main objective being that kind of "army professionalization the aim of which is to make civilian control over armed forces stronger." None of this has anything to do with "arms and equipment transfer," especially not the future of the lifting of the arms embargo.

THE NEW YORK TIMES, as well as Minister Susak, who turned out to be the main source for the story, were thus slapped on the wrist twice: the clever defense minister has been asked to be diplomatically silent about what he knows for certain, so that he does not provoke international scandals with self-praise, particularly as he is usually wisely quiet about what is the most important for Americans on the "way to democracy", which is the kind of professionalization that will not "create a state within a state" out of the army, or "authority over authority", but instead subject it to firm civilian control. When Americans give something, they will ask for something in return, so that the organization of the Croatian Army finally meets the conditions of the Partnership for Peace.

In sum, both statements are wind for Croatian sails, but Croatia has not been able to avoid diplomatic slaps on the wrist even on these occasions, as even in the relations with friends it will—still—keep certain things secret and blow certain things out of proportion.

Russia's Churkin Interviewed About Z-4 Proposal

AU0411123894 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 27 Oct 94 p 9

[Interview with Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin by Bogoljub Lacmanovic; place and date not given: "Chess Cannot Be Played Without Kings"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Two things prompted us to ask Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Vitaly Churkin go give us an interview. After almost two and a half years, Yeltsin's personal envoy for problems of former Yugoslavia will get a new job: On 11 November in Brussels, he will become Russian ambassador to Belgium and NATO. The second reason is a recent backlash by the Croatian public against the Z-4 mini-group draft proposal for solving the problem of UNPA [United Nations Protected Area] zones in Croatia. We began the interview by asking him about the "hot potato."

What Is Z-4 Really?

[Lacmanovic] Vitaly Ivanovich, the public knows very little about the mini-group called the Z-4. So, I think it would be good if you first told us how it came to be, how it works, and how relevant its proposals and plans are.

[Churkin] The mini-group called the Z-4 was created spontaneously. We can say that the idea was conceived when we were signing the Zagreb Agreement on the cease-fire in Croatia, of 29 March. Afterwards, the Russian ambassador and the ambassador of the United States kept meeting more and more often in Zagreb. They have a very good professional relationship. The deputies of international mediators for former Yugoslavia, Ahrens and Eide, also met with them in Zagreb to discuss the problem of UNPA zones. Their meetings, as well as plans they were drawing up, were exclusively unofficial. They were not approved by the bodies of the Conference for Former Yugoslavia. Anyway, those plans they devised were not at the stage where they could be approved by Russia or by the United States. Those plans are still incomplete and require a lot of work, but the positive thing about the work of the group—and that is what Zagreb should appreciate—is the fact that the appearance of the Z-4 means that the international community is not satisfied with the status quo and that it is trying to find a solution for UNPA zones in Croatia.

[Lacmanovic] Still, the draft proposal of the mini-group appeared in the newspapers and, naturally, provoked a violent backlash and dissatisfaction in Croatia.

[Churkin] Yes, I have heard about that reaction of the Croatian public. However, now that my work on the territory of former Yugoslavia is almost over, I can say that those draft proposals were given to the press by those people who wanted to undermine the efforts of the international community in normalizing the relations between Zagreb and Knin.

[Lacmanovic] Who did that?

[Churkin] It is no secret that some people on the Serb side want to maintain the status quo, and that some people on the Croatian side do not believe in political solutions and have faith only in force of weapons. Solving problems by means of force is a grave mistake and war-mongering could have tragic consequences. I believe that the mini-group should continue working, but it should not reveal or present its plans to the public right away, but segment by segment, so as to give time to both sides to get used to it and avoid violent reactions. Saying that, I bear in mind that we are trying to find solutions for the problem of Croatian UNPA zones in very troubled times bleak with internal political turmoil. The situation is even more delicate because, in order to reach an agreement and accept a solution, both Zagreb and Knin will probably have to make some concessions that they now say they will never agree to making.

Only as Part of Croatian State

[Lacmanovic] Can you be more specific as to what views and concessions that would entail, i.e. your own and the Russian vision of a solution for Croatian UNPA zones?

[Churkin] Russia has recognized Croatia and it is our firm belief that the problem must be solved in the framework of the Croatian state and its internationally recognized borders. I think the solution lies in granting the Serbs a high-degree of political autonomy. It is up to Zagreb and Knin to arrange the details, to give a name to that autonomy.

[Lacmanovic] You actually advocate federalization, but this is absolutely unacceptable to Croatia.

[Churkin] I am aware that this is an extremely delicate matter for Croatia. However, I am convinced—more due to the situation in and outside Croatia, which I will not expound on, and less due to the ways of solving the Serb question. I believe that—looking for a solution to the problem of UNPA zones—we should not fear the term federalization. After all, the word federalization has neither pejorative nor other negative connotations. Many countries with complex multi-national problems resorted to federalization in their solution. Why should people in Croatia not think about federalization as a possible way out of a difficult conflict? The most important thing for Croatia is to preserve territorial integrity. All other proposals of international mediators should be discussed and considered as possible solution variants. For example, until recently, Georgia was refusing the federation option for the sake of integrating Abkhazia. Now Shevardnadze is laying the foundations for federalization with his political parties.

We Will Look for a Lasting Solution

[Lacmanovic] But a federation would enable the Knin Serbs to eventually secede from Croatia.

[Churkin] Zagreb will not agree to that solution unless the international community provides guarantees for the territorial integrity of Croatia. We will look for a final solution, not a transitory solution in the manner: federation now, confederation tomorrow, etc. I repeat, it is most important to preserve the territorial integrity of Croatia and get a firm international guarantee for that.

[Lacmanovic] What do you think will happen next with regard to solving the problem of UNPA zones?

[Churkin] Observers in charge of the problem think that, by insisting on finding political solutions first, Croatia arrested the re-establishment of political ties. In my opinion, it is best to first re-establish economic relations, for their development would gradually pave the way for a political solution. If the matter were dealt with my way, I believe the solution to the problem would be found as early as in a few months. Negotiations, contacts, even minor agreements, are all very important, for they are actually small steps forward.

[Lacmanovic] We heard that you advised President Tudjman and President Izetbegovic to meet with Milosevic again.

[Churkin] Chess cannot be played without two key pieces on the board, without the kings. The same holds true in politics. I think too much time in trying to solve the problems of former Yugoslavia was lost because there have lately been no meetings between President Tudjman and President Milosevic. Let us just remember their meetings of last year and early this year in Geneva and other European cities. Those meetings were not futile, without results, nor did they have a purely propaganda purpose. On the contrary, they always produced results and brought the two sides a step closer to the solution every time.

Gradually Until the Final Goal

[Lacmanovic] Croatian leadership holds that President Tudjman can meet with Milosevic only provided that Belgrade recognizes Croatia in its internationally recognized borders at that meeting.

[Churkin] I do not want to polemicize, but it is debatable whether it is best to set the highest standards right from the start. That is not done in sports, let alone in diplomacy or politics. Given a difficult and complex situation, reaching the heights is a gradual process. Much still needs to be done before a final resolution and solution for the Serb-Croat relations is found; it will take many meetings and agreements before that is achieved. I think it is unrealistic to expect that a meeting between the two presidents always produces "historic results and historic agreements."

[Lacmanovic] You recently visited Belgrade. Where does Milosevic stand today with regard to recognizing Croatia?

[Churkin] I cannot speak on behalf of President Milosevic, however, after many meetings with him, I think he is aware the crisis must be resolved and that it will be solved by the mutual recognition of Belgrade and

Zagreb. Regardless of what people think about Milosevic, most people involved in resolving the crisis agree that he is contributing to the solving of the problem. However, as a careful politician with ample problems regarding the Bosnian Serbs, hence also in Serbia proper, he tends to hold off from recognizing Croatia. Still, I repeat, he knows it will all end in mutual recognition between Croatia, the FRY, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is, however, unrealistic to expect that he would dare recognize Croatia at a time when there is a deadlock in relations between Zagreb and Knin, and now that Croatia insists on a political solution for UNPA zones before re-establishing the said economic relations. Obviously, the problem is tied to the solving of the Serb question in Croatia.

[Lacmanovic] Vitaly Ivanovich, do you not think that Russia has recently openly sided with Milosevic and that this goes against its policy of balanced relations with Belgrade, Zagreb, and Sarajevo?

[Churkin] No, we want to maintain friendly relations with all nations and countries created on the territory of former Yugoslavia and our politics reflects that. Our insistence on lifting sanctions against Belgrade stems from our efforts to respect legality. Sanctions were imposed on Serbia and Montenegro because of Bosnia and, now that Milosevic has broken off relations with the Bosnian Serbs, they should be eased. If Milosevic should continue this positive trend, sanctions should be completely lifted. The steps that Milosevic took against the Bosnian Serbs who defied the peace plan of the contact group, is unprecedented and we think that the Serbian president must be supported and that sanctions should be lifted.

I Still Cannot Talk About New York

[Lacmanovic] The media all around the world, even the Russian newspapers, say that the third peace plan for Bosnia is dead and that the work of the contact group has reached a deadlock, due to a lack of internal unity.

[Churkin] That is not correct. The contact group will meet again, most probably in 10 days, and the results of its extended session held last week in New York have still not been revealed, as they contain delicate moves and set goals for solving the Bosnian knot, and it is not yet time to make them public. The rumors about a deadlock in the contact group are most likely spreading since, at that meeting, the United States said it intended to propose that the Security Council lift the arms embargo against Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Lacmanovic] Can you tell us now what was agreed in New York?

[Churkin] No, I cannot, it is still not time to reveal those plans of the contact group. I can only tell you that we will never relinquish the plan of the contact group for Bosnia and that we exchanged opinions in New York, among other things, also about the ways to solve the problem of Croatian UNPA zones.

[Lacmanovic] Your mandate as personal envoy of President Yeltsin for former Yugoslavia is coming to an end. What do you think is your biggest achievement during the two and a half years of your mandate?

[Churkin] The spring Zagreb Agreement on the cease-fire in Croatia is what I am most proud of. The agreement saved dozens if not hundreds of lives in Croatia, and that is my biggest achievement.

[Lacmanovic] You will be succeeded by Alexandar Zotov, who was until recently Russian ambassador in Damascus.

[Churkin] Yes, but his role will be somewhat modified. Alexandar Zotov will have the status of ambassador with special authorization from President Yeltsin. He will not be deputy foreign minister at the same time, so, unlike myself, he will devote all his time to solving the problems of former Yugoslavia.

[Lacmanovic] Vitaly Ivanovich, you are associated with "glasnost" at the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. After you leave, will your successor continue to meet frequently with the press?

[Churkin] My statements have always been frank and people are wrong in thinking that the statements of anonymous high representatives of the Russian Foreign Ministry were generally mine. All our diplomats, Minister Kozyrev most of all, have contacts with the public and I am convinced that, with regard to the problem of former Yugoslavia, "glasnost" will also be the "policy of my successor."

Tudjman Wants Pact With Krajina Serbs by 21 Nov

LD0411155294 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 4 Nov 94

[Report by Zlatko Kuretic from Karlovac]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] President Tudjman and his aides today talked to the prefect of Karlovac County, Josip Jakovcic, and to four mayors, the top men of Karlovac, Ogulin, Duga Resa, and Slunj, about all the problems pressing the county, which is still 50 percent occupied. The most prominent issues were the problem of 16,500 refugees, the military and security situation, and many questions regarding Karlovac's economy as well as those regarding the economic facilities of Duga Resa and Ogulin, which have been hit hard by the war.

In his talks with representatives of the refugees President Tudjman stressed:

[Begin Tudjman recording] Either the Serbs from the occupied areas will agree to a gradual return of the occupied areas to Croatia's constitutional and legal system... [Tudjman pauses] That is why we raised some demands as a precondition for signing such an agreement, it should be signed by 21 November. Its implementation should start by 20 December.

Well, what is at stake here is opening the highway via Okucani, from Zagreb toward Slavonski Brod, as well as the Zagreb-Split road; opening the rail line; opening the oil pipeline and power lines. Water supply problems should also be solved.

Consequently, either agreements on those issues will be signed or we will cancel our arrangement with the UN Protection Force [UNPROFOR] in the spirit of the conclusions passed by the Assembly and in the spirit of those talks and negotiations we have hitherto been conducting with the international community. [end recording]

[Kuretic] [Passage omitted] President Tudjman said that in the future, the Interior Ministry and the Justice Ministry will simplify the process of issuing citizenship certificates. As far as the eviction of refugees is concerned, President Tudjman said that one should bear in mind the fact that in Croatia there are still about 300,000 refugees and that many of these refugees are living in the apartments of those who abandoned them as they left to join the forces of occupation; i.e. many refugees are living in the apartments of the collaborators of the occupying force.

President Tudjman was informed today by his hosts about the economic problems facing Karlovac and Karlovac County.

Tudjman Receives FRY's Jovanovic in Zagreb

LD0411190094 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 4 Nov 94

[Statement issued by the office of Croatian President Franjo Tudjman]

[FBIS Translated Text] Croatian President Franjo Tudjman has received Vladislav Jovanovic, FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] minister of foreign affairs, at the presidential palace. They discussed Serb-Croat relations in general and ways to resolve the crisis in a peaceful manner, as supported by Croatia. President Tudjman presented Croatian standpoints and Minister Jovanovic said he would convey them to President Milosevic.

President Tudjman said that Croatia has 394,000 refugees who must return to their homes and that he and the government are bound by the parliament's decision on the UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] mandate and the reintegration of the occupied areas. He said that the Croat people can no longer tolerate delays and postponements of solutions. President Tudjman is for negotiations that will bring solutions, but he rejects negotiations without end which do not lead to a resolution of the crisis. He said that Croatia cannot take part in negotiations if they lead to secession or to the Cyprusization of Croatia. Having this in mind, a meeting with President Milosevic is possible only if it would lead to the recognition of Croatia by Serbia and Montenegro within Croatia's internationally recognized borders.

In the half hour of talks President Tudjman spoke about the historic necessity to draw conclusions. Will the group of extremists continue trying to dictate their own views? President Tudjman pointed out that only a minority of Croatian Serbs are living in the occupied regions and that, for instance, Serbs in Zagreb are not encountering any problems. He added that 50 percent of the judges in Karlovac are Serbs, and that Croatia is guaranteeing all civil and ethnic rights to the Serb national minority in line with the highest international standards.

Croatia and its allies in the world are advocating the position that there can be no lifting of the sanctions against the FRY before the reintegration of the occupied regions of Croatia, the Croatian president said. In reply to Minister Jovanovic's question, he added that there is no friction with the Serbs in Zagreb and in the free parts of Croatia.

The talks were also attended by Mate Granic, deputy prime minister and foreign minister; Deputy Foreign Minister Ivo Sanader; Miomir Zuzul, the president's special envoy; Zvonimir Markovic, head of the Croatian office in Belgrade; and Ivic Pasalic, the president's domestic policy adviser.

Minister Jovanovic was accompanied by Veljko Knezevic, head of the FRY office in Zagreb.

Jovanovic: Information 'Useful'

AU0411213294 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 4 Nov 94

[Statement by FRY Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic, "after being received by Croatian President Tudjman," in Zagreb on 4 November—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] We had an opportunity to hear President Tudjman, how he views the normalization of Serbian- Croatian relations, and the [word indistinct] that (?depend on it). We believe that the information that he provided will be useful and will, together with other information, definitely influence further understanding of [word indistinct] and development of [words indistinct] the FRY [words indistinct].

Jovanovic, Granic Talks Reveal 'Considerable Gap'

LD0411142594 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1314 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Zagreb, 4 Nov (TANJUG)—In the course of today's talks in Zagreb between Vladislav Jovanovic and Mate Granic, foreign ministers of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of the Republic of Croatia, both sides raised a number of specific issues that might be solved in future bilateral relations.

As we have learned, there is still a considerable gap between the positions of both sides.

The Croatian side is insisting on a global aproach, while the Yugoslav side maintains that a pragmatic approach of small-big steps is more realistic and that at the moment only this approach can be purposeful.

The Croatian representatives are still sticking firmly to their view that such an approach is not possible and that a combination of pragmatism and global political solutions is a better approach.

Owen and Stoltenberg, cochairmen of the conference on the former Yugoslavia, also took part in the first round of Yugoslav-Croatian talks. They expressed satisfaction with the beginning of the talks and called on both sides to overcome their differences.

The first in a series of talks, to be held alternatively in Zagreb and Belgrade, are also being attended by Veljko Knezevic, head of the Yugoslav office in Zagreb, and by Zvonimir Markovic, head of the Croatian Office in Belgrade.

As we have unofficially learned, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman will receive Vladislav Jovanovic, head of the Yugoslav delegation, after the talks end this afternoon.

Further on Talks

LD0411172194 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] A few minutes ago we received another report from our colleague Tihomir Vinkovic:

[Vinkovic] The second round of talks between Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic and Serbian [as heard] Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic in Villa Prekrizje [Zagreb] has been completed. These talks, as we reported earlier, were initiated by international mediators Owen and Stoltenberg, who had attended the morning round of talks. Following the talks, Minister Granic said:

[Begin Granic recording] We had talks about all the open issues between the two states, overall Croatian-Serbian relations, the situation in the region, some concrete humanitarian issues such as the problem of POWs and those who have gone missing, and the operations of the Yugoslav bureau in Zagreb and the Croatian office in Belgrade.

We believe that the fundamental issue for the Republic of Croatia is the problem of it being recognized within its internationally- recognized borders by Yugoslavia, not because it is a problem of being recognized by yet another state but because it is a problem of the peaceful reintegration of UN protected areas in Croatia's legal system.

We also had talks about the succession issue and how to find the optimum solution, and also numerous other issues that could be examined if we resolve some important points. In that case, proposals put forward by Minister Jovanovic would be completely acceptable regarding culture, sport, transport, communications, etc. The key thing for us is to resolve some fundamentally important issues. We will continue our talks and will endeavor to bring our stands closer. [end recording]

[Vinkovic] Jovanovic said that the two sides still stood at opposing positions.

Granic Comments

LD0611135394 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1339 GMT 6 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Nov. 6 (TANJUG)—Croatian Foreign Minister Mate Granic said the talks with Yugoslav Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic showed the two sides had opposing stands.

Granic told Croatian press Sunday that in the talks in Zagreb Friday the "Yugoslav side urged a concept of (taking) small steps with a view to first establishing civilian traffic, telecommunication links and achieving cultural and sports cooperation. Jovanovic also gave support to the Zagreb-Knin talks."

Granic said that following these small steps Yugoslavia would recognize Croatia, while at the same time Belgrade did not request Croatia recognize Yugoslavia as it believed it was the successor to the former Yugoslavia.

In his view, "Croatia proceeds from the fact that the basis of the whole process of normalization of relations between the two countries and reintegration of UNPAs [UN Protected Areas] into the constitutional order of Croatia is primarily to be found in Yugoslavia recognizing Croatia in its internationally-recognized borders."

"We are not as much concerned with another state recognizing Croatia, but this would be a sign to the Knin Serbs (Republic of Serb Krajina) that the talks would be possible only within the Croatian state," said Granic.

According to him, the solution lay within the framework of the Croatian Constitution and constitutional law on minority rights, but that there could be no discussion about changing the Constitution and returning full national rights of the Serbs to the Croatian Constitution.

The Republic of Serb Krajina was proclaimed by the Serbs in 1991 after Croatia unilaterally seceded from the former Yugoslav federation and removed the national rights of the Serbs from the Croatian Constitution.

Granic also said a meeting between Croatian President Franjo Tudjman and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic should not be expected before Yugoslavia recognized Croatia.

Speaking about his coming meeting in Belgrade with Jovanovic, Granic said the Belgrade meeting could be the "key to reaching a solution, or the last meeting of its kind," because Croatia, as he said, was "no longer prepared to bear stalling."

RSK's Mikelic Assesses Progress of Knin Talks

AU0411210694 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 4 Nov 94

[Statement by Serbian republic of Krajina Prime Minister Borislav Mikelic for Belgrade Television on 4 November: place not given—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] Actually, I think that we have nevertheless made significant progress, primarily that we almost definitely [word indistinct] all issues, I would say. Perhaps only some minor, bilateral issues regarding the accounting system and control functions of [word indistinct] still remain. Therefore, we are very close to (?reaching an agreement). We have made considerable progress regarding the oil pipeline, which the two experts teams, ours and theirs, should examine in Split and Erdut in the meantime, and we are trying to find a solution to the manner of the distribution of oil and, within this framework, establish the status of the republic of Serbian Krajina [RSK] and the oil that would be distributed to our territory within the context of such an agreement.

The third issue that we raised yesterday is, I believe, also advanced enough so that one can reasonably expect that it will be included in the package of agreements, that is, the long-distance transmission lines, actually, a high voltage grid that is also [word indistinct] us in the context of the overall problems of the economic talks.

What seems to generally complicate the situation surrounding the agreement is that the public is not told that the international representatives and the Croatian delegation insist on a preamble that stipulates a departure from the Zagreb Agreement and that also includes all relevant resolutions. According to these resolutions—such as the latest UN resolution, No. 947, which we absolutely reject, and Paragraph 12 of Resolution No. 820 on economic sanctions—goods that would be transported along the highway, if covered by these resolutions, could not pass. Therefore, the same would apply to our relations with the FRY.

On the other hand, the transportation of goods from UN Protected Area [UNPA] Sector East to UNPA Sector West is also questioned and, given the role of humanitarian aid, it is not a major gain for us. The opening of the highway itself is not a major gain for the republic of Serbian Krajina.

Kostovic, Saudi Minister Discuss Refugees

LD0411134694 Riyadh SPA in English 1229 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Zagreb, Nov 4, SPA—Croatian Deputy Premier and the official in charge of refugees Dr. Ivica Kostovic met here yesterday visiting Dr. 'Abdallah al-Turki, the minister of Islamic affairs, endowments, call and guidance, and the accompanying delegation. They reviewed aspects of cooperation between the kingdom and Croatia in issues pertaining to the refugees problems.

In a press statement, Dr. al-Turki expressed happiness for the appreciation spelled out by the Croatan officials for the assistance being extended by the kingdom to the Bosnian refugees through the Higher Commission for Collection of Donations to the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina, headed by Prince Salman Bin-'Abd-al-'Aziz, the governor of Riyadh region.

Asked about the contribution of the newly established Higher Council for Islamic Affairs to the Islamic work, Dr. al-Turki said the council will play an important role in the service of Islam outside the kingdom.

Meanwhile, Dr. al-Turki left Croatia for Slovenia within the framework of his tour of a number of Balkan countries.

He was seen off at the airport by the Croatian Foreign Minister and a number of officials.

Later yesterday Dr. al-Turki arrived in Slovenia where he was welcomed by a number of senior officials.

Article Questions NATO Airspace Needs

AU0611165094 Zagreb GLOBUS in Serbo-Croatian 28 Oct 94 pp 1,2

[Article by Zeljko Rogosic: "Consequences of Catastrophic International Agreement: NATO Has Completely Occupied Croatian Airspace"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Dear passengers, this is your pilot speaking. Welcome to Croatian Airlines' Boeing 737 flight 654 between Zagreb and Split. We have just flown over Karlovac, Rijeka, and Losinj, and are now 7,030 meters above Sali on Dugi Otok. The reason for such an unusually high altitude for this type of aircraft are NATO corridors, which intersect our route. But, this is the situation and there is nothing one can do.... This is what the pilot said on a recent flight, indirectly informing us about the scandalous fact that Croatia's air sovereignty is limited.

Problems with NATO aircraft in Croatian airspace started in 1993, that is, at the beginning of the "forced" implementation of the ban on flights over Bosnia-Herzegovina. On that day, several dozen NATO combat aircraft appeared in the Croatian skies. Croatian air traffic controllers learned of the appearance of western aircraft from the newspapers. Contrary to strict international rules regulating air traffic, radars registered a number of aircraft that failed to identify themselves, provide information on their altitude or flight direction, and establish radio communication.

NATO—These Eight Corridors

This was a logical consequence of the agreement reached by Croatia and NATO allowing the use of Croatian airspace for the enforcement of the flight ban over Bosnia-Herzegovina. The agreement was signed by the Foreign Ministry on behalf of Croatia, and the Netherlands on behalf of NATO. [passage omitted]

After many protests NATO promised that it would not fly below 200 meters, but at about 6,000 meters. So, Croatian aircraft were allowed to freely fly up to 6,000 meters. This solution was extremely unfavorable, since Croatian Airlines' Boeings had to fly at considerably lower altitudes than is economically ideal, which in turn resulted in an increase in fuel bills and the cost of flying per hour. [passage omitted]

Did Croatia have to permit its airspace to be reduced so much that its aircraft fly only at altitudes determined by UNPROFOR [UN Protection Force] and NATO on the basis of their requirements? In addition to one-third of Croatia's territory being occupied by the Serbs—territory in which Croatia, despite UNPROFOR's wholehearted assistance, does not exercise its state sovereignty—the Republic of Croatia also does not enjoy sovereignty over some of its airspace.

Limited Sovereignty

Croatian military aircraft are not allowed to fly their own free skies, while civilian aircraft on domestic flights are forced to acrobatically maneuver through the only remaining corridor connecting Zagreb with Split and Dubrovnik. Therefore, the answer to the key question of whether the Republic of Croatia enjoys full sovereignty over its airspace is negative. [passage omitted]

Without saying anything, AWACS planes are entering and controlling Croatian airspace. On the basis of their reports, NATO aircraft often overfly our planes in our airspace. So, for instance, a Croatian military pilot flying over Imotski was recently ordered to assume a certain altitude and direction. Moreover, a few days ago, without making its presence known to anyone, an AWACS flew over Split as if it were not in the airspace of an independent state. [passage omitted]

All air traffic between Split and Zagreb is conducted through the Split-Sibenik-Sali-Losinj-Rijeka-Zagreb corridor, which has to be adapted to the direction and altitude of NATO corridors that intersect Croatian airspace. A Croatian Airlines plane flying from Split to Zagreb must fly the first 30 miles at an altitude of 12,000 feet (4,000 meters). On the way to Rijeka it must climb up to 24,000 feet (8,000 meters) as its route is intersected by a NATO corridor.

Planes flying from and to Dubrovnik perform the most acrobatics.

Planes taking off at Cilipi (Dubrovnik airport) must quickly reach 31,000 feet (about 10,000 meters), and then, on the way to Zagreb, suddenly climb down several times because of intersecting NATO corridors. [passage omitted]

Restricting civil aviation in the Croatian skies has wreaked enormous damage to the economy and tourism because civil air traffic has been completely subordinated to the needs of UNPROFOR and NATO. And yet, their flights have little to do with real combat actions. [passage omitted]

This situation raises the question of how long Croatia will be granting concessions to the international community without also taking into account its own national interests?

Even though the initial agreement signed by the Foreign Ministry and NATO, after persistent insistence by our experts, was significantly altered for Croatia' benefit, there are still a number of unresolved issues. These are, for instance, the payment of fees for the service provided by Croatian air controllers and the servicing of UN planes, flights over UNPA's [UN Protected Areas], and preventing NATO aircraft loaded with bombs from overflying tourist areas.

Peterle: Letter Bombs Will Not Harm Relations

AU0511205594 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 5 Nov 94 p 10

[Report on interview with former Foreign Minister Lojze Peterle by Heinz Mueller; place and date not given: "Peterle Comments on Letter Bombs: Threats Not Pleasant for Relations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vienna/Ljubljana—Lojze Peterle, Slovene foreign minister until the end of October, who received a letter claiming responsibility for the recent letter bomb, believes that the threats contained in the letter will not harm bilateral relations. "Well, this is the dirty side of politics. One must live with that." Lojze Peterle is not really surprised that he was selected, of all people, as the recipient of a letter in which the "Salzburg Confederation" and the "Bavarian Liberation Army" claimed responsibility for the recent letter bomb series and the pipe bomb attack on the bilingual elementary school in Klagenfurt.

"I believe that the letter was sent by a person who is against the development of good relations between Austria and Slovenia, and against our fight for the rights of the Slovene minority in Carinthia," Peterle stated in an interview with DIE PRESSE. Both the letter claiming responsibility and the letter bombs were posted in Tirol, the Christian-Social parliamentarian stressed.

In fact the threats contained in the letter—including the sentence "Anyone who uses the Slovene language on Austrian territory in the future must expect to be injured or killed"—are not very congenial. However, Peterle does not believe that bilateral relations will deteriorate. Moreover, the letter claiming responsibility was not the first letter of this kind from Austria: "I have received one or two letters warning me: 'We'll show you.'"

Also, Peterle does not believe that the threats against Slovene shopping tourists and business people in southern Carinthia who speak Slovene with each other will harm economic relations: "People continue to go there. However, it is certainly not pleasant to frequently hear or read about threats."

According to Peterle, the Austrian and the Slovene interior ministries are cooperating to clear up the bomb series.

Peterle Says SKD To Leave Government Coalition

AU0411170794 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] At a regular party news conference, Lojze Peterle, president of the Christian Democrats [SKD], said that a series of lies have been used in the attack on him and that he will confront the authors of those lies with all legal means, including by pressing charges.

The SKD president does not doubt that the party will leave the coalition. This will be discussed at the expanded session of the SKD political coordination tomorrow, while the final decision will be passed by the party council. Gojko Brvar reports:

[Begin recording] [Brvar] Lojze Peterle took plenty of time to explain the history of negotiations with three Italian foreign ministers—Colombo, Andreatta, and Martino—during which, as he said, he never agreed to changes to the present agreements with Italy nor subscribed to the theory that Slovenia owed anything to its neighbor. To him, the present events in the Slovene public mean the revival of the old model and old terminology in attacking him and the SKD because of the forthcoming local elections.

The populist vocabulary the Liberal Democracy has started to use, is, according to Peterle, short lived and is not leading into Europe. Peterle believes the sentence uttered publicly by the prime minister that, objectively speaking, nothing more could have been achieved in Aquileia was crucial. Why such an uproar, then? the former foreign minister wonders.

The prime minister announced new negotiations with Italy and the European Union. However, all this is merely alienating us from EU associate membership and slowing the tempo.

In his interventions in foreign policy, which Peterle initially welcomed, the prime minister made at least three crucial mistakes. First, after the negotiations with Croatia, he said on the radio that Croatia had yielded, which is something one simply does not say about a partner in talks. This has halted the negotiations. Second, in the negotiations with Italy, and third, by taking to lighting the process of Slovenia's direct integration into the European Union. Namely, Italy has a decisive word there, which is something Sir Leon Brittan [EU commissioner] also emphasized during his last visit to Slovenia.

Peterle said that the Liberals are constantly creating a belief that the Aquileia Document is a binding agreement for Slovenia. It is merely a statement of intentions. A statement that encourages gestures of goodwill, but is in no way a document that could be understood as binding guidelines for both governments.

Peterle also denied the non-existence of a parliamentary platform for the negotiations with Italy. Namely, the parliament passed it last March. The former foreign minister also said Drnovsek was lying when he said that he was supported by the entire government, as three SKD ministers actually supported Peterle, however, according to Drnovsek's version, they did not vote at all.

What is left now is the departure from the coalition:

[Peterle] The conflict, as I see it, of course exceeded everything that has happened in this coalition, within which we have achieved many things together in the past.

[Brvar] This last straw, therefore, made the SKD reexamine the coalition links once again and decide whether to support its president who is proposing a departure. Peterle believes that this will be the case. [end recording]

LDS Urges SKD To Take Stand on Peterle

AU0411171094 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] The Liberal Democracy of Slovenia [LDS] expects that the Christian Democrats [SKD] will take a position on the behavior and statements made by Lojze Peterle regarding the protection of Slovene national interests. The party believes that the SKD president is not the one who should set the conditions for the party's further participation in the government coalition. This was a view taken by the LDS Executive Committee at its noon session today. Sandi Frelih reports:

[Begin recording] [Frelih] Today, the LDS Executive Committee primarily debated the situation in the government coalition and the relations with Italy. The party's vice president, Igor Bavcar, stated that the party supported the stand of Prime Minister Janez Drnovsek in negotiations with Italy and deemed yielding on the vital issues of national interest unacceptable to the LDS.

[Bavcar] We also ask the party led by Peterle whether it truly supports all of his views. Namely, some views that Peterle is currently espousing abroad are unacceptable to Slovenia in general, and not merely regarding the views of individual political parties. We cannot allow anyone to set conditions for us when vital Slovene interests are at stake, and we intend to insist on this.

[Frelih] The LDS does not approve of Peterle washing his dirty laundry on the pages of foreign newspapers. For that reason, they cannot foresee further cooperation with him unless he changes his views on vital Slovene interests.

[Bavcar] We were even more concerned by the contents of his views, which we rejected at today's session of the Executive Committee. We passed an assessment that was diametric to Peterle's regarding the significance of the Aquileia Document. We adopted the view shared by Drnovsek and other colleagues who debated this issue today, that this was a very serious document.

[Frelih] The subordination of the coalition relations to the interests of day-to-day politics is unacceptable, Bavcar says:

[Bavcar] We would like to resolve the conflict that has emerged in the most principled manner. Henceforth, our rather sharp attitude toward the actions by the SKD president. We truly want to clarify what is happening with our coalition partner, namely, is this is only a game, that is [word indistinct] by the SKD president, or does it represent certain serious contextual changes?

[Frelih] Among the contextual changes discussed are also the SKD's views toward the national liberation struggle [during World War II], that is, the rehabilitation of the Home Guards. [end recording]

Arhar, FRY Bank Governor To Meet in Budapest

AU0411172694 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade media report that Governor of the National Bank of Slovenia France Arhar and Governor of the Yugoslav National Bank Dr. Dragoslav Avramovic will meet in Budapest within the next few days.

The initiative for the meeting was supposedly given by France Arhar. During his visit to the headquarters of the strongest Serbian opposition party—the Serbian Renewal Movement—Avramovic officially confirmed these reports. He added on that occasion that a great interest exists in Slovenia for cooperation with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, which is how Belgrade calls Serbia and Montenegro.

Federal

Jovanovic Assesses Talks in Zagreb With Granic

AU0411200794 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 4 Nov 94

[Report by Dragoslav Kosaric from Zagreb]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Begin recording] [Kosaric] It is certain, even after today's Zagreb round of talks—which in itself represents a step forward in the bilateral relations of the two countries—that fundamental differences in approach to the normalization of relations still remain. After the third afternoon session of talks, Minister Jovanovic assessed today's talks in Zagreb as follows:

[Jovanovic] As you know, we are here to continue the process of normalization that commenced at the beginning of this year and which both sides confirmed a wish and desire to continue. In this sense, we agreed to resume the practice of regular meetings at the foreign ministerial level.

Today, we held an intense exchange of opinions on ways to continue this process, give it a meaning, and accelerate its tempo. We clarified the positions of both sides, which will allow us to proceed more easily in the coming meetings. We will try to identify the points of contact and, with the help of these, to also find a possible framework that would facilitate a safer progress.

At the moment, our positions differ, primarily regarding methodology, but also contents. We favor a pragmatic resolution, that is, that simpler issues be resolved first. In this way, we would create the conditions for the subsequent resolution of the issues that are more difficult and complex. In this sense, we came up with numerous ideas and suggestions that the Croatian side did not find controversial, however, suggestions that, at the moment, the Croatian side believes that there is no need to discuss concretely before the departing stances have been clarified and a sort of common denominator found.

The Croatian side will probably explain its position better than I could. I would only like to say that Croatia believes that our relations could developed better and the process of normalization run smoother if we approached all problems in a general manner, within which all issues that both sides put forward as issues for resolution would find a place.

Independent of this, we also went through a whole spectrum of issues of bilateral importance that face us as the countries and the sides, as well as our citizens. We agreed on some concrete measures, primarily in the humanitarian sphere and regarding missing persons, and we concluded that a joint commission should meet soon, together with the president of the International Red Cross, to thoroughly examine all demands, according to a procedure that the International Red Cross envisages for such situations.

We also agreed to tackle concretely the resolution of the issue of pensions from the pension funds of both countries. The Croatian side will soon inform us in writing of the ways in which it has resolved this in its own country and how it believes this should be resolved at the bilateral level. Therefore, the talks on this will continue.

We also concluded that we should examine and improve the conditions of work of the bureaus in both countries. We also discussed some other concrete issues on which we agreed that we should continue bilateral dialogue. These primarily involve the issue of succession within the Group for Succession. We expect that our experts will hold a bilateral meeting on this subject at the first opportunity, when the group meets in Geneva.

Today, we took the opportunity to examine the situation in the region, which is of interest to both countries, and we concluded that this exchange of views was useful and that a further continuation of our talks will allow us, in this sense, to reach even more interesting conclusions. [passage omitted]

[Kosaric] It was agreed that the next meeting of foreign ministers should be held in Belgrade next week. The date will be established soon.

Views Relations With Croatia

AU0511160394 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 5 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] At the negotiations in Zagreb yesterday, Federal Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic, outside the protocol set by the hosts, agreed to hold a brief news conference at the request of some journalists. They wanted our foreign minister to give them further details on the Yugoslav position in the negotiations. Let us recall that the Yugoslav delegation at the negotiations in Zagreb proposed the resumption of flights between Zagreb and Belgrade, the restoration of telephone links, and cooperation in culture and sports. One of the journalist's questions was whether it was possible to achieve all this without full diplomatic relations. Foreign Minister Vladislav Jovanovic said:

[Begin Jovanovic recording] This would not be the first time in recent experience that two countries without full diplomatic relations establish sports and other links. Such cases have occurred in the past. Let us recall the spectacular ping-pong diplomacy between China and the United States some 20 years ago. Therefore, the more difficult and more complex issues can be solved quicker and easier if they are approached from the easier and simpler side.

We therefore take the view that sports, culture, and trade could play a very important role of some kind of ambassador, as these activities can clear the way for full relations between the countries in question. [end recording]

U.S. 'Military Involvement' in Bosnia Assessed

AU0511171894 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 5 Nov 94

[Commentary by Todor Mirkovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] The United States is continuing its direct or indirect military involvement in the clashes in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina. Indirect involvement is reflected through the UN Security Council and NATO, while direct involvement is reflected in the participation of aircraft and other activities. Here is a military-political commentary by Todor Mirkovic on the extent and form of this involvement:

[Mirkovic] In accordance with the principles expressed in its new strategy of war doctrine, the United States is avoiding sending troops into the Bosnia-Herzegovina maelstrom, either in the role of peacemaker or any other role. Nevertheless, the United States is militarily very much involved in this maelstrom.

The United States' military involvement in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina assumes diverse forms. These are: control of the air space and participation in actions from the air against the targets of the army of the Srpska republic; helping procure military equipment for the Muslim-Croat Federation forces, mainly through secret channels; the infiltration of groups for special purposes in different national and international organizations for the purpose of processing intelligence on military battlefields, and so forth.

The United States' [words indistinct] activities in connection with this recently have been noticed in particular. These are: the initiative launched in the UN Security Council to lift the arms embargo for the forces of the regime in Sarajevo; open support for the offensive undertaken by the Muslim forces together with the Croatian Defense Council forces and the regular Army of the Republic of Croatia in some sectors; and the announced visit to Sarajevo of a consultative high-ranking military delegation.

All these and other activities indicate that the United States has possibly opted for a long-term and more direct military cooperation with the regime in Sarajevo. This assumption is especially confirmed by the announced visit of the aforementioned military consultative team, led by none other than retired General John Galvin, former NATO commander for Europe.

General Galvin's team, consisting of some 15 military experts and auxiliary staff should, as has been pointed out officially, bring about with its expertise and authority the unification of the Muslim and the Croatian Defense Council forces into a unified Muslim-Croat federation military organization. However, the team's trip to Sarajevo, which was announced at about the same time as the launching of the aforementioned Security Council initiative, and with the appearance of U.S. training teams in some Muslim army units, could easily turn into some kind of military assistance unit, of the kind the United States has in some 60 countries worldwide.

Such units have a very important role and many tasks, such as: work on improving military relations and cooperation, overseeing military aid deliveries, supervising training groups, and so forth.

The U.S. policy on the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina, if the current trends and announcements continue, could have very serious consequences, not only for further developments in this part of the world, but also for international relations in general.

Government Condemns Escalation of 'Civil War'

LD0511170794 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1531 GMT 5 Nov 94

[Quotation marks are as received]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 5 Nov (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Government today most vehemently condemned the escalation of the civil war in former Bosnia-Herzegovina and expressed its deep concern over the open support lent by some foreign countries, including "a country member of the Contact Group," to the violation of the cease-fire.

A statement by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs reads:

"The federal government has examined the latest worrying developments in former Bosnia-Herzegovina. It reiterates its firm conviction that the Contact Group plan and the continuation of the peace process are the only rational and just way to end the crisis and find a fair and permanent settlement.

"Proceeding from such a conviction, the federal government most vehemently condemns the escalation of the civil war, which results from intentional and crude violation of the cease-fire agreement by the Muslim, and, of late, also by the Croat forces. It also believes that the continuous efforts being made by certain countries to lift the arms embargo against the Muslim side are contradictory to the efforts being made to strengthen the peace process, and that they encourage the Muslim side to violate the cease-fire without fear of possible consequences.

"The federal government expresses its great concern because some countries, including, unfortunately, one member of the Contact Group, openly support the violation of the cease-fire. Assessing such a violation as a conscious blow to peace and an unconcealed attempt to torpedo the negotiating process and impose a military option, the federal government appeals to all sides in the civil war to immediately and unconditionally halt all military activities and strictly observe the cease-fire agreement. The government also appeals to other countries not to offer any direct or indirect support to those sides in the civil war which are responsible for the violation of the cease-fire, and to oppose the escalation of war and embrace the peace process."

DSS: Krajina Plan 'Totally Unacceptable'

AU0511175394 Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 4 Nov 94 p 2

[Article by S.Z.: "Plan for Krajina Is Unacceptable"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—Vojislav Kostunica, president of the Democratic Party of Serbia [DSS], stated at a news conference yesterday that the proposed plan by the mini contact group for Krajina is "totally unacceptable." He takes the view that the "fiction about symbols (flag, currency, passports), at a time when Yugoslavia does not exist and the Serbian people are fighting for self-determination, is stuff and nonsense."

According to Kostunica, the FRY [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia] foreign minister is going to the negotiations in Croatia with a "controversial, problematic, and dangerous stand: The Croatian side should reexamine its earlier decision and bring Serbs back into the Croatian constitution as people with the right to form a state." What does that mean?—Kostunica mused and said: "This empty phrase conceals concessions that the regime in Belgrade is prepared to make, above all the recognition of Croatia within its AVNOJ [Antifascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia] borders." The regime would later say, Kostunica continued, that this was all it was able to accomplish, and that it would be better for the Krajina Serbs to live in Croatia than in their own state.

The DSS president compared the success of the Muslim offensive from the direction of Bihac to the blockade on the Drina, saying that this could not have been a coincidence. Kostunica said that history would show what happened, and that it was obvious that the Muslim forces were waiting for the embargo to start taking hold.

He indirectly supported Karadzic's statement on the formation of court martials for those spreading defeatism: "In conditions of war, one must look out for squalls. One must be careful. Karadzic probably has a reason to be careful. We are witnesses to the destabilization of the Srpska republic and the RSK [republic of Serbian Krajina] by the regime in Belgrade. Unfortunately, and history will show that, some members of this nation will find their names on the list of those from the fifth column," said the DSS president.

Serbia

Radical Party Calls For End to Blockade of Serbs

LD0411152794 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1319 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Nov. 4 (TANJUG)—Serbia's opposition Radical Party has called on President Slobodan Milosevic to open the border with the Srpska republic and aid it militarily and in all other ways.

"If the president of Serbia does not take urgent measures to improve the position of the Serbs west of the Drina River, the Serbian Radical Party will be compelled to take direct action to put an end to the horrendous blockade and the wall toward the Srpska republic," a Radical Party statement issued Thursday said.

The Yugoslav Government on August 4 closed the border with the Srpska republic and severed all political and economic ties with it.

The move followed the Bosnian Serb National Assembly's decision to refer the international "Contact Group" plan for the territorial division of Bosnia-Herzegovina to a referendum. The Bosnian Serbs said no to plan in the referendum held in late August.

The Radical Party issued the statement after reports that the Bosnian Serb town of Kupres, 150 km west of Sarajevo, had been captured by Croatia's regular army troops and Bosnian Croat forces.

The radicals accused Milosevic of bearing the greatest responsibility for the military situation in the Srpska republic.

The town of Kupres and the Kupres plateau have great strategic importance for northern and northwestern Bosnia. The region has been held by the Bosnian Serbs since late April 1992.

The joint offensive of regular Croatian army troops and Bosnian Croat forces was launched about 15 days ago simultaneously with a Muslim offensive launched from the U.N.-protected "safe area" of Bihac in northwestern Bosnia.

Poll Shows Majority Opposed to Kosovo Autonomy

AU0611170194

[FBIS Editorial Report] Belgrade TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian on 2 November on pages 10 and 11 carries an approximately 400-word report on the results of a TELEGRAF's opinion poll on "ethnic tensions" in Kosovo. The report is entitled "Dialogue Is Necessary, No Autonomy for Kosmet as It Is 'Serbian Land,'" and does not provide the date of the poll.

According to the report, the "sample includes 200 randomly selected citizens of Serbia. Because the poll was conducted over the telephone, the sample includes mainly urban population. For the same reason the poll includes a smaller number of people with lower education (people with only primary school or some kind of work qualification) than are actually part of the population.

"Only Serbs were polled in Kosovo as Albanians refused to take part in a poll carried out by a Belgrade paper. The greatest number of citizens who refused to take part in our poll were in Vojvodina and Kosovo (on average, only every fourth person in these two provinces agreed to be polled)."

The results of the poll are presented in four pie charts and expressed in percentages as follows:

Is a dialogue between Albanians and Serbs necessary for the problems in Kosovo-Metohija to be resolved?	
Yes, dialogue is necessary	83.9
No, one should not talk to Albanians	14.4
Other answers	1.7

Do you approve of (possible) new rallies by Kosovo Serbs ("March on Belgrade")?	
Yes	50.6
No	21.1
Do not know	28.3

Should Kosovo be given autonomy within Serbia?	
No, this is Serbian land	83.3
Yes, cultural autonomy	13.9
Other answers	2.8

Should Kosovo be divided between Serbia and Albania?	
No	91.1
Yes	7.8
Do not know	1.1

Kosovo

LDK's Agani Views Albanian Constitution

AU0411205994 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1635 GMT 4 Nov 94

[FBIS Translated Text] At its regular news conference, the Democratic League of Kosova [LDK] confirmed the conviction that the approval of Albania's new constitution will be a strong support for unity, which will further consolidate Albania politically, democratize its internal affairs, and expand its international incorporation in order to ensure Albania's progress and that of the Albanian community in general. For more details on the LDK's news conference, Skender Durmishi is on the line:

[Durmishi] Being important for all Albanians, we hope that Albania's draft constitution, which is a political and judicial document of the Albanian state, comprising indubitable democratic orientations, will find broad approval on 6 November, in order to become a strong support for unity and to further consolidate Albania in a political and democratic way, thus ensuring its more active participation into the international scene and the prosperity of Albania and the Albanian community in general, LDK Deputy Chairman Dr. Fehmi Agani stressed at today's news conference.

At the conference, Agani commented on, and highly assessed President Rugova's meeting with the cochairmen of the Geneva Conference, Owen and Stoltenberg. Mr. Agani said that the meeting confirmed our stance that the solution to the Kosova issue can be realized only on the basis of a referendum and independence with modalities that cannot infringe the essence of this solution.

Just like the meeting of President Rugova with German diplomats at the United Nations, this meeting, too, voiced support for the policy of resolving problems peacefully, examined possibilities for dialogue, and reconfirmed a permanent interest of the international community in Kosova and in finding a solution to the issue.

The Geneva meeting was important as it denied the claims of official Serbia that present Kosova as its internal affair, Dr. Agani stressed. Concluding this chapter, Agani said that the meeting, apart from citing possibilities for dialogue, called for an increased presence of the international community so as to accelerate the solution to the Kosova issue.

Agani also assessed the elections in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia]. About 20 elected deputies are not enough for a worthy representation of the political parties and the Albanian community in the new parliament, he said. This, nevertheless, is not a defeat for the Albanians. This can be called a defeat for the narrow and deformed party outlooks and their uncontrolled rivalry. Anyway, although elections were held under extremely unfavorable conditions for Albanians, Albanians testified to the prestige and importance of the Albanian factor for life and stability in Macedonia.

Agani also noted that the assistance of the Coordinating Council of Political Parties was not enough, but the framework of the Council's cooperation is currently inadequate and new forms of cooperation should, perhaps, be sought, by respecting the new realities that have been created in the meantime.

Dr. Agani also briefed reporters on the intensive continuation of the police repression and raids against Albanians. Protesting all these cases, in the LDK's name, Agani reiterated the assertion that repression is the main form of Serbia's presence in Kosova.

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